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4Abstract
This thesis studies asset pricing from three different angles. Firstly, it reveals that there 
is a possibility that economic shocks could damage asset pricing model performance, 
taking the recent 2007/2008 financial crisis and a number of recent asset pricing models 
as examples. Although there has been research suggesting the potential impacts of “bad” 
and “good” economic conditions on stock performance and forecasting power of 
economic models, this possibility remains an undiscussed idea. This is perhaps due to a 
range of methodological obstacles in testing the link. The thesis, therefore, proposes a 
new approach to overcome the issues and finds that financial shocks indeed have 
impacts and need to be adjusted for when assessing performance of asset pricing models. 
Secondly, in search for potential risk exposure associated with family ownership in 
pricing assets in stock markets, an examination in Turkey, a family business country, 
shows that family firms are not necessarily riskier that non-family firms. Instead, such 
ownership characteristics are associated with the sensitivity of some other risk factors. 
We find that within firms with low growth prospects and/or small firms, family firms 
outperform non-family firms and as firms grow in size and market-to-book value, non-
family firms appear to perform better. Also, liquidity ratio, firm age and current stock 
prices are also among those factors which can explain the return differentials between 
family and non-family firms. Thirdly, privatisation with involvement of family 
ownership does have positive impacts on firm performance and stock return in the long-
run but has negative impacts on short-term investors. An investigation on a recent 
privatisation deal of Tupras, the largest refineries firm in Turkey, shows that unless 
shareholders’ investment horizon is in line with the owner family, they would not 
benefit from the firm long-term investment projects and could even suffer from low 
dividends.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1. Objectives
The main objective of this thesis is to examine asset pricing models from the stock 
market view and to show how they are affected by shifts in the overall economic 
condition such as the recent financial crisis, or differences in ownership structure and 
major ownership transfers at the firm level. These ideas will be explored in the context 
of Turkey, an emerging market that has been restructuring itself rapidly during the last 
two decades. The advantage of considering this market is that it allows testing the main 
hypotheses of the thesis. The country has a stock market that is developed enough for a 
formal analysis through asset pricing models. Also, since it imposes no restrictions on 
foreign investment or large ownership, Turkey provides a relatively free platform for 
investors to access and express their views in the stock market. Thus, analysing stock 
expected returns would reflect fairly the market views and their evaluation about firm 
value.
Chapter 2 addresses the question of whether asset pricing models are affected by shocks 
such as the recent 2007/2008 financial crisis, and if so, how to take their effects into 
account when examining model performance. The Fama and French (1993) three-factor 
model and a number of commonly used risk-based models are selected as sample-cases 
to test our hypotheses. There are four main hypotheses that the chapter aims to examine. 
The first hypothesis suggests that Turkey suffered little impact from the recent financial 
crisis and therefore it is a suitable sample for assessing the performance of asset pricing 
models. Secondly, we examine whether stocks of firms with low growth prospects 
outperform those with high growth prospects: in other words, whether there is a value 
anomaly in the Turkish stock market. Thirdly, we verify the presence of size effects, 
which refer to an abnormal return generated by investing on stocks of small firms than 
those of big firms. Last but not least, the chapter aims to answer its key question of 
whether or not financial shocks have any impacts, and thus if they need to be accounted 
for when assessing the performance of asset pricing models.
In chapter 3, the main objective is to test whether in a weak legal protection system like 
Turkey, outside investors and the market would view stocks of family firms as a riskier 
asset and if so, what are the underlying reasons behind this divergence. Unlike previous 
studies, the chapter intends to seek for the answer on a broader scale, from the largest to 
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the smallest enterprises and from direct to indirect ownership, since both were 
documented to be crucial in family ownership analysis. It also tests for the possible 
links between family ownership and other firm characteristics to explain expected stock 
returns.
Chapter 4 looks at privatisation, a special type of ownership change, by adopting a case 
study approach. It studies the case of Tupras privatisation, one of the most significant 
deals in the 2000s in Turkey. Specifically, the process involved a family firm - Koc 
Holding - and the chapter is interested in understanding whether such involvement 
would cause any issues for the existing shareholders. By extending its analysis to fifteen 
years of privatisation, it aims to test the following propositions:
(i) Privatisation has positive impacts on firm operating performance;
(ii) Privatisation has positive impacts on firm stock performance;
(iii) Privatisation by direct sale is more profitable than by share issue;
(iv) Family owners pursue a dividend policy which is biased in favour of 
their own interests after privatisation.
1.2. Scope and Methodology
This thesis covers discussions on theories and on some recent methods of security 
pricing, in which risk-based asset pricing models are the focus. It particularly seeks for 
potential risk components in economic condition changes and firm ownership structure 
that could explain the movement of asset prices in stock markets. The Istanbul Stock 
Exchange (ISE) is selected as a testing sample in the thesis for its demonstrative ability 
as the market was little affected by the recent financial crisis. It is also mature enough to 
offer a rich and accessible dataset for a substantial analysis.
Chapter 2 consists of two parts. The first section involves cointegration tests in order to 
verify that the Turkish market suffered little impact from the recent financial crisis. 
Accordingly, a wide range of tests are performed, including conventional methods such 
as Engle-Granger, Johansen and an augmented test with one added structural break. The 
second part of the chapter studies asset pricing models and possible consequences of the 
financial crisis on their performance. The Fama and French three factor model and some 
alternative models are selected to be the testing objects. Additionally, out of many risk 
factors discussed in the literature, the chapter selects some of most commonly used 
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variables for experiment purposes. This does not aim to be exhaustive but to provide a 
comprehensive analysis hoping to improve some commonly-used measures and pricing 
methods. The chapter also employs Vector AutoRegression (VAR) to check the 
robustness of the results.
In terms of data, chapter 2 obtains information from the DataStream Thomson Reuters 
database. For the first part, global indices used in cointegration tests are collected from 
1988 (the first trading date of the youngest index, the ISE National 100) up to 2010. The 
rest of the chapter covers from July 1989, when there are a sufficient number of firms in 
the sample, until December 2010. For the first time, the chapter takes account of de-
listed firms when they existed in order to eliminate potential survivorship bias. Like 
most previous studies in asset pricing models, it only includes non-financial firms in the 
analysis since the meaning of some measurements in asset pricing models, such as 
book-to-market equity, is different for financial institutions. 
In contrast, Chapter 3 sees no reasons to exclude financial firms when analysing family 
owned firms versus non-family firms. Thus, all firms in the ISE All-share are 
considered. It is however not possible to include de-listed firms due to data 
unavailability. Therefore, it is conceivable that the results might suffer from 
survivorship bias but we argue that the bias is likely to be immaterial. While most data 
can be obtained from DataStream, chapter 3 also accesses Bloomberg database to 
collect ownership data and ISE official website as well as individual firm websites for 
cross checking. The analysis covers 210 months, starting from July 1993 when more 
than a single family firm was listed. 
Chapter 3 computes multivariate regressions on a wide range of risk-based factors that 
are either commonly used in the asset pricing literature or documented to be associated 
with family ownership, such as firm age and current prices. For diagnostic tests, the 
analysis controls for the main econometric issues that normally concern firm ownership 
studies, such as endogeneity, heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in residuals to 
ensure the robustness of its findings.
Following up on the role of firm ownership, Chapter 4 analyses the privatisation case of 
Tupras, the biggest refineries firm in Turkey, from the firm Initial Public Offering (IPO) 
in 1991 to the end of 2010. Using case study techniques, we analyse the firm operating 
performance and its stock returns before and after each one of the stages of the 
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privatisation process. The study also tests both long-term and short-term impacts of the 
ownership transfer on the firm following different privatisation methods. In addition, 
the firm’s accounting performance and stock returns in the long run are considered in 
relation to the market and to the firm’s domestic rivals. Several commonly used return 
measurements, for instance the compounded rate of return, are considered and the 
results are also adjusted for the movement of the market and industry index. 
Additionally, concerns over the benefits of existing shareholders under the new owner 
family management are analysed from a dividend and an investment perspective.
1.3. Contributions
The thesis contributes to the existing literature from methodological and empirical 
aspects. 
Firstly, chapter 2 proposes a new approach to assess the possible impacts of economic 
shocks, taking the recent financial crisis as an example, on asset pricing models. Some 
commonly used models are observed on U.S market where the impact from the crisis 
was high. We then examine a number of markets, including the emerging market groups, 
using cointegration tests to find that Turkey was little affected by the financial shock. 
Thus, it appears to be a suitable best candidate for cross-referencing the results in the 
U.S. A range of experiments are also carried out by controlling for other relevant risk 
factors, such as past returns, to eliminate the potential bias caused by omitting necessary 
explanatory factors. The results show that shocks such as the recent financial crisis can 
make a substantial impact on a model and therefore should be controlled for when 
assessing model performance.
In addition, chapter 2 contributes to resolving the inconsistent results which were partly 
due to a short testing horizon of the previous studies in Turkey. It finds that there are
value and size anomalies in the ISE but that they are statistically insignificant. This 
suggests a form of market efficiency in Turkey in the long run. In other words, investors 
seem to correctly value financial assets in a timely manner.
Chapter 3 enhances the limited findings on family ownership and stock performance in 
a number of ways. Firstly, there have not been any comprehensive works on the Turkish 
market where family businesses have historically seen dominant. In addition, unlike in 
advanced economies, most family businesses in emerging countries including Turkey 
have their unique way to structure their firms. For example, owner families in Turkey 
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control firms without clearly revealing a high concentration in ownership by using 
complex business groups. As studies in firm ownership tend to obtain only direct 
ownership, their controlling power over the firms may be overlooked. Because of this 
possibility, the chapter includes not only direct ownership but also indirect ownership in 
the analysis. This allows the analysis to capture fully the ultimate control of family 
owners for the first time. 
Secondly, previous studies on concentrated ownership tend to pay attention to large 
family firms only, while this chapter also covers small and medium size businesses 
which are how most family firms started. It is plausible to believe that exclusion of such 
firms could lead to a positive bias for family firms. This is because, in practice, many 
new businesses do not survive in the first five years of starting up and among the 
survivors, not all could carry on and grow to reach the top group. Hence, those firms 
which could achieve that level while still retaining family control are usually 
exceptionally strong ones. This could explain why many studies found a better 
performance for family firms in comparison to non-family firms. Also, examining firms 
regardless of size will allow performance of firms at all stages of their business life to 
be assessed.
More importantly, the chapter hopes to contribute to the existing literature on family 
firms from the stock market point of view. As mentioned in the previous sections, most 
studies focus on the impact of block shareholders on firm performance from an 
accounting standpoint. Among those studying family ownership, few have analysed its 
impact on stock performance. As family firms are documented to improve firm 
performance but may exploit minority shareholders’ interests, outside investors should 
consider these factors in their investment decisions. If they are indeed concerned about 
potential tunneling and exploitation caused by family firm owners, they should expect 
to receive higher returns on stocks of family firms for bearing higher risks. 
The results in Turkey show that although the market may not favour family firms in 
relation to non-family firms, the former do exhibit a fundamentally different behaviour 
from their non-family counterparts. More specifically, ownership could interact with 
some other firm characteristics, such as High-minus-Low (HML) and Small-minus-Big 
(SMB). Within firms with low growth prospects and/or small firms, family firms 
outperform non-family firms and as firms grow in size and market to book-value, non-
family firms tend to perform better. Additionally, the empirical results also confirm the 
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findings from other countries that liquidity ratio, firm age and current stock prices could 
largely explain the return differentials between the two groups.
In chapter 4, family ownership is studied from a different setup. It takes a closer look at 
possible impacts of owner families on firm performance and minority shareholder 
interests in a privatised firm. The chapter contributes to the literature on privatisation 
and family ownership with regard to the following aspects. First of all, it explores a 
privatisation experience in the oil and gas sector which has been left un-discussed for 
many years. As recent privatisations are usually designed on a case-by-case basis, the 
chapter employs case studies techniques in studying Tupras, one of the largest 
privatisation deals in the Turkish refineries industry. Secondly, this case study allows us 
to compare and contrast the performance of different privatisation methods while still 
addressing methodological issues in large scale analysis, such as lack of data or variance 
in market conditions. Finally, perhaps for the first time family involvement is taken into 
consideration in privatisation research. Results in chapter 4 show that privatisation 
indeed has positive impacts on firm performance and stock returns in the long run. 
However, the involvement of the Koc family in Tupras seems to have negative impacts 
on shareholders with a short investment horizon.
1.4. Thesis Outline
The thesis consists of three essays on asset pricing models when there is a shift in 
economic conditions, asset pricing in family businesses or a shift in corporate 
ownership involved by a family firm, taking Turkey as a testing sample. The first 
empirical essay (Chapter 2) examines value anomaly and the performance of the Fama 
and French (1993) model as well as a number of alternative models over financial crises, 
such as the recent 2007/2008 credit crunch. Using various cointegration methods, it 
shows that Turkey is a suitable object to test the model validity without suffering 
various methodological issues and potential biases that traditional methods might face. 
Chapter 2 begins by briefly introducing the existing literature on value anomaly and 
arguments on its underlying explanations in asset pricing models. The tests on 
cointegration are derived from the chapter’s main argument that the criticism against the 
Fama and French model might have been subject to a number of methodological issues. 
For example, two alternative asset pricing models proposed by Petkova (2006) and by 
Hahn and Lee (2006) have not accounted for the 2000/2001 economic downturn in their 
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sample period. Thus, the chapter argues that perhaps this is one explanation for a 
slightly better performance of their models over the Fama and French model. Also, the 
chapter notices a multicollinearity problem in both studies. Although this problem does 
not invalidate the model as such, it could limit the ability of the studies to draw a 
precise conclusion on the explanatory power of each independent variable. After 
correcting these potential biases, chapter 2 carries out a comprehensive assessment with 
a range of experiments aiming to enhance the models. The chapter ends with robustness 
checks and concluding remarks.
Still from an asset pricing model viewpoint, chapter 3 tests if family ownership is riskier 
and if this factor helps explain stock expected returns. First of all, the chapter 
summarises typical ownership characteristics associated with a civil-law legal regime in 
Turkish firms. Some of them present high concentration, a complex structure and 
insider voting right. The second section briefly reviews the literature on potential costs 
and benefits of family ownership and its impacts on firm stock performance. Empirical 
analysis starts by introducing the data, control variables and valuation methodology. For 
this purpose, a dummy variable, DFamily, is interacted with both constant and explanatory 
variables although only the significant factors are reported in the final results. 
Following discussion of the empirical findings, chapter 3 performs robustness checks on 
the final results. It adjusts for a wide range of possible econometric issues that could 
arise in a family ownership analysis, namely endogeneity, heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation of residuals, as well as the effects of Turkish economic reform in 2001. The 
chapter concludes with further research suggestions.
Chapter 4 is particularly interested in a privatisation case of Tupras. It starts by 
reviewing a vast literature in privatisation and pointing out some potential areas where 
the chapter can contribute to the field. The chapter then briefly describes the 
privatisation scheme in Turkey, the Tupras background and its privatisation process. 
This is followed by the data and methodology section focusing on identifying the main 
propositions that will be tested in the chapter. The first part of the empirical analysis 
focuses around the share issuing privatisation method that was chosen to sell the first 49%
shares of Tupras in several stages. The method Tupras chose to privatise the remaining 
51% shares was via direct sales. An in-depth analysis of each method and their impact 
is presented separately. The study analyses both short-term and long-term impacts of 
each privatisation stage on the firm accounting performance and on its stock returns. 
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From these experiences, the chapter could reveal some useful lessons for a successful 
privatisation deal. Finally, taking a closer look at the role of family ownership, the 
chapter finds evidence that the involvement of family ownership could be potentially 
more beneficial to those who have a similar investment horizon as the owner family 
while other shareholders may be negatively affected.
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CHAPTER 2: THE VALUE ANOMALY
2.1. Introduction
Value stocks have been shown to earn superior returns than growth stocks1. In other 
words, the stocks with low market value in relation to their fundamental values should 
have been preferred to the high market value stocks. This return differential is called the 
value premium. For decades, the investment strategy of buying (or taking a long 
position in) value stocks and selling (or taking a short position in) growth stocks, a so 
called value strategy, has shown a great success around the world. However, both 
academia and practitioners have raised doubts about the abnormal returns gained by this 
investing strategy for several reasons. First of all, it seems illogical to pursue stocks that 
recently performed poorly instead of the well performing ones and expect to receive 
higher returns. Even if one believes in the positive relation between risk and return, it is 
not necessarily true that bearing extra risks will guarantee a premium to compensate for 
the risk. Secondly, if low market price stocks are considered to be cheap, or being 
undervalued, once the success of this simple strategy is known, its return premium 
should be wiped out. A large amount of research, however, has found this is not the case. 
Last but not least, since the strategy was first discussed, none of the conventional 
theories including the well-known Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) by Sharpe 
(1964) and Lintner (1965) could explain these abnormal returns. It is therefore called a 
value anomaly in stock markets.
More importantly, it is irrational that such return premium should still exist in a rational 
and fast-learning world. Is this because of the impatience and lack of courage to stand
against the crowd or are there more logical reasons behind the success of value strategy?
On one hand, some authors, such as Delong, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990)
argue that noise trading could explain deviations of stock valuation from their 
fundamentals. On the other hand, others argue that financial modelling should capture 
value anomaly.
Those questions have motivated both scholars and investors to investigate possible 
answers. That has created an extensive discussion on the sources of value premium,
                                                            
1
Value stocks refer to firms with high ratios of book-to-market value (B/M), earnings-to-price (E/P), cash flow-to-
price (C/P), or dividend yield (DY). Stocks, of which the above fundamental values are small, are characteristically 
called as growth stocks.
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among which the Fama and French (1993) three factor risk-based model seems to attract 
most attention. Despite its achievements, since the three factors are not ad hoc, a wide 
range of for and against arguments have been raised. While many recent studies 
question the validity of the Fama and French model, none has considered shocks
occurring during their sample periods.
It is widely documented in financial econometrics that structural breaks can cause 
considerable forecasting errors and can damage the reliability of econometric models.
For many years, researchers focused on improving asset pricing models and while crises 
have been found to have considerable impacts on risk bearing levels, they have not yet 
been fully accounted for in the models. The recent financial crisis in 2007/2008, for 
example, has caused major macroeconomic changes across the world and is not yet over.
It is worth mentioning that the nearest recession was back in 2001/2003, and that many
opponents of Fama and French’s model have not made adjustment for it. Failure to take 
into account structural breaks could bias the results and lead to erroneous conclusions 
on the validity of an asset pricing model.
This chapter addresses value anomaly and the issue of assessing asset pricing model 
performance after carefully taking into account the effects of structural breaks such as
the recent financial crisis.
A test covering the period up to December 2010 will therefore aim to eliminate such 
bias while providing a fair environment for model performance evaluation. One may 
argue that the traditional event studies techniques, which were designed to capture the 
effects of an event occurring during the testing time by splitting the sample into sub-
samples, are appropriate to this purpose. However, there are a number of reasons why 
these techniques and some other traditional methods using factor loadings to capture 
event and seasonal effects cannot be fully satisfactory. Firstly, unlike company’s 
announcements, it may be difficult to establish the exact starting date of a crisis. Crises 
or shocks are normally a series of events that tend to cause “domino effects” in the 
global economy with no clear-cut beginning and ending dates. Without a specific 
starting date, event studies are unable to form a proxy capturing the possible effects of 
an event. Moreover, the methods of splitting samples or building proxies require 
sufficient observations to carry out an efficient estimation. However, since the recent 
financial crisis occurred only a few years ago, it is hard to expect the test on extreme 
unbalanced sub-samples would be unbiased.
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This chapter contributes to the literature of asset pricing by proposing a new method of
assessing asset pricing model performance which controls for the potential bias caused 
by shocks, such as the recent 2007/2008 financial crisis. More specifically, it suggests 
using independence tests to identify a market that suffered little effects from the crisis,
where the model performance can be fairly assessed. The concerns over methodological 
issues related to estimation and testing in the context of structural breaks will therefore 
be adequately addressed. The tests find that Turkey appears to be a suitable object.
Examining value anomaly and asset pricing models in the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) 
can also reach a second goal. Because of the inconsistency among previous studies in 
the ISE, this thesis would make a contribution by filling the gap in the Turkish market 
anomaly literature with a more appropriate analysis. 
The results in this chapter help establish the signs of value and size premia. Additionally, 
the failure of momentum strategy indirectly supports the success of value strategy. The 
return differentials appear to be statistically insignificant. They also have a tendency to 
increase over market downturn periods, providing additional evidence supporting the
risk-based theory.
Tests on a market that has been little affected by the recent financial crisis show that the 
simple but efficient Fama and French three-factor model remains relevant in spite of
criticism. Some experimental improvement can be made, for example by controlling for 
more risk factors, but the difference is immaterial. The results are robust and relatively 
free from bias.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the existing 
literature in value anomaly and the underlying reasons for such value abnormal returns.
Section 2.3 proposes a new approach for testing model performance through
independence tests. Data and methodology are described in section 2.4. Section 2.5 
summarises the main findings while the final section concludes the chapter, discusses its 
implication, and recommends possible areas for further research.
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2.2. Literature review
This section aims to introduce value anomaly and to review the most discussed sources 
of return differentials of value versus growth portfolios. The performance of value 
strategy has generated a great deal of academic and practitioner discussion for decades. 
Although the majority of research documents the success of value strategy, recent 
studies are more interested in understanding why such simple investing strategy still 
works, especially after it has become well-known. Perhaps most controversial is the 
underlying reasons of the abnormal returns from investing on recently poor performers 
rather than their growing counterparts. Among these, data bias, behavioural theory, risk-
based explanations and firms’ characteristics have been documented to play an 
important role. This section starts by reviewing the main results and debates on the 
presence of value anomaly, and is followed by a discussion on the above four 
explanations.
2.2.1. Value premium
Pioneering work on what was later known as value investing by Graham and Dodd 
(1934, reprinted in 1940, 2009) suggests that growing firms are not likely to keep up 
their high performance over time and that weak firms might also enhance their poor 
performance. They argue that the strategies of buying stocks that have low dividends, 
market prices relative to book value or to earnings, or other measures of value will 
outperform the market in several following years. In other words, value-oriented 
investors should gain significant value premium from pursuing firms with low 
fundamental ratios instead of trying to well-diversify their portfolios. 
For many years, analysts and researchers were concerned that this unusual strategy 
would not last long and that value stocks might exhibit long-term poor performance, 
especially once the strategies had become well known (Asness, Friedman, Krail and 
Liew 2000, and Chan and Lakonishok 2004). They believed that the abnormal returns 
may be arbitraged away after investors had learnt about them via published research and 
adjusted their portfolios accordingly. This tendency, which is also known as the 
learning effects towards market efficiency, has been observed in other investment 
strategies, such as the disappearance of small-firm effect in the late 1980s.
Moreover, some authors argue that value anomaly is simply the result of collective data-
snooping bias, which will be discussed further in the next section. Chan and Lakonishok 
(2004), however, point out that if these were true, the value premium should not appear 
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in other markets or other periods. A large amount of subsequent studies on the success 
of value strategies around the world has shown that it is not the case.
Furthermore, some empirical evidence shows that value premium does not hold under 
certain restrictions. For instance, research exclusively on large-cap or small-cap stocks 
provide an unclear view. A study by Houge and Loughran (2006) on the large-cap S&P 
500 and Russell 3000 indices finds no significant value premium. They, however, admit 
that the book-to-market effect is strongest among smaller stocks. Fama and French 
(1993, 2006) confirm this is the case in the US market while the opposite is true in 
Japan (Daniel, Titman and Wei 2001) and in Australia (Gaunt 2004). Another example 
is a research in Singapore, where short-selling is restricted. In that study, Yen, Sun and 
Yan (2004) document that, although in general value stocks outperform growth stocks 
over the period from 1975 to 1997, the value premium is only prominent in the first two 
years after portfolio formation date and disappears in the subsequent years.
Despite considerable criticism, academia and practitioners have produced mounting
evidence of the success of value strategy across times and markets. To begin with, this
section will review the main findings on value anomaly in developed markets. The most 
commonly discussed studies are Fama and French (1992, 1996) and Lakonishok, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1994) that confirm existence of value anomaly in US stocks.
Strong value premium is also seen in Japan (Chan, Hamao and Lakonishok 1991) in 
France (Arisoy 2010) and Europe (Bird and Whitaker 2003). Capaul, Rowley and 
Sharpe (1993) document persistent value abnormal returns in a range of major stock 
markets over the world.
A comprehensive study by Fama and French (1998) on a broad sample of markets, 
covering 13 developed countries and 16 emerging countries, using a variety of 
indicators, B/M, E/P, C/P and DY has been the central of literature. They found that the 
value premium exists in 12 out of 13 developed markets, with the exception of Italy. In 
other words, value stocks outperform growth stocks. In emerging markets, the premium 
is found for 12 out of 16 countries (except Argentina, Colombia, Mexico and Pakistan). 
Their recent study in 2012 updates and confirms the results on a broader scale for 23 
markets across four continents2.
                                                            
2 The study looks at North America, Europe, Japan and Asia Pacific. Turkey is however left out.
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In addition to a large number of studies on the behaviours of these investment styles in 
well-developed markets, research in smaller and less developed markets is growing in 
number. Generally, this value anomaly appears to be unpredictable in these markets. A
study by Chen and Zhang (1998) shows that the difference in market growth rate could 
lead to variation in behaviour of value strategies. They show stronger effects of value 
investing in the US, less in Japan, Hong Kong and Malaysia3, and undetectable in 
countries with high growth rate, such as Thailand and Taiwan.
Despite the growing roles of Turkish stock markets at both the regional and global level, 
this candidate for the European Union membership has only attracted little attention.
While Akdenniz, Altay-Salih and Aydogan (2000) and Aksu and Onder (2003) 
document the success of value strategy over five to seven years up to 1998, Gonenc and 
Karan (2003) argue that there was no value premium from 1993 to 1998. Inclusion of
financial firms in Gonenc and Karan’s (2003) sample may be responsible for the 
dissimilarity in results between these studies over a similar sample period. Moreover, a 
five-to-seven year sample horizon is rather short for value strategy test. Fama and 
French (1992) document that over at least five years since B/M is measured, firms tend 
to maintain their performance. Therefore, the validity of those studies on Turkey during 
such a short sample period is questionable. This chapter aims to examine the 
performance of value versus growth strategies in the ISE with a wider testing horizon.
More comprehensive research on the ISE could additionally benefit both domestic and 
foreign investors. Existing studies found low linkage to other markets (Wong, Penm, 
Terrell and Lim 2004 and Hassan, Haque and Lawrence 2006). This is also shown in 
this thesis through the absence of cointegration. Turkey is a fast growing and sound
investment environment. Overall its characteristics make it a diversification opportunity
for investors. According to Quach (1998) and Swedroe (2006), these diversification 
opportunities can reduce potential risk and volatility without having to sacrifice return. 
Beyond the B/M, subsequent studies experiment other indicators and their combination 
for testing value strategy: the most discussed variables are E/P, C/P and DY. For 
example, Fama and French (1992), Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994), Rosenberg, 
Reid and Lanstein (1985), Teo and Woo (2004), and Chan and Lakonishok (2004) 
analyse price to earnings and price to book value ratios, whereas Chan et al. (1991), and 
                                                            
3 More recently, Arshanapalli, Coggin and Doukas (1998) and Drew and Veeraraghavan (2002) also confirm the 
success of value strategy in Malaysia.
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Capaul et al. (1993) base their study on price to cash flow ratio while Fama and French 
(1998) use all four indicators. Besides, Chan, Lakonishok and Sougiannis (2001) 
included intangible assets in book value of common equity while Piotroski (2000) used 
a range of financial ratios to classify value stocks. The results of these studies suggest 
that using various indicators and approaches may allow investors to achieve a higher 
level of accuracy. Although the evidence on B/M indicator ability is relatively 
uncontroversial, results from other indicators are far less consistent.
While the majority of the research has agreed on the success of the value strategy, 
regardless of the indicators and methods used, fewer underlying reasons are actually 
accepted about the abnormal return.
The CAPM of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) has set a milestone in financial 
economics history, and early evidence tends to support the theory's central view that the 
market portfolio should remain mean-variance efficient (Black, Jensen, and Scholes 1972,
Fama and MacBeth 1973). This means the market risk beta is the key factor determining
the average returns of stocks.
However, there has been an ongoing debate on the validity of the CAPM. Besides 
requiring a series of strict assumptions, CAPM is considered to fail in many cases due to 
poor proxies of stock indexes and other market measurement (Roll 1977). This is known 
as the Roll’s critique. Subsequently, increasing evidence has showed that the CAPM is 
inconsistent with many empirical common findings of cross-sectional asset pricing data 
(Fama and French 1993, Shefrin and Statman 1994, Campbell 1996). Perhaps one of the 
most disappointing results is that the CAPM has failed to explain the cross section of 
average returns on assets sorted by size and book-to-market equity ratios (Fama and 
French 1992, 1993).
The CAPM inability to explain this abnormal movement of average returns is known as
market anomalies. The next sections will discuss the four most common explanations for 
one of these anomalies, the value premium.
2.2.2. Data snooping and selection bias
The argument of data-snooping bias was initially raised by Lo and MacKinlay (1990), and 
later by Berk (1998) and Conrad, Cooper and Kaul (2003) to name but a few. They argue 
that inappropriate methods of data mining, which are called data snooping, in testing
financial asset pricing model arise from test statistics that tends to narrow the probability 
of rejecting a certain hypothesis. More specifically, because of the linkage between 
characteristics and asset prices, tests based on returns of portfolios sorted by size or B/M 
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instead of individual stock returns can cause misleading inferences. A recent study on 
single securities by Avramov and Chordia (2006), however, confirms the findings of 
portfolio-based studies.
In some opinions (Black 1993, MacKinlay 1995), the higher return of high B/M stocks 
compared to low B/M stocks occurs for the United States and is unlikely to be observed 
out of sample. However, other studies such as Chan, Hamao, and Lakonishok (1991), 
Capaul et al. (1993), and Fama and French (1998) show further out-of- sample evidence
on the value premium in markets outside the US.
In addition, another explanation to value investing by Kothari, Shanken and Sloan (1995) 
is the bias relating to data-selection methodologies. They claim the value anomaly is 
simply a result of selection bias occurring in a typical data source such as Compustat. 
They argue that there are at least two related potential sources of selection bias. Firstly, 
when adding a firm to its data file in the early years prior to 1978, Compustat often “back-
fills” historical data back to 1946, while firms added in 1978 include data going back to 
1973. This is claimed to cause data bias. Consider the high B/M firms that were not in the 
Compustat tapes in 1978. These value firms are likely to be distressed firms. If the firms
perform poorly in the previous five years with for example negative stock returns and 
relatively low market values, they might not be added in Compustat database in 1978. 
This is because they had been delisting or failed to meet the minimum requirements on 
asset value or market values of Compustat. On the other hand, if the firms unexpectedly 
overcome their financial distress and performed well in the previous five years, they 
would be added to the database with data filled back to 1973. The analysis based on 
current data in Compustat, therefore, tends to favour the high B/M that subsequently 
performed well. This seems to give an erroneous impression that the high ex post returns 
and high B/M ratio imply a positive relation between expected returns and B/M.
Secondly, since Compustat includes only data of surviving firms, firms that went 
bankrupt due to financial distress were dropped. Those recovering from financial 
distress might update the retroactive reports for non-reporting period. Many firms that 
have data on Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) are being omitted on 
Compustat. This selection procedure might unintentionally favour high B/M firms.
Among many others, a careful study by Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1995), 
however, provides a thorough study that documents it is unlikely for such bias to be 
able to explain the difference in performance between value and growth stocks. They 
form a sample that is free from any selection bias and reveal that the bias in Compustat 
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is relatively insignificant. In addition, Barber and Lyon (1997) confirm that neither 
data-snooping nor selection bias explains the pattern of size and B/M in stock returns,
not only in non-financial firms but also in financial firms.
2.2.3. Behavioural Finance
Supporters of behavioural asset pricing believe that asset prices reflect investors’ beliefs
on future cash flows and risks which are driven mainly by their sentiment rather than 
prospective profits of the assets. Hence, investors’ overreaction is the reason behind the 
value premium.
According to Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994), investors have a tendency to 
consistently overvalue growth stocks as well as to undervalue value stocks. They prefer 
growth stocks, because their recent high growth rate may appear to be an indicator of
future performance, and out-of-favour sentiment may be placed toward value stocks. As a 
consequence, the purchase of growth and sale of value stocks could result in value stocks 
being undervalued (Drew and Veeraraghavan 2002). This is the fundamental explanation
of "contrarian strategies", which aim to create benefits from potential outperformance of 
value portfolios in the long run by investing against the prevailing trend. Discussion on 
the on-going debate over these strategies is vast but beyond the scope of this thesis. From
a brief view of contrarian strategies, a study by Antoniou, Galariotis and Spyrou (2005) 
provides supporting evidence of market overreaction, which is believed to lead to the 
profitability of contrarian strategies across markets.
Following psychology theory, Lakonishok et al. (1994) believe that favouritism toward 
growth stocks may be caused by a possible conflict of interest between shareholders and 
fund managers. Even when the benefits of value strategies can be seen, there are several 
reasons why fund managers would like to pursuit growth strategies. Firstly, recent good 
performance is a promising ground for money managers to recommend stocks. Secondly, 
growth stocks are generally those of well-known companies or growing sectors, making 
the managers’ published reports more impressive (Bhushan 1989, Jegadeesh, Kim, 
Krische and Lee 2004). Furthermore, since value strategies are widely documented to be 
profitable in the long run, fund managers with a short term appointment may find this 
unattractive and will have to explain the poor performance of the value strategies with the 
owners (Lakonishok et al.1994). Overall, behavioural finance economists argue that the 
conflict of interest or agency problems is the value premium’s possible explanation 
(DeBondt and Thatler 1985, Lakonishok et al. 1994, Haugen and Baker 1996, Daniel and 
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Titman 1997, and Chan and Lakonishok 2004). This has raised a growing concern 
regarding the market efficiency.
In contrast, Yen et al. (2004) show that in Singaporean stock market, the overreaction is 
present in one direction only. This is investors overvalue growth stocks but find no 
evidence to support the undervaluation of value stocks. The lack of short selling in 
Singapore is believed to be the root of these results. Additionally, Rozeff and Zaman 
(1998) demonstrate through a detailed analysis of insider investors’ behaviour that they 
do not normally overreact due to their advantage of information while outside traders do. 
Moreover, Doukas, Kim and Pantzalis (2002) find that growth stocks are not overvalued
over value stocks and hence the abnormal returns on value strategies might not be 
explained by the overreaction theory. Clare and Thomas (1995) even point out that the 
overreaction observed in the UK is indeed size effects. In short, the psychological
reasoning of neoclassical finance on value anomaly is far from certain.
2.2.4.Risk-based explanations
Supporting the market efficiency theory, Fama and French (1993, 1996) argue that 
value premium is indeed not an anomaly at all. The higher average returns on high B/M 
stocks are compensation for bearing risks in a multifactor version of Intertemporal 
Capital Asset Pricing Model by Merton's (1973) (ICAPM) or Ross's (1976) arbitrage 
pricing theory (APT). In other words, the value abnormal returns are driven by 
fundamental risks. Although the positive relation between returns and B/M is beyond 
the explanatory ability of the market portfolio return, B/M is indeed a common factor in 
explaining returns. Fama and French (1995) find that there are book-to-market effects in 
fundamental values such as earnings and sales in returns. It is therefore natural to ask if
the inclusion of B/M factor in a multifactor risk-based model can explain differences in 
average returns. Fama and French (1993, 1996) propose a three factor model that uses 
the market portfolio and mimicking portfolios as common factors associated with size 
(i.e. market value) and B/M to capture asset returns. Although these two factors have no 
theoretical reason to support their explanatory abilities, the three factor model is able to 
capture most of the average returns on the US. Expanding the study, Fama and French 
(1998) confirm that their multifactor model also seems to describe average returns on 
portfolios formed on scaled price variables in international markets.
Independent studies have also confirmed the explanatory power of the three factors on 
value premium in both developed and developing countries comparing to the 
conventional CAPM. For example, Chan et al. (1991) prove the success of the model in 
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Japan while Chen and Zhang (1998) perform a similar experiment in US, Japan, Hong 
Kong, Malaysia, Thailand and Taiwan. Moreover, from a firm-level perspective, 
Avramov and Chordia (2006) found that most of the model improvement is captured by
Fama and French three factors and that adding two commonly-used variables, winner-
minus-loser and liquidity, does not improve the model. Interestingly, their experiment 
with both conditional and unconditional versions of CAPM does not capture any of the 
size, B/M, liquidity and winner-minus-loser (also known as momentum) effects, even 
after allowing the beta(s) to vary with size, B/M, default spread or all the three.
While supporting the risk-based theory, a number of subsequent studies have been 
searching for additional factor loadings that mean to capture common risks in cross-
sectional expected stock returns which have not been priced by the CAPM or Fama and 
French model. For example, Carhart (1997) augments the three factor model with 
momentum factor and find that the four-factor model outperforms the high-skilled and 
well informed manager theory in explaining expected returns of mutual funds. More 
recently, Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) propose liquidity risk as an important factor that 
accounts for significant return differentials even in the presence of Fama and French 
three factors and winner-minus-loser factor whilst Arisoy (2010) emphasize the 
importance of volatility risk. The following sections of this thesis, therefore, will also 
take momentum and liquidity variables into account in order to verify their potential 
power in improving Fama and French three-factor model.
Furthermore, some argue that Fama and French three factors are poor proxies for risk 
element in value premium. A case in point is a recent study by Petkova (2006) who 
claims to have formed a better model than Fama and French’s model and that Fama and 
French factors lost their powers in explaining returns. Petkova argues that a desirable 
cross-sectional asset pricing model is one whose variables proxy changes in investment 
opportunities. In the paper, Petkova included four more factors: the short-term T-bill, 
aggregate dividend yield, term spread, and default spread factors. These variables are 
believed to have a power of predicting future investment opportunities. However, the 
latter two elemental factors are used in existing literature (Fama and French 1992) as 
proxies for factor changes in bond markets. Though Fama and French document the 
possibility to mirror those factors in stock markets’ modelling, this thesis believes that 
the effects of the changes in bond investments on stock returns should not dominate the 
effects of the stocks’ “internal” factors. Another example is a study by Hahn and Lee 
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(2006), in which they propose an alternative set of variables, changes in default spread 
(∆DEF) and changes in term spread (∆TERM), and size and value premium are 
compensation for bearing higher risks associated with ∆DEF and ∆TERM. These 
studies however, involve some econometric drawbacks that will be discussed further in 
section 2.4.2.B later in this chapter.
In contrast to the growing support, Fama and French’s findings have also faced a great 
deal of criticism. Notable opponents are Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) who document 
that a return premium of high over low past return stocks is neither due to overreaction 
nor to risk theories, but rather to short-term delay in price reaction to firm 
announcements. From a macroeconomic point of view, Campbell (1996) and 
Jagannathan and Wang (1996) believe that labour income growth is an important factor 
in capturing cross-sectional aspect of security returns. 
2.2.5. Firm characteristics
In contrast to the risk-based models, a competing explanation for the returns on value 
stocks draws on value-characteristics (Daniel and Titman 1997). They argue that prior
studies cannot differentiate the risk pattern from the characteristics pattern in average 
stock returns. Since the high versus low book-to-market characteristics are associated 
with covariation in security returns, when the market experiences periods of distress and 
growth, the value and growth characteristics rather than risks are responsible for the 
returns differentials. Indeed, firms share common variation because they have similar 
characteristics and expect to be distressed at the same time. Therefore, when portfolios 
are formed to capture a risk factor related to relative distress, it appears that the value 
premium is related to the covariance of returns with a common distress risk, when in 
fact it is due to the distress and growth characteristics. Thus, it is hard to distinguish the 
risk pattern from the characteristics pattern in multifactor models that are based on 
analysing common factors. In order to distinguish the risk model from the 
characteristics model, the only empirical solution left is identifying variation in risk 
loadings that are not related to B/M. They find that cross section returns cannot be 
explained by the three factors after controlling for firms’ characteristics.
In summary, the characteristics hypothesis believes that firm relative distress induces
differences in stock returns, and B/M characteristic is a proxy for relative distress. 
Accordingly, low B/M firms which are typically characterised as growth firms tend to
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yield low stock returns, regardless of risk loadings. In the same way, high B/M or 
distressed firms produce high returns.
However, Davis, Fama and French (2000) argue that the failure of the three factor risk-
based model and in favour of the characteristics model in Daniel and Titman (1997)’s 
study is subject to the short sample period (20.5 years). Testing on a much longer 
sample period (68 years), they successfully defend the three factor model against B/M 
characteristics theory. In particular, when examining the three factor regression for July 
1929 to June 1997, the intercept in is economically and statistically close to zero while 
if they exclude the 20.5-year period examined by Daniel and Titman (1997), the 
intercept for the rest of the 68-year sample period could clearly distinguish from zero as 
being predicted by the risk model. Therefore, the short sample period in Daniel and 
Titman (1997) explains their favouritism for the characteristics model.
Among a large number of studies supporting the risk theory, most attention was paid to
seeking sufficient proxies for risk loadings. Yet, the impacts of external shocks or 
market downturns, which naturally link to the level of risk taking, are also vital. The
recent on-going credit crunch in 2007/2008, which has been causing great damages for 
the global economy with too short a post-event horizon to validate conventional 
approaches, naturally leads to the need of a different methodology. The next section
reviews recent studies on performance of value strategy and risk-based asset pricing 
models under different states of economy (i.e. good, normal and bad times). This 
chapter then aims to answer the questions of whether the shock did affect them and if so, 
how to assess their performance without bias.
2.2.6.Value premium from business cycle perspective
An earlier study discovering the link between business cycles and stock expected 
returns is tracked back to Fama and French (1989). They suggest that expected returns 
follow an opposite direction to the economic conditions. When the market is down, 
income is low, expected returns on both stocks and bonds must be high enough to 
encourage people to invest rather than consume and vice versa.
Testing in every possible states of economy, Abhyankar, Ho, Yu and Zhao (2008) finds 
strong evidence of value premium, regardless of investor preferences, and even risk-
averse investors would prefer value to growth stocks. However, a closer look reveals 
that the success of value investing is only significant during economic booms, while 
neither of these strategies performs better than the other during recessions. Examining 
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the interactions between risk and “economic primitives” (p.67), such as tastes and 
technology, at the firm level, Zhang (2005) argues that growth firms are riskier during 
good times, whereas value firms are riskier during bad times when the price of risk is 
high. Supporting this view, Arisoy (2010) confirms that value stocks among CAC40 
index (France) become riskier at bad times and less risky at good times compared to
those in the normal situation. The opposite is true for growth stocks.
Lakonishok et al. (1994) defend traditional measures of standard deviation and market 
beta, saying dwelling into the examination of extremely bad times provides refuge for 
those looking for proofs that high return strategies are riskier. Studies in extreme states 
have a tendency to distort the value premium. 
In order not to fall into that tendency, this study explains value premium using a
different approach. The test will be performed in a market that has little effect by bad 
states, and thus could act as a benchmark for the others. The method allows our analysis 
to examine the whole time frame of the market without being concerned by 
methodological obstacles mentioned earlier when taking the effects of extreme 
economic conditions, such as the 2007/2008 credit crunch, into account. Hence, the test 
of model performance will be more accurate and widely applied.
The aims of this chapter are to examine the validity of Fama-French model, and also to 
check if crises affect the explanatory power of the model. The approach presented in the 
present research will allow us to test the model performance in both crisis and normal 
economic conditions.
Recent criticism on the Fama and French (1993) three factor model includes Petkova 
(2006) and Hahn and Lee (2006) who offer models with different factor loadings. They
document that the Fama and French three factor model fails and that its success is 
merely because the three factors are parts of their models’ predictive innovations. In 
other words, the factors in Petkova’s, and Hahn and Lee’s models have stronger 
predictive abilities and in the presence of these innovations, the Fama and French
factors are superfluous. The driving motivation behind their works is to come up with 
an arguably better model. One problem of their arguments is that they have not taken 
into account events occurred, such as crises and shocks, during the sample periods. It is 
worth mentioning that Fama and French’s (1993) opponents expanded the test to 2001, 
which coincided with a stock market downturn. Looking at Figure 2.1, we can see a 
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clear drop starting in 2000 due to a collapse of the Dot-com bubble and since then the 
US market has never reached the point before the shock. A question raised is what if the 
original model still works and is widely used across markets but economic booms or 
recessions have undermined its explanatory power.
One possible reason behind the Petkova (2006) and Hahn and Lee (2006) results is that
the Fama and French model through which anomalies were well explained, fails doing 
so after a crisis happens. The problem is one tends to use the same model for different 
sample periods and markets regardless of events happening within it. Doing so could 
reduce the explanatory effectiveness of this type of models. This thesis hopes to identify 
these cases, or at least proposes a method that has potential to do so. 
In terms of methodology, the thesis proposes using co-integration tests in conjunction 
with testing model strength. First, it is widely known that co-integration tests can detect 
long-run equilibrium relationship between two or more variables. The tests therefore 
can be used to check if one market has significant linkage with other markets in the long 
term. A group of four leading markets across continents are selected including US, UK, 
Germany and Japan. They are not only widely used in co-integration tests but also share 
similar characteristics that well served the purpose of this thesis, since they are 
significantly influenced by the recent 2007/2008 financial crisis. The present research
scanned through many markets, including the emerging market groups, in order to find 
Turkey as the best candidate that shows insignificant co-integration with these four
markets. The data are ideally suited to the comparison of the effects of a financial shock 
because the ISE stocks are little affected by it.
An existing problem is how to know if a model starts failing after a shock. One method 
is to analyse it before the shock, observe and use it again after this shock and note down 
the difference in effect. A problem with this method is that it could be that the model 
used to work well and for some external reason it performs poorly, and therefore 
although the model was adequate, we are unable to test its own strength.
An alternative method - which this chapter has just introduced earlier - is testing on a 
market less affected by the shock using independence tests. This will isolate the shock-
affecting possibility leaving us able to compare the effectiveness of a model on two (or 
more) testing samples. The advantage of this approach (method 2) is that we have the 
same time period of long enough observations for both tests. This is significant because 
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say for the 2008 shock, there are not enough observations following the event up to now 
to carry unbiased examination. A second advantage is that unlike firms’ announcements, 
a crisis is not a break point, but rather a lasting period, one without a single date of 
representation; using method 2 we can avoid splitting the sample and arrive to a more 
accurate approach than the splitting sample. 
Despite the advantages of method 2, at the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the 
first application of this approach to assess a models’ adequacy. The selected market first 
should have insignificant link to main global indices which are heavily affected by the 
2008 crisis, and the market must also be mature enough to carry out the test for a better 
asset pricing model. The first step could be done via cointegration check and then the 
tests of model performance are relatively free from significant external effects caused 
by the shock. Section 2.3 will demonstrate the process in detail.
2.2.7. Conclusion
For decades value premium has attracted a great deal of attention among academics and 
practitioners. Although it has become widely accepted that in the long run value stocks 
outperform growth stocks, their performance in markets outside the U.S is rather 
diverse. Though developed markets tend to confirm the success of value strategy, there 
are still some exceptions, such as the case of Italy. In emerging markets, while the 
behaviour of value strategy is unpredictable, perhaps due to their rapid market growth 
and high market volatility, they may also present higher profitability opportunities for 
value oriented investors. The higher return of value over growth stocks however has not 
been fully explained by the conventional CAPM, and the strategy therefore remains as 
an anomaly in stock markets.
Interestingly, there is no evidence that abnormal returns disappear after the strategy has 
become well known. Hence, arguments over underlying reasons behind the success of 
value strategy appear to be more debatable among researchers. The most discussed 
theories are data snooping and selection bias, behavioural finance, risk-based theory, 
and firm characteristics. Among them, the risk-based explanation seems to inspire a 
wider range of studies seeking to develop the argument, and result in many augmented 
versions of the initial risk-based model.
Recently, the question of whether or not value stocks are fundamentally riskier than 
their growth counterparts is found to have some linkage with economic conditions. 
More specifically, holding growth stocks may be riskier during economic booms while 
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value firms seem to be riskier especially when shocks or financial crises like the 
2007/2008 credit crunch come along. It is therefore crucial to take into account the 
possible impacts of these shocks on the performance of investment strategies.
This chapter proposes a new approach which aims to consider the recent financial crisis 
without suffering the methodological issues encountered when one uses conventional 
methods.
2.3. Independence tests
By independence test, the present research refers to a linear test for long-term 
independence. There are at least three reasons for looking at the test from this particular 
angle. First, the asset pricing models studied in this chapter are in a linear form. 
Secondly, the chapter is concerned with testing the models’ ability to predict expected 
returns in the long run rather than arbitrage opportunities. Also, the effects of business 
cycles are likely to persist over the long term. Thus, this chapter employs cointegration 
analysis to test for the orthogonality independence between selected markets in the long
run.
To begin with, it considers the possibility that financial crises could cause an 
unexpected shift or a structural break in the data.
2.3.1 Financial crises and structural breaks
This section does not intend to summarise the enormous literature on endogenous 
breaks and financial crises. It rather pays attention to their effects on financial modelling 
and how to control for such effects in the asset pricing context. To start with, the section 
will briefly discuss possible effects of economic shocks on financial modelling.
The globalisation of financial transactions has created a tighter relationship between
financial markets across the world. It is undoubted that the dynamic interactions bring
advantages for both domestic and international investments, they however have a 
potential downside. They are claimed to make economic shocks, such as financial crises,
spread wider, quicker cross borders. The most recent crisis is an example of how 
problems in one country can damage others. The 2007/2008 credit crunch started in the 
U.S and quickly became a global financial crisis with victims among the leading 
countries that have strong linkages to the U.S market.
It is widely accepted that financial crises tend to cause structural breaks, when the 
market mechanism breaks down (Pesaran and Timmermann 2002). They are also likely 
to have serial impacts on firm specific as well as on macroeconomic variables, and it is 
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hard to adjust for all of the effects in financial modelling. Among others, Bai (1997) 
points out those structural breaks are particularly common and need to be considered in 
time series data over long horizons. In addition, there is mounting empirical evidence in 
financial econometrics that structural breaks can cause considerable forecasting errors 
and damage the reliability of econometric models (see Bai 1997, and Neely and Weller 
2000 for discussion). Thus, failure to take into account crises, such as the recent 
2007/2008 credit crunch, in assessing model performance in long run could lead to 
erroneous conclusions on the validity of asset pricing models.
There are a number of ways to identify breaks in parameters in regressions, such as 
Chow (1960), Andrew (1993) or Bai-Perron (1998, 2003) techniques. Once break(s) are 
found, it is however hard to account for effects of “recent” break points where few 
number of observations are available. This chapter proposes a new method to this 
problem in model evaluation context. The idea is to identify a market that has little 
effects from the shocks but which is also mature enough to carry out model performance 
assessments.
Visually, Figure 2.2 shows that the stock markets in UK, U.S, Japan and Germany 
appear to share similar movements over the 2008 crisis while the Turkish national index 
does not. It is however important to check this first with proper econometrics 
procedures.
2.3.2 National Index data
The analysis concentrates on the world’s four largest stock exchanges: New York 
(Standard and Poor’s 500 Composite – S&P), Frankfurt (DAX 30 Performance- DAX), 
London (FTSE 100 Price Index – FTSE100) and Japan (Nikkei Stock Average Price 
Index 225 – Nikkei) in relation to Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE National 100 Price 
Index – ISE). Monthly closing data for all five indices are obtained from DataStream 
database over the period beginning in January 1988 and ending in December 2010.
When the stock exchanges were closed due to holidays or unexpected events, the index 
level was assumed to stay the same as that for the previous trading day.
The four major national stock markets experienced a dramatic fall over the 2007/2008 
credit crunch, the largest drop in modern history of the global stock market. In order to 
account for the effects of the recent financial crisis on these markets, the selection of the
starting date of the crisis is crucial but controversial. Many choose the date Lehman 
Brothers bank was filed for bankruptcy on September 15th, 2008 as a starting point for a 
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series of subsequent collapse of major banks and difficult time for financial system in 
US and other major markets over the world. To assure that Turkey is not being 
influenced by the other markets which are known to be the heart of the financial crisis, 
the next section will perform a cointegration test that was designed specially for this 
purpose and also use September 2008 as a crisis date, TB. Once a market impervious to
the 2008 financial crisis is found, the model performance can be fairly accessed without 
the need of including crisis effects or structural break(s). Section 2.6 earlier details the 
advantages of this approach compared to the conventional approach utilizing event 
studies theory.
2.3.3. Market selection
2.3.3.A. Unit-root test
A.1. Unit-root theories
In order to determine the cointegration between two market indices, it is necessary to 
first carry out the unit root test of whether each series is integrated of order one, I(1).
A.1.1. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP)
The conventional Augmented Dickey-Fuller (1981) and Phillips and Perron (1988) 
regressions are used respectively when one thinks of testing for the stationarity or the 
presence of a unit in a series. 
The ADF test which examines whether yt is I(0) can be written as:
∆yt = a0 + a1 yt-1 + ∑௣௜=1 (ai ∆yt-i) + ut                                                                             (2.1)
where p is large enough to make ut white noise. The series can also be subject to PP test:
yt = b0 + b1 yt-1 + υt                                                                                                                                                                   (2.2)
where υt is serially correlated.
A.1.2. Allowing multiple breaks
Although our interest remains to uncover the impact of crises on stock indices, it is 
important to rule out the likelihood that any unit-root found may have been the result of 
structural change in data (Perron 1989). The use of dummy variables in the specification 
allows this. Further literature by Zivot and Andrew (1992) and Perron (1997) has
included an exogenous break-point in the equation. By allowing one breakpoint they 
have found more evidence against the unit root hypothesis than the Dickey and Fuller 
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(1981) method. To avoid bias toward the hypothesis, this chapter incorporates multiple 
unknown breaks in the testing process, as suggested by Lumsdaine and Papell (1997). In 
the chapter, we use their idea but employ the more recently developed procedure by Lee 
and Strazicich (2003), which allows for breaks not only under the null, but also under
the alternative hypothesis. The test is general enough to allow for more than one crisis, 
which may not necessarily be the same across markets, and to ensure our evidence that 
the series are I(1) is unbiased. In addition, as break points are documented to be less 
inference sensitive than the assumptions about the number of breaks, we shall fix 
neither the number of breaks nor their dates using the Minimum Lagrange multiplier 
(LM) test proposed by Lee and Strazicich (2003)4.
∆yt = μ + βt + θDU1t + γDT1t + ωDU2t + ψDT2t + αyt-1 + ∑௞௝=1 (cj ∆yt-j) + εt,                              (2.3)
t = 1,..., T  
where DUit are indicator dummy variables for a mean shift occurring at times Ti, that 
equals 1 for t > Ti.
DTit are the corresponding trend shift variables, and are equal to (t-Ti) when t >
Ti.
A.2. Unit-root test results
In order to test the cointegration between markets, the series have to be integrated of 
order 1. First, the ADF and Phillips-Perron tests allowing no breaks are used and 
confirm that indeed they are I(1). As can be seen in Panel A of Table 2.1, all five 
national indices have unit root in level, they are however stationary in the first 
differences. For ADF, the optimal lag length p, in parentheses, which should be large 
enough to make ut white noise, is selected by Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC). In 
most of cases, p equals to zero except for Germany in level. The test statistics are much 
larger and statistically significant in the first difference. For example, for S&P500 
index, the statistics value is -15.31 (significant at 1% level) in the first difference while 
it is -1.5 (insignificant) in level. The results are also hold under PP tests.
Taking one step further, a more recent method developed by Lee and Strazicich (2003) 
has ensured the selected indices are I(1) even after accounting for possible structural 
                                                            
4 We thank Junsoo Lee for generously providing the coding for the test in RATS
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breaks caused by shocks and the recent financial crisis. Over a sample period of 23 
years, it is appropriate to allow a maximum of two breaks. This not only reflects the real 
economic movements but also take advantages of multiple break unit-root tests. The 
Lee and Strazicich’s test results two break dates, TB1 and TB2, that the shocks are most 
likely to occur but not necessary to take place. The results in panel A of table 2.1 show 
that the recent 2007/2008 financial crisis tends to have some effects on all selected 
markets except Japan which experienced heavily damage from its own crisis during 
1991-1994. Moreover, Japanese stock returns are known to have different risk pattern to 
the world price of risk under the CAPM (Harvey 1991). Therefore, Japan does not seem 
to be an appropriate candidate for this study’s testing sample. The remaining question of 
which market(s) is qualified will be addressed in the next section. 
Accounting for two structural breaks, the LM τ-statistics for unit root hypothesis cannot 
be rejected at the 5% significant level for all series implies that they contain a unit root. 
In short, the minimum LM test reassured that all national indices are I(1) with or 
without breaks and we can proceed to the next step of independence tests, cointegration 
tests.
2.3.3.B. Cointegration Tests
B.1. Cointegration
Although the concepts of Engle-Granger and Johansen tests can be found in many 
sources, it is worth to briefly summarise their main arguments and show how we
augment the traditional tests to account for the 2008 financial shock. For symmetric 
reasons, it is important to ensure that the results remain robust after the structural 
changes are taken into account like they do in unit root tests.
B.1.1. Engle and Granger 
Now the test of cointegration can be taken once each series is found to have one unit 
root, when test statistics are derived from residuals of the following regression:
Yt = α0 + α1 Xt + α2 t + et                                                                                                                                                  (2.4)
where Yt and Xt are the regressand and regressor, respectively and t is a trend
If the series are cointegrated, the ADF test shall examine whether et is I(0):
∆et = α0 et-1 + ∑ (߶௤௝=1 ∆et-j) + νt                                                                                         (2.5)
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where q is large enough to make νt white noise. The estimated residuals are also subject 
to PP test:
et = β0 + β1et-1 + γt                                                                                                                                                                     (2.6)
where γt is serially correlated.
Two series are said to be cointegrated when there exists a stationary linear combination 
of the two. In terms of inter-market efficiency, cointegration implies that the markets 
are linked even if they are non-stationary. If one denotes zt = yt – θxt, where xt, yt ~ I(1) 
and zt  is stationary and invertible Autoregression and Moving Average models 
(ARMA), then the two series xt and yt are cointegrated if and only if E(zt) = δz and 
Var(zt) = σ2 <  ∞.
B.1.2. Johansen
Johansen’s maximum likelihood method suggests testing cointegration using dynamic 
VAR(k) specification of vector Xt, of the size n x1, consisting of I(1) variables, to 
construct common stochastic trends:
Xt= μ + A1 Xt-1 +… + Ak Xt-k + εt                                                                                                                            (2.7)
where εt is assumed to be an i.i.d. Gaussian process
Next, denote ∆ ≡ 1 - L where L is the lag operator.
The model above is rewritten as followed
∆Xt= μ + Γ1 ∆Xt-1 +… + Γk-1 ∆Xt-k+1 + Π ∆Xt-k + εt                                                                                  (2.8)
where             
Γi = - (I - A1 - …- Ai),                        i = 1, …., k-1          
Π = - (I - A1 - …- Ak)
The benefit of this is that it allows all long-run information of Xt to be recapitulated by 
‘long-run impact matrix’, Π, whose rank shall determine the cointegrating vectors 
number.  
If the coefficient matrix, Π, has rank of r < n, then there exist n x r matrices φ and ψ 
each with rank such that Π = φ ψ' and ψ'Xt is I(0).
The analysis of these matrices can be referred to in Johansen (1991, 1995) for details.
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In summary, the strength of Johansen approach lays in his assumptions which allow the 
Maximum Likelihood estimation to be incorporated with cointegration issue and its 
testing framework.
B.1.3. Cointegration with a structural break
We contribute a method to test whether, after including a break, the cointegration still 
exists. Developing from the cointegrating regression (2.4), if there is an exogenous 
structural break in the level occurring at time 1< TB < T, the equation is followed.
Yt = α0 + α1 Xt + α2 D(TB)t + α3 D(TB)tXt + α4 t + et                                                                                  (2.9)
where D(TB)t = 1 if TB + 1 ≤ t ≤ T and equals to 0 otherwise.
A rejection of the null hypothesis implies that the series are cointegrated with an 
exogenous change in the level at time TB.
In this analysis, the cointegration test includes a break at the recent financial crisis, 
commonly chosen at September 2008, but does not include a break in trend function, 
which appears to be appropriate for recent effects caused by the current financial crisis.
One possible approach is the LM test proposed by Westerlund (2006 p.101), which 
allows “for unknown number of breaks to be located at different dates and for different 
individual, endogenous regressors as well as serial correlation”. The test is however 
designed and more suitable for a panel cointegration check between a number of series 
across markets, which is beyond the interest of this thesis and thus will be useful for 
other research.
B.2. Cointegration test results
Results of the test of cointegration between markets are given in Panel B of Table 2.1.
Choosing Turkey as the base index, the null hypothesis of no cointegration between the 
ISE100 and each of the other indices cannot be rejected by Engle-Granger and Phillips-
Ouliaris methods. Both the τ-statistics and z-statistics cannot reject the null at 5% 
significant level.
At this stage, we continue to double-check the analysis of their interdependence by 
Johansen’s (1991, 1995) dynamic method. For all cointegrating vectors, Johansen test
confirms the previous results through the common stochastic trends that we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis. For each pair of national indices where the ISE100 is the base 
index (n=2), the test results a maximum rank order, r, of one. As can be seen from panel 
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B of Table 2.1, the null of no cointegration cannot be rejected under ranks r= 0 and r ≤ 1 
by both Trace statistics (λtrace) and Max-Eigen statistics (λmax).
Taking a step further, the Engle-Granger test is augmented with a dummy variable 
which stands for a structural change at the recent financial crisis, TB. The tests of 
whether TB is in fact a structural break in the time series indices show significant 
coefficients associated with the dummy variable, D(TB). This implies that the break has 
an important role in the cointegration tests. In addition, Panel C of Table 2.1 provides 
strong evidence that the ISE bears no relationship to the rest of the markets. Both τ-
statistics and z-statistics are not significant using Mac Kinnon (1996) critical values.
Thus, the Turkish market has immaterial effects from the four markets, which have been 
heavily attacked by the 2007/2008 shock. 
2.3.3.C. Conclusion
The results from independence tests suggest that each of the five index series contains a 
unit root but becomes stationary in the first difference. Since being I(1), the national 
indices of Turkey, Germany, Japan, UK and U.S are eligible for cointegration tests to 
ensure if Turkey is an isolated market relative to the other leading markets. Both the 
conventional cointegration tests, such as the Engle-Granger and Johansen tests, and an 
augmented method which allows for a structural break cannot reject the null hypothesis 
of no cointegration between the ISE100 and the rest. We therefore can safely conclude 
on the independence of the Turkish stock market in the long run.
2.3.4. Conclusion
The results of various cointegration tests show that the U.S stock market has no 
significant linkage to the Turkish market. Over the 2007/2008 credit crunch, while the 
four major markets are strongly linked, the Turkish market appears to be substantially 
independent from all of the four leading national stock markets. The finding is robust 
after adjusting for structural breaks. It therefore suggests that Turkey is a suitable
candidate for assessing the performance of asset pricing models without having to 
worry about possible effects caused by the structural changes on the model performance. 
The next sections will examine the behaviour of different asset pricing models in the 
Turkish stock market, which is expected to provide a relatively fair view of model 
performance.
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2.4. Data and Methodology for testing value anomaly in Turkey
2.4.1 Data
Data are obtained from DataStream Thomson Reuters database and cover the period 
from July 1989 to December 2010, 258 months, for non-financial firms. Bond and bill 
rates in treasury auctions are obtained from the Central Bank’s record. Variables are 
monthly data for most parts, however, default spread is based on annual data because
the accounting reports are available at the yearly frequency. The sample excludes 
financial firms since the meaning of these firms’ variables differs from that of non-
financial firms. For example, a high leverage in financial firms is common, while it 
normally refers to a distress situation in non-financial firms. This can be clearly seen in 
Table 2.1 which describes the sample in comparison to the population. Financial firms 
generally have negative working capital regardless their financial status. Checking a 
sub-sample in section 2.5.2.D shows that the exclusion of financial firms does not 
materially distort our results5.
As mentioned earlier, previous studies exploring the value premium in Turkey tend to 
cover a rather short span of time. Moreover, aside from their limited time horizon, these
studies are potentially subject to at least two problems. Firstly, it is typical for most of 
databases including DataStream to leave out delisted firms. Previous works in the ISE, 
therefore, might suffer from survivorship bias. Second, in those studies, it is lack of 
sufficient diagnostic tests for the model goodness of fit in explaining value anomaly.
In this study’s estimation, by including delisted companies in year(s) they were listed, it 
hopes to eliminate potential survivorship bias in the dataset6. Also, as this study takes 
into account distress risk and bankruptcy risk, there is a need to include poor performing
firms, especially those went bankrupt, in the analysis. Since DataStream only reports 
data of active trading firms, while there are firms that used to be listed and satisfied the 
selection criteria, we also collect data on those delisted firms in the ISE main website. 
This study also cross-references different sources to confirm the delisted firms’ identity,
and forms its own portfolios. Further advantages of this method are discussed in Kothari, 
                                                            
5 Barber and Lyon (1997) also found a strong relationship between stock returns, size and B/M in both financial and 
nonfinancial firms in the U.S.
6 Delisted firms are defined as firms go bankrupt, engage in merger and acquisitions or be disqualified. We also 
perform the check if exclusion of dead firms changes the performance of each pair of portfolios and found it 
statistically and economically impacts the market anomalies test.
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Shanken and Sloan (1995). The present research also performs a range of robustness 
check over a 21 year sample period. It confirms that the results are robust to the choice 
of classifying criteria and estimating methods.
In order to be included in year t of the sample, a stock must have sufficient data on 
return index from July of year t-1 to June of year t, and on market value of equity as at 
30th, June of year t-1. To mirror the real investment environment, negative B/M, 
negative E/P and zero DY stocks, which are rare during the sample period, are excluded 
from B/M, E/P and DY portfolios, respectively. The thesis, however, finds no reason to 
exclude them in other portfolios formed in the later sections which aim to assess the 
effects of changes in investment opportunities.
Table 2.2 presents the sample description. It reports the descriptive statistics of various 
variables, including number of employees, net sales, total cash flow, total working 
capital, total assets, and market value across all firms after the screening process and in 
the ISE National All-share index as at the end of December, 2010. The sample covers 
majority of listed firms and spreads from small firms with the number of employees as 
little as 3 to more than 34,000 staff, from zero revenue to more than 26,218 trillion 
Turkish Lira (TRY) firm. It also well represents the market with more than 90% of total 
market capitalisation in the ISE.
One might notice an extremely negative revenue firm in the National All-share but the 
outlier should not be a concern. It is Torunlar Real Estate Investment Company, the 
only firm that suffered negative sales of –TRY 36,719 million because the firm is 
mainly working with construction projects, which is normally ongoing at the year end.
However, the firm is not included in the sample due to being less-than-a-year listed. 
2.4.2 Methodology
2.4.2.A. Portfolio formation
Value and Growth portfolios are classified based on B/M, and also on E/P and DY for 
robustness check purposes. Accordingly, stocks are allocated to three quantiles with a 
breakpoint of 30%, 40% and 30%. This is a conventional way of grouping portfolios7 to
examine the performance of value portfolios (top 30%) versus growth portfolios 
(bottom 30%). Unlike many studies, the chapter does not consider individual stocks in a 
                                                            
7 Suggested by pioneer studies, such as Fama and French (1992, 1993, 2004), Abhyankar, Ho and Zhao (2008).
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portfolio equally, but uses value weighted return approach in order to take the effect of 
firm size into account8. The weights of stocks in each portfolio in year t+1 are based on 
their market value of equity at the end of June, year t, one month before taking a long or 
a short position in the portfolio. This method of weighting individual elements of a 
portfolio will also be applied for any subsequent variables that are portfolio-based 
factors in this thesis’s analysis.
Forming in December year t-1, the portfolios are held from July year t to June year t+1
(called as year t+1) and rebalancing annually with assumption of no transaction costs. 
Six month lag is allowed to ensure all accounting information is known. This gap 
between fiscal year-end and returns tests is “conservative” due to delay of financial 
report announcement (Fama and French 1992a, p.429). Indeed, although Turkish listed 
firms are required to publish financial statements quarterly, like any other markets, 
Akdeniz et al. (2000) notice that the delay in report of audited statements also appears to 
be common in the Turkey. About 97% of listed companies in Turkey9 have a fiscal year 
end on December 31st and practically, Turkish firms tend to release their financial 
statements within three months after the end of their fiscal year.
In June of each year t, stocks are split into Small and Big portfolios using the median as 
a breakpoint. The portfolios also employ the buy-and-hold strategy on an annual basis 
and positive excess monthly value weighted returns of the small over the big will imply 
the existence of size premium. Despite the similarity in the number of stocks in small 
and big portfolios, the total market capitalisation of the small group is far less than half 
of the total (about 5% in 2010). Thus, it is interesting to see if small stocks could 
outperform big stocks as documented in other markets.
Finally, a proxy for the market factor is the excess return between the market portfolio, 
Rm, and return on the risk free asset, Rf, where Rm is the value-weighted portfolio of all
stocks in B/M and size portfolios plus negative B/M stocks and Rf is the 1-month 
London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR).
                                                            
8 Since returns on equal-weighted portfolio are affected more by small stocks (Fama and French 1989), weighting 
portfolio based on size (value-weighted) appears to be closer to the investment behaviour of rational investors.
9 Calculation based on data provided by DataStream.
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2.4.2.B. The explanatory variables
Explanatory variables in the time-series and panel regressions include the three stock 
market factors proposed by Fama and French (1993) and a number of common risk 
factors that have dominated recent discussion in the literature about value anomaly, 
which have motivated their use in this chapter.
Besides the market factor that has been discussed in previous section, Fama and 
French’s HML and SMB are mimicking portfolios for size and B/M factors in returns.
For example, HML is the return differentials between stocks with high B/M and low 
B/M at 30th June year t, the average returns are calculated from 31st July year t to 30th
June year t+1 and weighted using their market value at 30th June year t. At this point, it 
is worth noticed that, the forming date of the high B/M and the low B/M portfolios, 
which build the HML factor, is only one month before their returns are computed and
the HML factor is formed, while it is 6 month lag for Value and Growth portfolios. This
difference in the forming date is to ensure that the two pairs are not identical and that no 
bias caused by possible correlation between dependent and independent variables in a 
model10. Likewise, SMB factor in relation to Small and Big portfolios is constructed
using a similar method to avoid problems likely raised from the asymmetric way of 
treating HML and SMB.
Recently, there are a series of other fundamental variables that are meant to proxy for 
common risk factors which have not been unobservable by the CAPM. Among them, 
liquidity factor (suggested by Pastor and Stambaugh 2003), winner-minus-loser 
(recently brought to value anomaly discussion in 2006 by Avramov and Chordia), 
dividend yield, short-term treasury bill rate, default spread and term spread (proposed 
by Petkova 2006), and changes in default and in term spread (supported by Hahn and 
Lee 2006) seem to draw a great deal of attention. Studies by Petkova (2006) and Hahn 
and Lee (2006) are among the recent surge in interest in the impact of bond factors and 
interest rates on stock returns. Although Fama and French (1993) have mentioned the 
explanatory power of default spread and term spread in bond returns but revealed that 
the roles of these bond-market factors in explaining common variation in stock returns
are fully captured by the market factor. In other words, the powers of these variables as 
                                                            
10 We thank Fabrizio Adriani for raising the possibility that there might exist a linear relation between B/M portfolio 
returns and the HML factor.
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alternative factors in explaining stock returns, that are strongly supported by Petkova 
(2006) and Hahn and Lee (2006), are called into question.
The thesis, therefore, will examine the possible explanatory abilities of those dominant 
factors at once and discuss some econometric problems in building risk factor of 
previous studies as well as propose an alternative method to avoid the problems. The 
purpose of this thesis is not to re-examine the results of published studies but rather to 
put all main arguments together in one encompassing framework to verify the variable 
validity and explanatory power of models in capturing value anomaly.
First of all, when taking into accounting size effect, small firms - known to be relatively
illiquidity in most markets - tend to gain higher profits than larger cap companies. 
Moreover, numerous studies have shown the explanatory ability of liquidity factor in 
predicting stock returns11. Hence, it is natural to expect that liquidity factor will help to 
further understand the anomaly. The proxy for liquidity factor varies dependent on the 
goals. Two recent measurements are Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) non-traded liquidity 
factor measuring the impact of liquidity risk in association with daily price changes; and 
Avramov and Chordia’s (2006) measurement focusing on the stock sensitivity to the 
liquidity factor. However, Avramov and Chordia document that neither of the two 
measurements can capture the impact of turnover on expected returns. This study 
employs monthly turnover ratio to act as an indicator for the purpose of capturing 
liquidity effect on monthly portfolio returns. Turnover, TURN, proxy for liquidity factor, 
is a mimicking portfolio that takes a long position in low turnover stocks and a short
position in high turnover ratio stocks. Turnover ratio is defined as trading volume 
divided by the number of shares outstanding.
Secondly, other academics, such as Asness (1997) and Daniel and Titman (1999) also 
examined the relation between past return (i.e. the momentum) and value effects and 
suggested that other investment strategies could improve the performance of value 
strategy. This chapter therefore will also examine the interaction between momentum 
effect and value effect in explaining value abnormal returns. The momentum effect is 
measured by Winner-minus-Loser, WML, based on the Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) 
momentum strategy of buying stocks with high 11-month past returns and selling those 
                                                            
11 Amihud and Mendelson (1986) document the impact of bid-ask spread as proxy for liquidity on the cross-section 
returns. Subsequently, forming different proxies, Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000) and Pastor and Stambaugh 
(2003) find strong correlation between their liquidity factors and stock returns.
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with low 11-month past returns, lagged 1 month. Next, DIV stands for the one-year 
aggregate dividend yield. It is the sum of value-weighted dividend yield of individual 
stocks from July of one year until June of the following year.
In addition, the short-term Treasury bill variable, STBill, is a monthly rate of the 3-
month T-Bill. Term spread, TERM, is the difference between monthly long-term 
government bond rate and the short-term T-Bill rate12.
Moreover, two widely cited bond-market factors, namely default spread and term spread,
will be also included. Default spread is a universal proxy for the risk of change in credit 
market conditions. Increases in DEF signal the market’s anticipation for bad credit 
market state and vice versa. Term spread, on the other hand aims to capture change in 
interest rates. However, this study differs from previous studies in the way that we do 
not use correlated regressors within our analysis. For example, Petkova (2006) defines 
default spread, DEF, as differential in returns between Long-term Corporate Baa Bond 
and Long-term Government Bond; TERM as 10-year government bond minus 1-year 
government bond, where using the FRED® database long-term government used is the 
10-year bond. Clearly, the two variables are correlated.
Hahn and Lee (2006) propose the usage of ΔDEF and ΔTERM as an alternative set of 
variables to capture the value effect. They define DEF as the yield spread between Baa 
corporate bond index (Bond Index) and 10-year Treasury constant maturity (10yTbill), 
and TERM as the spread between 10yTbill and one-year Treasury bill (1yTbill) rates, 
we have by definition and rearrangement:
ΔDEFt = – [(Bond Index t – 10yTbillt) – (Bond Index t-1 – 10yTbillt-1)]      (2.9)
            = – (Bond Index t – Bond Index t-1) + (10yTbillt – 10yTbillt-1)
ΔTERMt = (10yTbillt – 1yTbilllt) – (10yTbillt-1 – 1yTbillt-1)   (2.10)
  = (10yTbillt – 10yTbillt-1) – (1yTbilllt – 1yTbillt-1)
The term (10yTbillt – 10yTbillt-1) appears in the construction of both variables. While 
the dependence between them resulting a multicollinearity problem does not invalidate 
the model as a whole, high correlation between regressors, especially in OLS estimation, 
                                                            
12 The classification of long and short maturity of these government securities in each year depends upon the 
availability of the bonds and bills in the year. Accordingly, long-term Government bonds are bond with maturity from 
12 months to 121 months, and from 3 months to 6 months for short-term bonds (1-month Government bonds are rare 
during the sample period).
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will call off the predictability power of each correlated individual predictor, and 
regarding which predictor are redundant with respect to others.
Two points rise to attention. The first is that high correlation between independent 
variables can damage the accuracy with which each of the variables’ slopes is measured 
(Pastor and Stambaugh 2003).  The second issue being that no conclusion on the 
significance of each regressor can be made. Petkova (2006) furthermore documents the 
need of a variable to be significant to be important. Unable to determine the significance 
implies this would mislead many interpretations, such as each factor’s role to the 
regression. For example: to examine the relationship between SMB and ΔDEF and HML
and ΔTERM in a view to counteract Fama-French factors, Hahn and Lee (2006) 
document the following 2 regressions:
SMBt = a1 + b1Rm,t + c1ΔDEFt + d1ΔTERMt + e1,t                                                                                        (2.11)
HMLt = a2+ b2 Rm,t + c2ΔDEFt + d2ΔTERMt + e2,t                                                                                       (2.12)
Next, they interpreted the c1 coefficient as significant while d1 is not in order to 
conclude that the ΔDEF regressor can replace SMB, but we have been given that its 
respective regressors ΔDEF and ΔTERM are correlated, hence it is difficult to obtain 
such interpretations. The regression (2.12) experiences a similar issue that would leads 
to bias conclusions. 
The approach this present research uses could potentially avoid these econometric
problems. In the previous works, default spread variable, which is the differential in 
returns between Long-term Corporate Baa Bond and Long-term Government Bond,
means to proxy for the probability a firm going bankruptcy according to its credit rating. 
We notice other measurements that are also widely used as a proxy for the bankruptcy 
probability and not collinear with TERM variable. These measurements are O-score 
proposed by Ohlson (1980) and Z-score proposed by Altaman (1968), both using a wide 
range of firms’ financial fundamental information and macroeconomic ratios. There has 
been growing evidence that they can predict the default probability. The usage of the O-
score as a good proxy for default risk is also in the context of Griffin and Lemmon 
(2002) uses and Dichev (1998), in which Dichev finds that O-score predicts delisting 
cases in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) delisting list better than an
alternative measurement of bankruptcy risk Z-score. This thesis, therefore, proposes 
using O-score in constructing factor loadings as proxy for default risk. In line with other 
variables, the default spread factor is also formed on portfolio basis. The O-score is
calculated based on accounting information from annual financial statements and the 
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GDP price-level index. The formula to computer O-score of each firm in year t is 
followed13.
O-scoret = -1.32 - 0.407 log (total assetst/GNP price-level indext) + 6.03 (total liabilitiest/total assetst) 
- 1.43 (working capitalt/total assetst) + 0.076 (current liabilitiest/ current assetst) - 1.72 Ddebt
- 2.37(net incomet/total assetst - 1.83(funds from operationst/total liabilitiest) + 0.285 Dloss
   - 0.521(net incomet - net incomet-1) /(│net incomet│ + │net incomet-1│)           (2.13)
where the dummy variable, Ddebt, equals to 1 if total liabilities greater than total assets, 
and equals to 0 otherwise, and Dloss takes the value of 1 if the firm has net loss for the 
last two years (i.e. year t-1 and year y-2), and equals to 0 otherwise.
Using the above measurement of default probability, the default spread, DEF, is defined 
as the difference in returns between firms with the highest probability of bankruptcy, 
measured by Ohlson’s (1980) O-score, and firms with the lowest O-score. Based on 
portfolio excess returns, the DEF factors in this study has another advantage of being 
able to capture the corresponding risk premia, which are compensations for investing in 
firms with high default risk. 
Followers of risk-based models tend to capture abnormal returns through evaluating the 
kind of risk that concerns their assets, and hence models capturing more risk or explain 
the most risk compensation are considered to be more successful in bringing 
explanatory power. Different methods would be needed to go around this problem, if 
otherwise. Supporting this view, Fama and French (1993) also use portfolio formation 
method to construct their DEF factor but not to the TERM factor. This is natural as the 
TERM factor captures the change in market interest rate, thus it is unreflective to build a 
portfolio around it. Therefore, the method of forming variables mostly on a portfolio 
basis allows this analysis to capture relatively well the time-varying risk premia under 
changes in investment opportunities.
For those that are formed on the basis of portfolio return differentials, namely DEF, 
WML and TURN, the analysis uses one breakpoint consistently throughout the chapter. 
Similar to the way Fama and French (1993) built HML factor, to mimic the risk 
loadings in each factor in which higher risk assets are assumed to yield higher returns, 
                                                            
13 Appendix 4 supplies codes written in Excel VBA to calculate O-score from individual firms’ accounting figures.
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DEF (and WML) is value-weighted return differentials between the top 30% and 
bottom 30% O-score (and past return) stocks while TURN is the difference in returns
between the lowest 30% and the highest 30% turnover ratio.
Finally, it is worth noticing that leverage, a variable suggested by Bhandari (1988) to 
capture an important dimension of firms’ distress risks, is not included for collinearity 
reasons. Since liabilities and O-score are interdependent (derived from formula 2.13) 
and the meaning behind leverage such as probability of financial distress and default 
should be captured by O-score, the exclusion of leverage does not likely to lead to 
omitting necessary variables in risk-based models.
2.4.2.C. Econometric approaches
Time-series analysis
First, the OLS time-series and panel analyses in this study assume that returns are 
generated by a linear regression of a k-factor model.
Rit = αi + βi (Rmt – Rft) +∑ γkiUktnk=1 + εit , for any i = 1 ... N                                                   (2.14)
where Ri is the excess return on portfolio i, Rm is the market portfolio, Rf is the risk-free 
asset, and Uk is factor loadings of factor k
th, and n is the number of factors added in the 
CAPM.                                                                                                           
Panel regressions
Besides time-varying analysis, the thesis also assesses the cross-sectional variation of 
average stock returns. Equation (2.14) can be rewritten as follows:
Rit = φi + μi (Rmt–Rft) + ∑௡௞=1 (ψkiUkt)+ υit ,    t  = 1 ... T                                                       (2.15)                                                                                             
The same description as in equation (2.14) is applied. 
Panel regressions on N assets over a T period length analyse is a combination of
equations (2.14) and (2.15). Ri is the vector T x N of excess returns on portfolio i, Rm is 
the vector T x 1 of the market portfolio, Rf is the risk-free asset (T x 1), and Uk is factor 
loadings of factor kth, and n is the number of risk factors a part from the market beta in 
the CAPM.
To assess the goodness of fit of the model, the chapter uses three measurements: the R2 
and standard errors adjusted for degrees of freedom, and the pricing error, which is the 
square root of time-series average of pricing errors squared in order to avoid cancelling 
out (formula is followed).
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un= 1/ (T-1)ට∑ ݑ௧,௡2௧்=1                                                                                                                             (2.16)
2.5. Empirical Results
2.5.1.Market anomalies
Table 2.2 reports the average monthly premium from three main market strategies 
namely, value, size and momentum. Within the scope of this work, we pay a particular 
attention on value anomaly; the size and momentum effects are examined from their 
potential abilities in explaining value premium in subsequent sections.
2.5.1.A. Value premium
The most commonly used indicator of value stocks is the Book-to-Market ratio. This 
study first follows this conventional approach and will later return to this point to 
discuss further robustness checks (see section 2.5.2.D). Figure 2.3 visually plots the 
annual value weighted returns on the Value-over-Growth portfolio (i.e. the value 
premium). From the figure, we can see the positive premium indicated by the dash line 
distance above the zero line. 
In addition, it also shows the variation of the premium in the ISE over the years. The 
performance of value strategy is very volatile over the early years in the market, and 
tends to stabilise in the later years. Apart from an outlier in the first year, when the 
number of listed firms was small, the peaks of the value premium tended to fall into the 
end of two downturn periods i.e. in 1995 and 2000. In 1994, Turkey fell into its greatest 
crisis; in 2001 the stock market crashed after a poor economic performance in the 
previous year. In 2000, the Turkish public finances experienced an alarmingly high
level of debt, although by then Turkey had started to sell many major state-owned 
industries. By November, the IMF provided the Turkish government with $11.4 billion
loan, following the country’s high unemployment rate and lack of basic medicinal 
supply, but even that amount of money did not seem to be sufficient. There was thus a
tendency to observe higher value premium in bad times, when the price of risk was high.
This result differs from what had been documented in the U.S, where no value premium 
was observed during economic downturns (Abhyankar et al. 2008) although in bad 
times value stocks become riskier (Zhang 2005). This suggests the need for further 
investigations on whether the higher return of value stocks over growth stocks in
Turkey is simply a compensation for bearing a higher risk. The results presented below 
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show that the value stocks are indeed riskier than the growth stocks but perhaps this is 
not the only reason.
Table 2.4 presents summary statistics of all three market anomalies. Regarding the 
value anomaly, the numerical result confirms the visual plotting that overall value 
stocks are riskier growth stocks with a standard deviation of 0.344 in contrast to 0.168 
of growth stocks. Both value and growth stocks seem to be riskier than the well-
diversified portfolio (the market) and the risk-free asset.
The risk-free asset unsurprisingly has the lowest standard deviation of 0.003 per month. 
Its return is however significantly lower than all the other portfolios. More specifically, 
the return is only 49 basis points per month while other portfolios yield about at least 
ten times higher. The results in this chapter appear to strongly support the positive risk-
return relation documented in the literature.
Overall, as can be seen from Table 2.4, high book-to-market equity stocks outperform 
both low book-to-market and the market portfolio. In other words, value premium does 
exist in the ISE and value strategy is even more profitable than a well-diversify strategy. 
On average, value stocks could gain higher earnings by 2.14%/month compared to their
counterpart and about 2% per month higher than a portfolio consisting of the whole 
market. These findings confirm the success of value strategy in Turkey, similarly to 
what has been observed in major developed and many other emerging countries14. 
Interestingly, while growth stocks seem to be riskier that the market portfolio, they 
generate lower monthly returns (4.89% compared to 5.04% respectively). This implies 
that the risk level may not be the only underlying reason for the success of value 
strategy, and that motivates further tests of asset pricing models in subsequent sections 
to seek for other factors.
Another important point is that although the value premium is high in absolute term, it 
is statistically insignificant (t-statistic is 1.22). An implication of these results is that 
although value strategies could generate abnormal returns in the long run, value 
investors might face uncertainty and temporally losses. One may argue that the 
insignificant return differential is due to the limited number of firms in Turkey at the 
                                                            
14 See studies by Fama and French (1998) and Chan, Hamao and Lakonishok (1991) for comprehensive examples.
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early years, but from Figure 2.1, it can be seen that the early period actually saw a 
significant value premium.
There are at least three recent works on the Turkish market, namely Gonenc and Karan 
(2003) who strongly reject the value premium; Akdeniz, Altay-Salih and Aydogan 
(2000) and Aksu and Onder (2003) who support a significant value premium. Their 
results are inconsistent, this is perhaps due to the testing samples were only from 5 to 7 
years in length. According to Davis, Fama and French (2000), a longer period will allow 
further enhancement to asset pricing models, especially in testing performance of value 
premium as within a 5 year period, firm fundamental values are unlikely to change. 
Therefore, the present thesis testing for value premium over 21 years, starting when data 
are available on DataStream, hopes to gain a higher accuracy.
2.5.1.B. Size premium
Also seen from table 2.4, in the ISE, size premium exists at 0.84% per month (t-statistic 
is 1.41) which is statistically insignificant. On average, small stocks could yield 5.75% 
while large-cap stocks generate slightly lower returns at 4.91% per month. Their 
standard deviation difference is immaterial. Comparing to the market portfolio, the
small-cap stocks perform slightly better whereas the large-cap stocks earn a similar rate 
of returns to the market.
Figure 2.4 also confirms the above result of a positive size premium. Similar to value 
strategies, size strategies experience a high volatility. There are significant higher 
returns on the small portfolio over the big portfolio in the earlier half of the sample 
period. In the second half, the difference in returns between the small and big stocks 
tends to narrow down.
This results are consistent to those in many earlier studies. Akdeniz et. al. (2000), for 
example, reveals the significant excess returns of small stocks over the big over the first 
period of 1992 and 1995, but notices that the abnormal returns disappeared during 1995 
and 1998. In addition, Aksu and Onder (2003) see higher size effects in Turkish market 
between 1993 and 1997.
On the other hand, a study by Gonenc and Karan (2003) over a similar sample period
argues that the unstable economic and political environment with high inflation and 
systematic risks could lead to a shorter investment perspective. Both foreign and 
institutional investors, therefore, tend to prefer large and strong firms in Turkey. The
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results imply that large capitalisation firms seem to outperform small and medium firms.
However, their result might only hold for a short sample period covering 5 years
including the 1994 crisis.
2.5.1.C. Momentum
Momentum strategies indicate a long position in past successors in returns and a short 
position in the past poor performers for the previous 11 months of portfolio formation. 
Rationally, investors should prefer recent well-performing stocks by looking at, at least, 
the previous year’s financial statements.
However, surprisingly the results in Table 2.4 imply quite the opposite. The winners
gain a positive 4.64% per month while the losers yield 5.88% per month on average. 
This shows that the momentum strategy seems to fail in the ISE. Also, not only 
outperforming the past winners, the past poor performing stocks seem to surpass the 
market portfolio. Surprisingly, the winner group brings smaller return while carrying 
higher risks. Their standard deviation is at 0.180, higher than the market’s standard 
deviation of 0.166. However, the return differentials are statistically insignificant.
Supporting these findings, Figure 2.5 shows that the losers perform much better than the 
winner group over the last 21 years. On average, momentum strategies generate a loss 
of -0.31 annually. It is worth noticing that at the two Turkish economic downturns in
1994 and 2000, the return differentials reached the lowest points. This corresponds to 
the performance of value strategy documented in section 2.5.2.A and Figure 2.3. Also, it 
confirms that risky stocks tend to get riskier while also being compensated by higher 
returns during bad times. In this case, during economic downturns, the poor past 
performing stocks generated much higher returns when carrying higher risks. One 
reason could be that value stocks tend to be the losers. A cross checking between the 
two portfolios seems to yield a mixture result. The most plausible reason is that no 
momentum implies a success of contrarian strategies, which works in a similar basis to
value strategies.
Additionally, Figure 2.5 notes that in the second half of the sample, momentum 
performance tends to be less volatile than during the first half. This tendency appears to 
be very similar to the experience of size and value strategists. The first explanation is 
the possibility of learning effects, which refer to the failure of a strategy after almost all 
investors have learnt about the strategy and fully applied it. If it was the case, the three 
market anomalies would have disappeared shortly while in fact they still worked for the 
following 10 years in the ISE. The second possible reason is that the market has 
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developed and its investors became well-educated. The abnormal returns are therefore 
getting lower in a more stable environment. This is supported by Antoniou, Ergul and 
Holmes (1997) who gave a spectrum of market improvements in Turkey. For examples: 
the market was inefficient at the beginning period, companies used to not have their 
financial statements audited, possible deterring of foreign capital, low illiquidity and 
trading volume. 
2.5.1.D. Robustness check
The present section will revisit the results regarding the presence of value premium 
from three different angles. It will check if these results are sensitive to the choice of 
indicators, with the exclusion of financial firms or the presence of de-listed firms in the 
sample.
First, to ensure the success of value strategy in the ISE, table 2.4 reports the abnormal 
returns on portfolios sorted by three most commonly used indicators, B/M, E/P and DY.
From table 2.4, high B/M (high E/P) stocks yield higher returns than low B/M (low E/P) 
group, however they are statistically insignificant. On average, high B/M (E/P) stocks 
generate 2.14% (0.14%) return higher than low B/M (E/P) stocks per month. The 
conventional risk measurement, standard deviation, also seems to confirm that the value 
firms are riskier than the growth, which supports the risk-based theory.
However, unlike B/M and E/P measurements, DY shows no positive return premium 
between value (high DY) comparing to growth (low DY) stocks. As can be seen from 
table 2.4, while high DY portfolio generates 4.58% monthly on average, low DY 
portfolio earns slightly higher, 4.93%. It is not a surprising outcome. Previous studies, 
such as Fama and French (1998) who study thirteen markets across regions found that 
value premium presents in twelve over thirteen markets when B/M and E/P were used 
as the classifying ratio, the number is however squeezed to ten when DY was employed. 
In addition, it is worth notice that Vivian (2007) points out that dividend yield might be 
heavily affected by executive judgments and corporate dividend policy and thus other 
measurements relating to earnings growth seems to be more precise indicator to 
estimate firm expected returns.
Next, it is also important to ensure the results are not sensitive to the data selecting 
process. Potential data bias is normally raised when one sets inherent selection rules in 
constructing samples rather than in a random basis. In finance, there are two main 
sources of selection bias, ex-ante and ex-post. Ex-ante selection bias is a statistical 
problem occurring when a research limits its sample in a particular group with similar 
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characteristics or involves a large fraction of missing data. However, the most damning 
data selection bias is ex-post, caused by selecting observations based on information 
that was not available. It is when an analyst assumes that investors have full information 
of firm performances at the year-end despite the general delay in releasing firm
financial statements. By allowing a 6 month lag after the year-end, the thesis can safely
avoid falling into this problem. Another common mistake that could lead to ex-post bias 
is when data downloaded are available for only survivor firms. For example, if a firm 
was delisted before the data collection date, it will not be considered even though in 
practice, it might be qualified to be included in the period it was listed. Scanning 
through all possible sources of those biases, a remaining uncertainty rests in the 
exclusion of financial firms in our sample, that may involves an ex-ante bias.
This section will therefore check if the results still hold after correcting for possible bias 
caused by the exclusion of financial firms and also reveal whether the effort of 
including delisted firms is worthwhile.
Regarding the first concern, a check is based on the more commonly used indicator B/M 
only, and a new set of portfolios is formed on all firms that have sufficient data15. 
Accordingly, the data set consists of all sectors, financial and non-financial firms, and 
all trading status, active and delisted firms. Value (growth) portfolio consists of the top 
(bottom) 30% B/M stocks where negative B/M stocks are not included for practical 
reasons. Interestingly, most of financial firms are added in value group in the earlier 
years while they switch to growth group in subsequent year. This practice reflects the 
actual fast growing of the Turkish financial sector after the 2001 economic reform, of 
which banking reform was the central of the reform.
Table 2.5 compares the return differentials between value and growth portfolios before 
and after including non-financial firms in the sample. The table provides strong 
evidence confirming that value premium does exist in Turkish stock market. The 
inclusion of financial firms leads to an abnormal return of 1.50% per month while it is 
slightly higher at 2.14% within non-financial firms. Although the value premium of 
1.50% is lower than 2.14% in value, it is now statistically significant at 10% level. The 
changes in significance level imply a higher volatility of value strategy when applying
on a sample of all sectors and the dissimilarity should come from the financial firms. As 
                                                            
15 Firms excluded because of data unavailability reasons are rare in our sample, therefore, although the analysis might 
suffer from selection bias, its effects are expected to be immaterial.
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discussed in section 2.4.1, since high (or low) B/M ratios in financial firms have 
different meaning to these in non-financial firms, it seems to generate higher standard 
errors when including financial sector in strategies using the B/M indicator. It is 
because financial firms usually have a high ratio of leverage which is normally 
interpreted as being riskier in non-financial firms. In other words, inclusion of financial 
firms in a portfolio would be riskier or more volatility in returns if based on the B/M 
measurement. The above result is, therefore, anticipated and being the reason behind the 
exclusion of financial firms in this chapter analysis. 
To sum up, there is value anomaly in Turkish National index and the results are robust 
to the industrial characteristics. Hence, regarding value anomaly, from this section
onward, all tests will focus on analysing non-financial firms.
To respond to the second concern regarding survivorship bias, another check on two 
sub-sets of samples is reported in table 2.6. Panel A of table 2.6 shows value premium 
while panel B compares size premium before and after taking account of de-listed firms 
in the time they were traded in the ISE.
As can be seen from table 2.6, overall, value stocks still earn higher returns than growth
stocks. It is, however, worth noticing that an exclusion of de-listed firms does make 
material differences in returns especially among groups of stocks with high B/M or high 
E/P. When using E/P as an indicator for classifying value versus growth stocks, 
including only survivor firms generates a value premium of 0.58% while it is in fact 
0.14% per month. The return differential mainly comes from the high E/P group (5.26% 
compared to 4.92% respectively). Perhaps, firms with consistently low market prices 
relative to earnings (i.e. high E/P firms) are more likely to remain out-of-favour by 
investors. Those which could not overcome financial difficulties might experience a 
long period of low returns before going default. 
In contrast, high B/M stocks appear to attract more optimistic investors and they could
be a good investment in the short run. Excluding de-listed value stocks therefore tends 
to squeeze the abnormal returns generated by value strategy. The results in panel A of 
table 2.6 show the value premium (columns shaded in grey) is only 1.57% per month 
when including only survivor high B/M firms while it should have been 2.14% when 
de-listed firms are taken into account. More importantly, although the 1.57% premium
is smaller in terms of value, the return differential turns out to be significant at 10% 
level. This might be due to a higher volatility among the high B/M group, especially 
those who are under distress. The findings provide further evidence that value strategy 
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rewards investors for bearing a higher risk. It is believed that high book equity value 
relative to market prices is signals of distress firms and they are more likely to fail into 
the list of de-listed firms. Although not all of them would, most of the de-listed firms in 
the ISE were high B/M firms. They were riskier assets but could be a profitable short-
term investment for risk lovers before being delisted. As a result, an exclusion of 
delisted firms tends to undervalue value premium.
A similar finding is observed in robustness checking for size premium. Although it 
seems that size premium does not extensively differ between the two cases, taking into 
account only survivor firms also means ignoring a number of small firms. Those are 
firms that are more likely to go default or be targeted in mergers and acquisitions but 
could be a profitable investment in the short run. On average, investing in those firms 
yields about 0.1% higher returns per month (5.75% compared to 5.66%), which leads to 
a size premium of 0.84% instead of 0.72% per month. In summary, the conclusion on 
overall performance of value and size strategies remains valid. However, an exclusion 
of de-listed firms does not only distort the real investment situation but also 
underestimate both investment strategies.
Studies in the U.S. also find that although data selection bias are material in Compustat 
(Banz and Breen 1986, and Kothari et al. 1995), it does not necessarily lead to different 
conclusions in the presence of value anomaly or the reasons behind it (Barber and Lyon 
1997). Even though an exclusion of de-listed firms does not seem to significantly affect
the success of value strategy, it is more meaningful to include them. Since value firms 
appear to be associated with being under financial distress, they are more likely to go 
bankrupt. In contrast, growth firms can involve mergers and acquisitions which also 
lead to a change in their trading status, most likely under another name. Hence, while
delisted firms do not seem to play a key role so far, it is both economically and 
statistically worthwhile to take account of de-listed firms in subsequent tests on 
performance of value and growth stocks.
2.5.1.E. Conclusion
Overall, value stocks are more profitable than growth stocks and the return differential 
tends to be widened during bad times, when the price of risk is high. The higher 
volatility of value strategy during economy downturn periods and the higher risk 
bearings of value versus growth portfolios provide further supporting evidence for a 
risk-based explanation of the value anomaly in Turkey. Although being a riskier asset, 
value portfolio seems to outperform the market, which implies that value oriented 
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investors may earn even higher returns than those who perfectly diversify their 
portfolios. A robustness check also confirms that the value premium found in the ISE is 
not sensitive to the choice of indicators or restrictions, and not a result of data bias.
In addition, unlike previous studies in Turkey, we find evidence of size effects in the 
ISE after correcting for the data selection bias although the return differential is 
statistically insignificant. A longer vision perhaps could explain these different findings
and reveals that small firms are still in favour, especially during riskier periods. Unlike 
value and size investment strategies, momentum strategy does not yield a positive return.
Indeed, holding winner stocks is safer but less profitable. The failure of momentum also 
implies a success of contrarian strategies, which works similar to the basis of value 
strategies. The results again confirm the presence of value premium in the testing 
market.
It is also important to emphasize that the tightened return premia of the three investing 
strategies in subsequent years are not because those strategies have become well known 
but because of the quick development of investment environment and better market
participants in Turkey. In a mature market, one could expect any market anomalies to be 
well captured by a well-developed asset pricing model. The next sections will examine 
different asset pricing models for the purpose of explaining value premium in Turkey.
2.5.2.The CAPM and augmented risk-based models
The present chapter aims to provide a comprehensive analysis on performance of 
various asset pricing models from both time-series and panel approaches. The widely
used panel estimation method would enable this analysis to capture the cross-sectional 
variance in stock average returns and allow the results to be comparable with studies in 
other markets. In addition, it is also very advantageous to use time-series approach to 
consider data with extreme outliers which most markets potentially are subjected to. 
The method has its capacity to inspect each factor loading’s ability in capturing the risk 
pattern it proxies for over a time-span. Supporting this view, Dimson, Nagel and 
Quigley (2003) favour the time-series approach while Fama and French (1992, 1993) 
employ both techniques. This study employs both methods in order to ensure an
inclusive view of testing model explanatory ability.
2.5.2.A The CAPM
The CAPM is the foundation on which most recent contemporary models are based. 
The risk-based CAPM shaped the way market participants think of the relation between 
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risk and return. In the following CAPM regression, if portfolio returns are fully captured 
by its explanatory variables, the intercept should be statistically insignificant from zero.
Model 1: Ri,t –Rf,t = α + βm[Rm – Rf] + ei,t
where Ri is the asset return on asset i and Rf is the risk-free rate of return, then the 
portfolio’s excess return is denoted by [Ri – Rf]. Similarly, [Rm – Rf] and βm is the market 
excess return and its beta capturing un-diversifiable risks.
In time-series analysis, Table 2.7 provided one panel for each portfolio. The estimated 
intercepts of the regression, α, indicate that the model somehow explains the average 
returns on value and growth portfolios. The two intercept values are both statistically 
and practically insignificant (0.0032 and 0.0026 respectively). All the CAPM intercepts 
for value and growth portfolios are far less than 3.4 standard errors from zero. This 
means the hypothesis of a zero intercept can be safely accepted.
According to Fama and French (1998), if CAPM has the ability to explain higher 
returns in value stocks, then the regression should have a large market beta. Also, if 
CAPM can explain a lower return pattern in growth stocks, its beta should be less than 
one. Table 2.7 shows evidence that the CAPM does not entirely fail in these respects. 
From panel A, it can be seen that the slope for value portfolio is slightly greater than 
one while in panel B the market slope for growth stocks is smaller than unity. As the 
market betas are statistically significant at 1% degree of freedom, the CAPM beta 
appears to play an important role in explaining expected stock returns in the ISE.
Moreover, the CAPM seems to capture more of the movement of growth stocks than it 
does with the variation in value returns. The CAPM captures nearly 80% of the 
movement of growth stock returns while a rather smaller percentage of the variation of 
value portfolio returns is explained by the market beta (73.12%). In addition, supporting 
the result a higher standard error is also found for the value group.
The findings differ to those observed in other markets, Fama and French (1998) and
Capaul et al. (1993) for examples found the market beta(s) are larger than one for 
growth stocks and less than unity for value stocks in their global market portfolio 
consisting of 13 developed markets. This could link to the fact that the Turkish market
is highly volatile with less sophisticated financial tools, typical characteristics of
emerging and developing markets, that make the market risks count.
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In panel data analysis (Table 2.8), estimated results reaffirm the existing literature that 
the market beta factor plays an important role in explaining the variation in average 
stock returns. The market slope is found greater than one at 1.1376, strongly significant,
and with a large t-statistic value of 22.0. This is expected in a market which has a value 
premium like Turkey. Supporting the argument, the constant term is relatively closed to 
zero, further suggesting a strong explanatory power of the CAPM beta.
On the other hand, according to Fama and French (1992, 1993), an asset pricing model 
including the market beta only is not sufficient, leaving room for size and book-to-
market explanations. When the excess market return is the only variable in the cross 
section regressions, the adjusted R2 is found rather low at 79.47%, the lowest across all 
models. The following section will consider these two factor loadings and find this has
enhanced the CAPM considerably.
2.5.2.B. Fama and French models
In a well-known study in 1993, Fama and French proposed three models, namely a two-
factor model consisting of the beta and a size factor, another two-factor model using the 
beta and a B/M factor, and a three-factor model consisting of the beta and both factors. 
The objective is to test the explanatory power of HML factor (standing for B/M effects) 
and SMB factor (standing for size effects) individually and jointly. The Fama and 
French three factor model (presented below) is highlighted in bold in all tables for 
comparison purposes.
Model 2: Ri,t –Rf,t = α + βm [Rm – Rf] + βHML HML + βSMB SMB + ei,t
From a time-series approach (table 2.7), regressions on the excess returns of value 
stocks always have positive HML and negative SMB slopes. This implies that the HML 
factor positively correlates to value stock returns while the size effects are negatively 
correlated. While the Fama and French two-factor model including the HML variable is 
proved to be the better of the 4 asset pricing models tested so far with an adjusted R2 of 
78.4%, the Fama and French three factor is not far off at 78.3%. The SMB factor when 
added into the two-factor model appears to lower the explanation power of the risk
factors related to the market and B/M. All efforts to improve the model later on show 
that the insignificant role of the size factor will persist.
The opposite is true for growth firms. While size effects do not play a significant role in 
the CAPM and Fama and French models, it starts to contribute to explaining the 
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variance of growth stock returns when more factors are added. Even though the Fama 
and French three factor model is now a better of the four models, it does not appear to 
be as successful as Petkova’s model in explaining growth stock returns, which will be 
discussed in the next section.
Additionally, although Fama and French (1996) concludes that size and B/M within a 
risk-based multifactor model can explain value anomaly but have no roles in explaining 
momentum, the results in the ISE indicate that they can do so for both value and 
momentum anomalies. Table 2.9 shows further investigation on the association between 
those factors and the anomalies. While size effects play a more important role in 
capturing the time-series variation in the winner portfolio, both the HML and SMB 
factors are statistically significant at 1% confidence level in explaining the loser
portfolio returns. Adjusted R2 values in Table 2.9 are of 87.2% and 78.4% for the 
winner and the loser, respectively, and the intercepts are indistinguishable from zero, 
implying a well-specified asset pricing model. While the model seems to miss the 
continuation of portfolio returns in the U.S with strong intercept values, it does not 
seem to be the case in Turkey. Perhaps, this is because unlike the U.S, the losers and 
winners do not focus on either SMB or HML group. In other words, there is no 
tendency of the losers (winners) towards small distress (big growth) firms or vice versa.
In terms of panel analysis, results in table 2.8 show that the Fama and French three 
factor model appears to outperform the traditional CAPM, in which HML effects seem 
to be the main driven force. Despite the success of HML and SMB, Fama and French 
(1992) admit that both of their factors have no theoretical basis to be chosen as proxies 
for systematic risks that have not been captured by the CAPM. That leaves room for 
subsequent studies. Among them, this thesis is interested in examining two recent
studies that propose a complete replacement of the two variables, which are Petkova 
(2006) and Hahn and Lee (2006), as well as performing an experiment with two most 
commonly discussed risk factor loadings, TURN and WML in its analysis.
2.5.2.C. Three augmented Fama and French models
From an investors’ point of view, it is natural to relate today’s stock prices with 
yesterday’s prices and with the current trading volume. This will give a quick picture of 
how attractive an underlying asset is. To proxy for these characteristics, past return 
(WML) and liquidity level (TURN) are among the most prominent factors in the 
literature in explaining common variation in stock returns. This leads to the possibility 
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that adding them could enable the augmented models to capture the time-varying and 
cross-sectional patterns in stock price movement that has not been covered by the three 
factors. The purpose of this experiment is not to test all possible risk-based models, but 
rather to check the robustness of the validity of Fama and French and its counterparts.
The augmented models are:
Model 3: Ri,t –Rf,t = α + βm [Rm – Rf] + βHML HML + βSMB SMB + βTURN TURN + ei,t
Model 4: Ri,t –Rf,t = α + βm [Rm – Rf] + βHML HML + βSMB SMB + βWML WML + ei,t
Model 5: Ri,t –Rf,t = α + βm [Rm – Rf] + βHML HML +βSMB SMB + βTURN TURN + βWML WML +ei,t
Panel A of Table 2.7 suggests that for value portfolio, the inclusion of a liquidity factor, 
TURN, does not improve the model ability in capturing the time-series returns, while 
WML seems to add a considerable explanatory power. The insignificant coefficient 
associated with TURN in model 3 indicates that adding the liquidity factor alone does 
not improve the model performance. This is perhaps due to the fact that in the ISE, the 
majority of low liquidity firms are also high B/M stocks. The risk of holding a low 
liquidity stock is therefore included mostly in the systematic risks proxied by the B/M 
factor. On the other hand, past returns factor has significant negative impacts on time-
varying returns of value stocks. Model 4 indicates that WML variable contributes to 
boost the adjusted R2 to 79.81%, the highest level among all efforts to capture the 
movement of average value stock returns. The improvement is however immaterial
comparing to, for example 78.28% in the Fama and French three factor model. It is 
unsurprising that in model 5, adding a redundant variable such as TURN into model 4 
has reduced the model explanatory power. 
Unlike in the case of value portfolio, TURN and WML share the same pattern in 
capturing the time-series movement of returns on growth stocks. It can be seen from 
panel B of Table 2.7 that both variables appear to be individually and jointly significant. 
Although the coefficients associated with those factors are smaller than their 
counterparts in panel A in absolute values, they are statistically higher. This implies that 
the estimation of growth stock returns appears to bear lower standard errors. However, 
it is worth noticing that in the presence of other factors (in model 9), the two variables 
are superfluous in explaining time-varying movement of growth stock returns. The 
explanatory power of WML in capturing the returns of value stocks mentioned earlier is 
also diminished. Additionally, the adjusted R2s are slightly higher than this of the Fama 
and French model. In short, models 3, 4 and 5 show no evidence of a significant 
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improvement comparing to the Fama and French model in capturing the common 
variation in stock returns.
Supporting this view, table 2.8 which presents panel regression results confirms that the 
average premiums which TURN and WML contribute in explaining the cross-section of 
average return on stocks are relatively modest. Indeed, models 3 to 5 have adjusted R2s 
and other goodness of fit measurements at the same values as the Fama and French 
model, giving no additional explanatory ability to the conventional model. Although it 
is believed that liquidity and prior returns could play an important role in predicting 
future returns (Chordia et al. 2000, and Jegadeesh and Titman 1993), the results in this 
section however support findings in more recent studies such as Avramov and Chordia 
(2006) who find that the Fama and French factors dominate liquidity and past returns in 
explaining stock returns.
2.5.2.D. Petkova (2006) and Augmented Petkova models
Model 6: Ri,t –Rf,t = α +βm[Rm – Rf] +βDIVDIV + βTERMTERM + βDEFDEF + βSTBill STBill + ei,t
Petkova (2006, p.581) documented “a better model than the Fama-French model” and 
that Fama and French factors lost their power in explaining stock returns. This section 
will re-examine the arguments by testing individual and joint effects of her explanatory 
variables from both time-series and cross-sectional approaches and also challenge the 
model with two most discussed factors, TURN and WML. If the model is good enough, 
adding more variables should not improve the model in anyway. The regression results 
provide strong evidence that overall, it is not the case.
In time-series analysis, Petkova’s model (model 6) is clearly not a leader in explaining 
value stocks returns on the ISE. Her proposed variables did not seem to improve the 
traditional CAPM. Moreover, the Petkova’s four new factors have neither individual nor 
jointly significant effects on the variation of high B/M stocks. The F-test result on a
jointly significance of the four factors has a value of 0.143 (p-value is large at 0.966), 
showing that the null hypothesis of no jointly effect cannot be rejected.
On the other hand, an augmented version of the Petkova’s model consisting of DIV, 
TERM, DEF and STbill together with the Fama and French’s existing three factors 
(model 8) appears to be the best in capturing the variation of average returns of low 
B/M stocks. In particular, the DEF variable is found to have a great individual ability in 
explaining the movement of growth stocks. Its sensitivity coefficient is statistically 
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significant. A further F-test testing for any possible jointly effect of the three remaining 
factors fails to reject the null. 
In summary, Petkova’s model shows a greater explanatory power in explaining growth
stocks in the ISE, where DEF is a more important factor but it does not seem to be the 
case for value stocks. It arises from the fact that in Turkey, growth firms tend to 
dominate a business group. Although this apparently helps to reduce asymmetric 
information and risk sharing among members, the practice also leaves a loophole for 
capital transferring from smaller members to the larger and sometimes sacrifices the 
benefits of well performing firms to serve the Board’s objectives, and as a result, less 
favour firms will face a higher default risk. 
In panel examination, among the five factors, only the traditional market beta is 
statistically significant with an estimated coefficient of 1.2194. The R2 value is only 
better than that of the CAPM. Although the standard errors and pricing errors appear to 
be smaller than those in all models tested earlier, the difference is insignificant. This 
confirms that the model suggested by Petkova is not dominant over others, regardless of 
which testing method is used.
In another attempt to improve the model, once again, turnover and momentum factors 
are added individually and jointly (model 6b, 6c and 6d). It seems that only the 
momentum effect, WML, is statistically significant. Adding the WML alone generates 
an estimated coefficient associated with the momentum of -0.1392 (significant at 10%) 
and joining with the TURN factor leads to an immaterial difference both in terms of
coefficients and the level of confidence. Also, the adjusted R2s and other goodness of fit 
measurements show no significant changes, confirming that they seem to be redundant 
variables.
2.5.2.E. Hahn and Lee (2006) and Augmented Hahn and Lee models
Hahn and Lee (2006) propose a model consisting of the conventional market beta, the 
changes in default spread (∆DEF) and the changes in term spread (∆TERM). The two 
variables are claimed to strongly correlate with Fama and French’s SMB and HML 
factors respectively, and thus can replace them. More specifically, they believe that 
∆DEF can capture most of the common risks proxied by SMB and ∆TERM can capture 
most of the common risks proxied by HML. For presentation purposes, in the first 
column of tables 2.7 to 2.12, the terms DEF and TERM will be also used to denote the 
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changes in default spread (ΔDEF) and changes in term spread (ΔTERM) exclusively in 
models 7 and its augmented forms (7b, 7c, 7d). The Hahn and Lee’s model is presented 
as follows.
Model 7: Ri,t –Rf,t = α + βm[Rm – Rf] + β∆TERM ∆TERM + β∆DEF ∆DEF + eit
From a time-series approach, the Hahn and Lee’s model (model 7 in Table 2.7) explains 
the value stock returns just as well as the Petkova’s model does with an adjusted R2 of 
about 72%. Among the three regressors, only the market beta keeps playing a key role 
in capturing the movement of value stock returns. The coefficient associated with the 
market factor is economically and statistically significant while those of the other two 
variables, ∆TERM and ∆DEF, are insignificant. That implies a failure of the alternative 
model in replacing the Fama and French model. In explaining the variation of growth
portfolio returns, Hahn and Lee’s model appears to show the same pattern that is 
observed earlier in value stocks.
It is worth to notice that when comparing to the performance of Fama and French three 
factor model and augmented Fama and French models, Hahn and Lee’s model behaves 
similarly to Petkova’s. One possible reason for this similarity is that perhaps their 
proxies for systematic risks may contain most of the pricing implications in Petkova’s 
factors. This is because fundamentally, all alternative variables proposed in those two 
models aim to capture the time-varying risk premia under changing investment 
opportunities within firms (through changes in dividend policy and default possibility) 
as well as from outside firms (through changes in interest rates).
Similar to the time-series approach, Hahn and Lee’s model does not seem to perform 
differently comparing to Petkova’s model does in explaining the cross-sectional pattern 
of average returns on stocks. As can be seen from table 2.8, model proposed by Hahn 
and Lee (model 7) and their augmented patterns (models 7b, 7c and 7d) explain around 
81% of the movements of stock returns. Moreover, these models show no sign of a 
superior performance comparing to the Fama and French model according to all three 
measurements of model’s goodness of fit. Similar results are found in the case of
Petkova’s model and its augmented versions. Overall, the Fama and French three factor
model is still valid against the recent efforts to replace it with a model consisting of 
variables which are more theoretically supported.
Since the performance of Hahn and Lee’s factors (i.e. ΔDEF and ΔTERM) appears to 
be similar to their counterparts, DEF and TERM, in Petkova’s model, for the sake of 
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brevity, from model 8 onwards, we use DEF and TERM proposed by Petkova as
proxies for default spread and term spread risks, respectively.
2.5.2.F. Other models
Some final experiments will involve examining the roles of TURN and WML in the 
same playing field with other explanatory variables discussed so far. Since they are 
augmented versions developing from model 8, they are numbered as models 8b and 8c,
and model 9 will consist of all variables. For the sake of brevity, this section only 
discusses the cross-section performance of these models when assessing the explanatory 
ability of these two proxy risk factors in capturing the cross-sectional pattern of the 
average stock returns16.
In panel B of table 2.8, models 8b and 8c show a similar performance comparing to
model 8 and model 9 in panel A when all factors come to play. In general, the R2s are 
around 80.8%, being rather lower than this of the Fama and French model (82.5%). It is 
also worth mentioning that apart from the market beta, in these three regressions, none 
of the regressors plays a significant role in explaining the stock returns cross-sectionally.
Although including redundant variables is apparently not as risky as omitting essential 
variables, when many unnecessary factors are included in a model, models 8b, 8c and 9 
witness a clear decrease in the explanatory ability of not only important variables but 
also of the model as a whole. Take model 9 as an example, an inclusion of all variables 
even diminishes the explanatory power of the HML effects that have been strongly and 
consistently perform well under the Fama and French model. Model 9 also sees its
adjusted R2 falls into the lowest R2 group.
To summarise, the simple but powerful Fama and French model seems to capture most 
of the movement of common stock returns and new factors that were believed to replace 
the Fama and French three factors do not seem to outperform them. Adding TURN and 
WML factors could improve the model performance but the difference is immaterial. 
The next section aims to ensure that these findings are not sensitive to the choice of 
indicators nor to the regression methods used.
                                                            
16 The time-series analysis of these models draws similar results to the based model and therefore is dismissed.
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2.5.3.Robustness tests
2.5.3.A. E/P and DY portfolios
As mentioned earlier, value and growth stocks can be classified based on a number of 
fundamental values, such as B/M, E/P, DY and C/P. Although B/M is the most 
commonly used and influential indicator, other measurements of stock value may carry 
different patterns that are not yet captured by the B/M. Tables 2.10 and 2.11 present the 
estimation results of panel regressions on average returns of E/P and DY portfolios, 
respectively17. Value firms are classified as firms with high book equity value, high 
earnings and/or paying high dividends in relation to their market prices. All stocks are 
split into value and growth portfolios accordingly using the same breakpoints to ensure 
the consistency in forming portfolios. More specifically, the value portfolio consists of 
the top 30% E/P (DY) and the growth stocks are the bottom 30% E/P (DY) stocks.
Overall, tables 2.10 and 2.11 provide strong evidence confirming that the newly 
proposed variables, DIV, TERM, DEF and STbill, are not likely to replace the Fama 
and French three factors in capturing systematic risks in common stock returns. Taking 
model 6 as an example, Petkova’s model does not seem to express substantial
explanatory power over other models. Although some of the Petkova’s factors are 
statistically significant, overall the model is among the poorest performance group 
together with the CAPM. Thus, one can safely conclude that the counter arguments 
against the Fama and French model do not seem to valid in the ISE.
Unlike for portfolios sorted by B/M, some improvement from the Fama and French 
model in explaining cross-sectional average returns of the E/P and DY portfolios is 
found and mainly comes from TURN factor. The liquidity effects play a consistent role 
both individually and jointly with other factors. In contrast, while B/M portfolios can be 
somewhat further explained by past returns factor previously, the WML does not seem 
to contribute its part in explaining E/P and DY portfolio returns. The outstanding ability 
in explaining returns of the portfolios based on these two indicators rests in model 9 
where all factors are included.
Since each fundamental captures a different aspect of value, it is interesting to look how 
they explain and predict the expected returns of common equities. In general, dividend 
yield depends heavily on dividend policy of firms and can vary from year to year.
                                                            
17 The test disregards the less common Cash-flows/Price due to inadequate data.
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Although market prices can reflect these changes, it is unlikely that stock prices react 
correspondingly to changes in dividend payout. Announcements on earnings on the 
other hand can be quickly seen in stock price movement. For a young market like 
Turkey, the domestic investors tend to base their decisions on solid evidence such as a 
positive earnings announcement or attractive dividend policies. Thus, firms with high 
earnings or dividends relative to market value could expect a shorter turnover. It is 
perhaps the underlying reason for TURN factor to mirror more changes in E/P and DY 
portfolios than it does for B/M portfolios.
2.5.3.B. Vector AutoRegressive (VAR) approach
As discussed earlier, Petkova (2006) argues that four factor loadings associated to DIV, 
DEF, TERM and STbill can replace HML and SMB proposed by Fama and French
(1993). However, since not all of risk proxies are portfolio-based factors, in order to 
estimate risk premia, Petkova admits that using a dynamic VAR approach instead of a 
static approach is an alternative option. The way risk factor loadings are formed in this 
chapter, however, can avoid such substitution. Moreover, its simple approach described 
earlier allows our analysis to be comparable to the results in previous studies that 
mainly use actual portfolio returns to build their factor loadings. However, since the 
Petkova’s argument over the Fama and French model uses a dynamic estimation 
method, for the robustness check purpose, this section will also re-examine the validity 
of Fama and French model against the Petkova’s in the dynamic context.
Table 2.12 presents the estimation results of two main models, which are Fama and 
French (1993), Petkova (2006) models, and only augmented models that show an 
improvement. Since both studies base their analysis on B/M portfolios, the test for
robustness will focus on this indicator to make the test consistent.  
Similar to Petkova (2006, p.581), estimated factor loadings, or “innovations”, are 
generated using a VAR approach by Campbell (1996). For every set of variables, a 
VAR progress is specified as follows.
Firstly, all variables in the state vector are demeaned. This is equivalent to specifying 
lags (1 2) in the VAR system. The first-order VAR is
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                                                                      Rm,t                            Rm,t-1            
                                                                      HMLt                     HMLt-1  
                                                                      SMBt                      SMBt-1   
                                                                      DIVt                        DIVt-1      
                                                                      STBillt = A STBillt-1         + ut                                     (2.17)
                                                                      TERMt                  TERMt-1
                                                                      DEFt                       DEFt-1     
                                                                     TURNt                   TURNt-1
                                                                     WMLt                    WMLt-1
where ut represents an innovation vector, from ut Fama –MacBeth two-stage procedure 
is applied to extract innovations that mean to proxy for risk factors correspond to those 
variables.
To begin with, for each asset, time-series regressions are estimated
Ri,t =  αi +βi,m Rm,t + (βi,ûHML) ûtHML + (βi,ûSMB) ûtSMB + (βi,ûDIV) ûtDIV + (βi,ûSTBill) ûtSTBill
         + (βi,ûTERM) ûtTERM + (βi,ûDEF) ûtDEF + (βi,ûTURN) ûtTURN + (βi,ûWML) ûtWML + εi,t              (2.18)
The second step involves running panel regressions on the average excess returns of all 
assets to the estimated beta(s) derived from equation (2.18).
Ri,t =  γ0 + γ m β̂i,m + (γûHML) β̂i,ûHML + (γ ûSMB) β̂i,ûSMB + (γûDIV) β̂i,ûDIV + (γûSTBill) β̂i,ûSTBill
         + (γûTERM) β̂i,ûTERM + (γûDEF) βî,ûDEF + (γûTURN) β̂i,ûTURN + (γûWML) βî,ûWML + ei,t            (2.19)
where the γ terms stand for the prices of risk for innovations in each variable and if the 
factor loadings associated with the risk factors are important in explaining asset returns, 
their corresponding γ(s) should be significant. More details of estimating procedure for 
each factor loadings from the VAR system can be referred to section I in Petkova (2006,
pp. 583-588).
While other models are also re-examined, only Fama and French three factor (model 2),
model 6 proposed by Petkova (2006) and those showing some improvement are 
reported for the sake of brevity.
As can be seen from table 2.12, the time-series VAR estimations confirm the results by
the OLS method for both value and growth stock excess returns. The signs of 
coefficients associated with HML and SMB also remain unchanged comparing to those 
in the static regressions (in table 2.7). In addition, the results in table 2.12 confirm the 
Fama and French’s (1993) findings on the positive (negative) relation between B/M 
(size) and average return. Among other regressors, the market beta and the HML effect
are still strongly significant implying their key roles in explaining stock average returns.
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For the value portfolio, Petkova’s model does not seem to capture more movement of 
value stock returns than the Fama and French model does. While the former explains 
about 80% the variation of average returns, the latter could capture more than 84%.
Although the coefficient associated with WML effects is statistically significant, adding 
WML factor seems to only slightly improve the model (84.85%). Overall, using VAR 
system or OLS method does not seem to significantly affect the findings that the model 
proposed by Petkova performs no better than the conventional Fama and French three 
factor model and that some augmentation on the Fama and French model can be done, 
for example by adding TURN and WML, but the improvement is immaterial.
Regarding growth portfolio, model 6 consisting of factors proposed by Fama and 
French, and Petkova appears to outperform the rest. Although all regressors might be
jointly significant, a strong individual explanatory power rests in the market beta, HML 
and DEF factors. These results are similar to those in table 2.7, it is therefore rather 
likely that a cross-sectional analysis may reveal a similar finding to those in table 2.8.
The chapter, however, does not perform cross-section estimation. This is because while 
VAR system is designed for estimating on vectors of multiple dimensions, this thesis 
aims to look at value strategy on a portfolio basis. Since the number of VAR 
dimensions is limited in portfolio analysis, it is likely that VAR regressions with two
dimensions will be similar to static regressions. Petkova (2006) also indicates that using 
the innovations on risk factors derived from a VAR system or using the actual returns
does not change her results in both time-series and cross-section analysis.
2.5.4. Conclusions
Empirical evidence reveals the presence of value premium in the ISE, and its close link
to the economic conditions strongly supports the risk-based theory. On average, value 
stocks appear to outperform growth stocks and the return differentials tend to be larger
during market downturn periods when the price of risk is high. A further investigation 
on the underlying reasons for the success of value strategy finds that the market beta 
does play an important role in explaining both time-series and cross-sectional 
movements of value and growth portfolio returns. Moreover, the HML effects add 
significant explanatory power to the CAPM model while SMB does not seem to be a 
crucial overall factor but it does show some contribution in explaining the average 
return on growth stocks. In summary, the three factors proposed by Fama and French 
(1993) jointly have a strong explanatory ability to capture asset returns. The three-factor 
model which has set a milestone in the asset pricing literature even shows an ability to 
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explain momentum effects in Turkish stock market, which has not been seen in other 
markets such as the U.S.
Recently, in an effort to seek for a better asset pricing model consisting of factors that 
have more theoretical supports, a range of risk factor loadings have been proposed.
Some have claimed to have the ability to replace the Fama and French model. Among 
them, the chapter focuses on the most discussed factors to examine the validity of the 
three-factor model under an unbiased condition. They are liquidity, momentum factors, 
and those proposed by Petkova (2006), and Hahn and Lee (2006).
It is natural to link liquidity and past returns factors to future stock prices since the 
stocks’ recent trading conditions and prices somewhat indicate the attractiveness of 
these stocks in the investors’ view. Some experiments relating to these two factors, 
however, provide a different result from what is normally observed in developed 
markets. While liquidity does not seem to make any improvement during the 
experiment, past return effect, WML, seems to add a small contribution. Although the 
risk exposure on WML alone can be significant, the factor starts to lose its ability in the 
presence of more explanatory variables. Its overall contribution to the models is not a 
clear cut. One exception is when WML is added in the Fama and French three-factor
model, a small improvement is seen in the regression explaining value portfolio returns, 
that makes the resulting model the best. However, it is worth noting that there is no such 
improvement in panel analysis. This suggests that when the cross-section relation with 
other factors is taken into account, the factor could not stand out.
Regarding some counterarguments in Petkova (2006) and Hahn and Lee (2006)
proposing alternatives for the Fama and French model, neither seems to display a
superior performance over the Fama and French model cross-sectionally when the 
economic shock has been taken into account. In time-series analysis, only Petkova’s 
model appears to have the ability to capture more of the movement of growth portfolio.
These findings are relatively free from bias and robust regardless of the choice of 
indicators and of the estimation method used.
In summary, the simple but efficient Fama and French three-factor model seems to 
remain as a dominant model in capturing average stock returns.
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2.6. Conclusions and suggestions for further research
This chapter investigates the underlying reasons behind value anomaly while being able 
to eliminate potential bias caused by economic shocks, such as the recent 2007/2008 
credit crunch. In doing this, the chapter aims to address how financial crises can be 
taken into account in financial modelling.
Structural breaks around extreme events such as financial crises tend to cause 
substantial forecasting errors and damage the reliability of an econometric model. 
Previous studies in asset pricing models have noticed the difference in risk bearing level 
of stocks during recessions but few have made adjustments for the crisis effects. A case 
in point is a study by Petkova (2006) which documents that the Fama and French (1993) 
three-factor model is losing its explanatory power but which does not accounted for an 
economic shock occurring during her sample period. The present chapter argues that 
failure to take into account crises in assessing model performance could potentially lead 
to erroneous conclusions on the validity of the asset pricing model. 
The chapter contributes to the asset allocation literature in several ways. First of all, the 
new approach of assessing model performance proposed in the chapter could take into 
account the shock while remaining relatively unbiased via cointegration tests. The 
independence tests are known to have the ability to identify a market little affected by
the shock in the long run. The results show that Turkey appears to have no significant 
linkage to the U.S and other leading markets, which have been the centre the recent 
crisis. Both the conventional and newly developed methods of unit root and 
cointegration tests with structural breaks confirm the validity of this choice.
Moreover, this chapter seems to resolve contradictory results on value anomaly in 
Turkey from previous studies. It suggests that the different conclusions on the 
performance of value strategy are due to their rather short sample periods (five to seven 
years). By testing over a 21-year time horizon, the chapter finds that on average value 
stocks yield higher returns than their growth counterparts, especially during downturn 
periods. In other words, value strategy can deliver abnormal profits and an arbitrage 
opportunity for risk takers during bad times. The results are robust to the choice of 
indicators and data selection procedures.
Furthermore, the chapter points out some critical econometric issues in two recent 
studies criticising Fama and French three-factor model. More specifically, studies by
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Petkova (2006) and Hahn and Lee (2006) proposed alternative models but did not 
account for multicollinearity problems that could limit the studies from drawing a fair
conclusion relating to the explanatory power of independent variables individually. By
resolving these problems, the chapter suggests a different result to those reported in the 
original works.
Finally, the experimental analysis performed in this chapter provides persuasive
evidence about the validity of the Fama and French model as well as on the underlying 
reasons behind the success of value strategy. The chapter finds strong support for the 
dominant role of the three-factor risk model in capturing time-series and cross-sectional 
movements of stock returns. It finds no evidence suggesting that the recent alternative 
models have a superior explanatory ability. Occasionally, benefits of adding other risk 
factor loadings can be seen but the improvement is immaterial and the Fama and French 
model remains valid. The results are robust to different methods of variable construction
and methods of estimation.
For further research, it is possible that testing on a wide range of markets would provide 
a more comprehensive view. In addition, a longer sample period covering different 
levels of economic crises and booms could potentially provide stronger evidence for the 
arguments. 
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Figure 2.1: The US stock market movements (1988-2010)
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Figure 2.2: Main stock market indices movements (2001-2010)
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Table 2.1: Independence Tests
Panel A: Unit-root tests
The panel presents the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Phillips-Perron (PP) tests and multiple structural breaks tests proposed by Lee and Strazicich 
(2003) for unit roots. Indices are obtained from Turkey (Istanbul Stock Exchange National 100 Price Index – ISE), New York (Standard and Poor’s 500 
Composite – S&P), Frankfurt (DAX 30 Performance- DAX), London (FTSE 100 Price Index – FTSE100) and Japan (Nikkei Stock Average Price Index 
225 – Nikkei). Monthly closing data for all indices are obtained from January 1988 to December 2010.
The first 2 conventional tests are on the autoregressive representations of the five stock indices and on the first differences. For ADF, numbers in 
parentheses are optimal lag length estimated by Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC). For PP, these are automatic bandwidth based on Newey-West 
bandwidth selection method and Bartlett kernel. Lee and Strazicich two unknown breaks, TB1 and TB2 in constant and trend, employs the Lagrange 
Multiplier (LMτ) test, in which the lag lengths are selected using Akaike information criteria and critical values reported in Lee and Strazicich (2003).
Test on Index level Test on First differences Lee and Strazicich (2003)
Country ADF PP ADF PP Lags TB1 TB2 t-LMτ (n)
Turkey -1.3 (0) -1.51 (7) -17.52* (0) -17.50* (6) 4 2004:05 2008:06 -5.39
Germany -2.17 (1) -2.34 (7) -14.34* (0) -14.48* (6) 7 2001:02 2007:12 -4.92
Japan -2.52 (0) -2.75 (8) -16.17* (0) -16.17* (7) 8 1991:03 1993:10 -5.29
UK -1.8 (0) -1.93 (8) -16.12* (0) -16.13* (7) 3 2003:03 2008:04 -4.34
US -1.50 (0) -1.83 (9) -15.31* (0) -15.48* (9) 5 2002:10 2007:10 -4.42
Note:
The asterisk indicates statistical significant at the 1 percent level. Critical values are from MacKinnon (1996).
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Table 2.1 - Continued
Panel B: Cointegration tests without structural breaks
The Panel displays the static Engle-Granger, Phillips-Ouliaris, the dynamic Johansen tests and most importantly an augmented test for cointegration from 
Engle-Granger allowing for an unknown number of breaks in both level and trend.
Engle-Granger Phillips-Ouliaris Johansen
Country τ-statistic z-statistic τ -statistic z-statistic
Ho: 
r (rank) Lag ordera
Traceb
(λtrace)
Max Eigenc
(λmax)
Ho: 
r (rank)
Traceb
(λtrace)
Max Eigenc
(λmax)
Germany -1.59 -4.46 -1.63 -4.74 r ≤ 1 2 1.72 1.72 r =0 5.29 3.57
Japan -1.97 -7.58 -2.11 -8.77 1 0.91 0.91 4.99 4.08
UK -1.6 -3.92 -1.57 -3.74 2 1.42 1.42 5.69 4.27
US -1.16 -2.55 -1.15 -2.49 2 0.74 0.74 6.03 5.29
a :Lag order determined by Akaike Information Criteria (AIC)
b :Trace critical value in MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) at 5% level are 3.8415 and 15.4947 for r ≤1 and r=0, respectively
c :Max-Eigen critical value in MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) at 5% level are 3.8415 and 14.2646 for r ≤1 and r=0, respectively.
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Table 2.1 - Continued
Panel C: Cointegration tests with a structural break
Augmented Engle-Granger
Country Dummy τ-statistic z-statistic
Germany Yes -2.13 -9.03
Japan Yes -1.20 -8.14
UK Yes -2.08 -8.22
US Yes -1.85 -5.66
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Figure 2.3: Annual value-weighted Value-minus-Growth returns in Turkey
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Figure 2.4: Annual value-weighted Small-minus-Big returns in Turkey
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Figure 2.5: Annual value-weighted Winner-minus-Loser returns in Turkey 
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Table 2.2: Sample description
The table describes characteristics of the sample in comparison with the ISE National All-share index at 31st December 2010. Except for the number of employees in 
unit, other variables are displayed in million Turkish Liras. It reports means, standard deviations (Std), median, minimum and maximum values of the variables.
As at 31st December 2010,in Millions TRY*.
Sample National All-share
Mean Std Median Min Max Mean Std Median Min Max
Employees
2,513.92 4,737.40 701 3 34,138 2,677.54 7,118.34 424 3 73,063
Sales
1,256,917.74 2,929,323.60 290,677 0 26,218,720 1,543,039.54 5,144,554.46 209,935 -36,719 53,812,436
Cash flow
188,952.84 573,559.25 29,778 -1,196,536 4,396,336 1,073,205.48 5,072,637.48 23,612 -1,196,536 42,019,432
Working 
capital 205,560.41 552,821.27 62,907 -1,108,264 4,046,906 -44,598.98 2,757,650.48 44,101 -40,486,868 4,046,906
Total Asset
1,369,595.94 2,698,579.98 373,511 8,790 15,097,801 4,496,123.63 18,040,159.27 322,092 4,596 135,523,866
Market 
capitalisation 1,248.35 3,021.60 322 12.41 23,210.00 1,604.74 4,462.48 232 8.41 34,320.00
(*): Except the Number of employees is in persons.
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Table 2.3: Explanatory variables
N is the number of month tested across variables; every variable have a 258 month horizon 
except DEF has 234 months due to unavailability of accounting data to computer O-score. The 
mean is presented in percentages. Std is the standard deviations. t-statistics is the mean divided 
by its time-series standard error.
The excess market returns, Rm-Rf, is the return differential between market portfolio and 1-
month LIBOR which stands for the risk-free asset. The High-minus-Low, HML, and Small-
minus-Big, SMB, portfolios meant to mimic the risk factor in returns associated with B/M and 
with size, respectively, with 1-month lag. The short-term Treasury bill variable, STBill, is a 
monthly rate of the 3-month Turkish T-Bill and DIV is the one-year aggregate dividend yield. 
Term spread, TERM, is the difference between monthly long-term government bond rate and 
the short-term T-Bill rate. Default spread, DEF, is the difference in returns between firms with 
the highest probability of bankruptcy, measured by Ohlson’s (1980) O-score and firms with the 
lowest O-score. The length of DEF time-series is 24 months shorter due to accounting data 
inadequacy. For each month n, ΔTERMn (ΔDEFn) is constructed in accordance to Hahn and Lee 
(2006) as the difference between the term spread (minus default spread) of month n and this of 
the prior month. The momentum factor is Winner-minus-Loser, WML, based on the Jegadeesh 
and Titman (1993) momentum strategy of buying high 11-month past returns and selling low 
11-month past returns, lagged 1 month. Turnover, TURN, proxy for liquidity factor, is a 
mimicking portfolio that long in low turnover stocks and short in high turnover ratio stocks. 
Turnover ratio is defined as trading volume divided by number of shares outstanding.
Explanatory returns N Mean Std
t-
statistics
Rm-Rf 258 0.0455*** 0.1658 4.41
HML 258 0.0269*** 0.1501 2.88
SMB 258 0.0178*** 0.1076 2.65
DIV 258 0.0410*** 0.0252 26.1
STBill 258 0.0342*** 0.0184 29.9
TERM 258 0.0097*** 0.0137 11.3
DEF 234 0.0164* 0.1483 1.69
ΔTERM 258 0.0001 0.0064 0.01
Δ DEF 234 -0.0000 0.2098 -0.00
TURN 258 0.0007 0.1470 0.08
WML 258 -0.0124 0.1377 -1.45
        *: significant at 10% level      **: significant at 5% level    ***: significant at 1% level
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Table 2.4: Descriptive statistics
At the end of June of year t, stocks are divided into 3 groups using the breakpoints: 30%, 40% and 30% based on their B/M at the end of December of each year t-1. 
This allows 6 months for investors to absorb information and avoid report delays biases. Top 30% B/M stocks are value stocks, bottom 30% are growth. Included 
stocks are all non-financial firms in the ISE National All-share index that have sufficient data to form portfolio and calculate returns. Firms with negative B/M, 
negative E/P or zero DY are excluded. Winners are separated from losers using the same breakpoints of 11-month past returns ranking, lagged 1 month. The sample is 
also separately split into two groups, small and big portfolios based on their market capitalisation in December year t-1, using the median.
The market return (Rm) is the value-weighted return on a portfolio including all stocks in the value, growth, small and big portfolios plus the previously excluded 
negative B/M firms. LIBOR 1-month rate is used to proxy for the risk free asset (Rf). Value-weighted monthly portfolios returns are computed from July to the 
following June and the portfolios are rebalanced annually. N is the total number of firms over time, the time-series mean is presented in percentages. Std is the 
standard deviations. t-statistics is the mean divided by its time-series standard error. *: significant at 10% level           **: significant at 5% level      ***: significant at 1% level
Portfolios formed on B/M Portfolios formed on E/P Portfolios formed on DY
N Mean Std t-stat N Mean Std t-stat N Mean Std t-stat
Value 532 7.03*** 0.344 3.28 753 4.92*** 0.169 4.44 564 4.58*** 0.168 4.28
Growth 530 4.89*** 0.168 4.68 750 4.78*** 0.156 4.68 562 4.93*** 0.165 4.68
Value 
premium
2.14 0.282 1.22 0.14 0.123 0.17 -0.35 0.125 -0.45
Portfolios formed on Size Portfolios formed on Past returns Benchmark portfolios
Small 883 5.75*** 0.173 5.32 Winner 541 4.64*** 0.180 4.14 Rm 1837 5.04*** 0.166 4.88
Big 883 4.91*** 0.168 4.69 Loser 541 5.88*** 0.194 4.86 Rf 258 0.49*** 0.003 30.10
Size premium 0.84 0.096 1.41 Momentum -1.24 0.138 -1.45
89
Table 2.5: Inclusion versus exclusion of financial firms
At the end of June of year t, stocks are divided into 3 groups using the breakpoints: 30%, 40% 
and 30% based on their B/M at the end of December of each year t-1. This allows 6 months for 
investors to absorb information and avoid report delays biases. Top 30% B/M stocks are value 
stocks, bottom 30% are growth. The first part reports value premium among all firms in the ISE 
National All-share index that have sufficient data to form portfolio and calculate returns and the 
second part shows it among non-financial firms only. Firms with negative B/M are excluded.
Value-weighted monthly portfolios returns are computed from July to the following June and the 
portfolios are rebalanced annually. N is the total number of firms over time, the time-series mean 
is presented in percentages. Std is the standard deviations and t-statistics is the mean divided by 
its time-series standard error.
Financial and non-financial firms Non-financial firms
N Mean Std t-stat N Mean Std t-stat
Value 694 6.66*** 0.213 5.01 532 7.03*** 0.344 3.28
Growth 642 5.16*** 0.172 4.81 530 4.89*** 0.168 4.68
Value 
premium
1.50* 0.138 1.75 2.14 0.282 1.22
*: significant at 10% level           **: significant at 5% level             ***: significant at 1% level
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Table 2.6: Currently traded firms versus actual traded firms
Panel A: Average monthly value premium
The panel reports average monthly return differentials between value and growth portfolios. The first sub-table is for firms that are currently traded at the end of 
sample period while the second sub-table shows not only results on the survivor firms but also firms that were delisted (included in the sample during the years
they were active). The later, thus, represents the actual traded firms. Shaded columns present value premium.
At the end of June of year t, stocks are divided into 3 groups using the breakpoints: 30%, 40% and 30% based on their B/M (E/P or DY) at the end of December 
of each year t-1. This allows 6 months for investors to absorb information and avoid report delays biases. Value portfolios (indicated with a leading H, for high) 
includes firms whose ratios (B/M, E/P or DY) is among the top 30%. Growth portfolios (indicated with a leading L, for low) includes firms among the bottom 
30%. H-L is the return differentials between the high and the low, or the value premium. Included stocks are all non-financial firms in the ISE National All-share 
index that have sufficient data to form portfolio and calculate returns. Firms with negative B/M, negative E/P or zero DY are excluded. Value-weighted monthly 
portfolios returns are computed from July to the following June and the portfolios are rebalanced annually. The time-series mean is presented in percentages. Std 
is the standard deviations and t-statistics is the mean divided by its time-series standard error.
Currently traded firms
H B/M L B/M H-L B/M H E/P L E/P H-L E/P H DY L DY H-L DY
Mean 6.46*** 4.88*** 1.57* 5.26***
4.68*** 0.58 4.58*** 4.97*** -0.39
Std 0.218 0.168 0.148 0.171
0.161 0.126 0.172 0.170 0.134
t-statistics 4.77 4.66 1.71 4.72
4.45 0.71 4.17 4.60 -0.46
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Table 2.6 - Continued
Actual traded firms
H B/M L B/M H-L B/M H E/P L E/P H-L E/P H DY L DY H-L DY
Mean 7.03*** 4.89*** 2.14 4.92***
4.78*** 0.14 4.58*** 4.93*** -0.35
Std 0.344 0.168 0.282 0.169
0.156 0.123 0.168 0.165 0.125
t-statistics 3.28 4.68 1.22 4.44
4.68 0.17 4.28 4.68 -0.45
*: significant at 10% level           **: significant at 5% level             ***: significant at 1% level
Panel B: Average monthly size premium
The sample is separately split into two groups, small and big portfolios based on their market capitalization at the end of December, using the median. The 
market portfolio, Rm, consists of all stocks in the value, growth, small and big portfolios plus the previously excluded negative B/M firms. Value-weighted 
monthly portfolios returns are computed from July to the following June to allow for a 6-month lag and the portfolios are rebalanced annually. The time-series 
mean is presented in percentages. Std is the standard deviations and t-statistics is the mean divided by its time-series standard error.
Currently traded firms Actual traded firms
Rm Small Big
Size 
premium Rm Small Big
Size 
premium
Mean 5.14*** 5.66*** 4.93*** 0.72 5.04*** 5.75*** 4.91*** 0.84
Std 0.169 0.172 0.170 0.100 0.166 0.173 0.168 0.096
t-statistics 4.88 5.30 4.66 1.16 4.88 5.32 4.69 1.41
*: significant at 10% level           **: significant at 5% level             ***: significant at 1% level
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Table 2.7: Regression estimates on Excess Returns of Value and Growth Portfolios
The table shows time-series results of excess returns on value (Panel A) and growth portfolios (Panel B). Regressors are listed in the first column, 
subsequent columns report estimation results for each models. The models numbered in the table are respectively: [1] CAPM, [1b,1c,2] Fama-
French (1993)’s 2 and 3 factor (in bold), [3,4,5] Fama-French model augmented by TURN, by WML factor, and by the both factors, [6] model 
proposed by Petkova (2006), [7] model by Hahn and Lee (2006), [8] model containing Fama-French and Petkova’s factors, and [9] model 
combining all factors so far. For the sake of brevity, in the Hahn and Lee’s (model 7), TERM and DEF represent for ΔTERM and ΔDEF. 
Estimated coefficients, t-statistics (in parentheses) are presented. R2 (in percentage) and standard errors (s.e.) are adjusted for degrees of freedom. 
F-statistics and their p-value test the joint significance of the corresponding loadings. Adjusted R2s and Pricing errors are reported in percentage 
form. For presentation purposes, this table inserts asterisks indicating statistical significant level next to t-statistics. See notes to Table 2.3 for 
explanations of variables.
93
Table 2.7 – Continued
Panel A: Value portfolio
[1] [1b] [1c] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Constant 0.0032 -0.0056 0.0038 -0.0035 -0.0039 -0.0046 -0.0049 0.0275 -0.0029 0.0127 0.0120
(0.19) (-0.35) (0.22) (-0.21) (-0.24) (-0.28) (-0.30) (0.69) (-0.17) (0.32) (0.31)
Rm-Rf 1.3669 1.2295 1.364 1.2173 1.2456 1.2373 1.2588 1.4992 1.4672 1.3845 1.3571
(14.0***) (12.7***) (13.7***) (12.3***) (12.1***) (12.6***) (12.3***) (12.9***) (13.1***) (11.5***) (10.7***)
HML 0.5572 0.5636 0.5059 0.4727 0.4305 0.4487 0.3289
(5.22***) (5.25***) (4.11***) (4.12***) (3.37***) (3.18***) (2.07**)
SMB -0.0259 -0.0957 -0.0622 -0.1299 -0.1023 -0.1933 -0.2202
(-0.17) (-0.65) (-0.41) (-0.89) (-0.68) (-1.18) (-1.33)
DIV -0.2123 0.0893 0.0581
(-0.30) (0.13) (0.08)
TERM 0.3895 -2.5834 0.0172 0.6340
(0.29) (-0.98) (0.02) (0.46)
DEF -0.0075 -0.0258 -0.0207 -0.0203
(-0.06) (-0.32) (-0.18) (-0.18)
STBill -0.7627 -0.6476 -0.7445
(-0.83) (-0.72) (-0.82)
TURN 0.118 0.0927 -0.1174
(0.96) (0.76) (-0.72)
WML -0.2603 -0.2511 -0.3145
(-2.15**) (-2.06**) (-1.90*)
Adj R2 73.12 78.40 72.90 78.28 78.27 79.81 78.93 72.11 72.64 74.17 74.57
s.e. 0.2797 0.2473 0.2602 0.2476 0.2476 0.2458 0.2461 0.2553 0.2541 0.2507 0.2498
F-stat 195.8 121.5 97.54 80.98 60.95 62.77 50.24 34.89 58.74 27.33 21.81
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
*: significant at 10% level           **: significant at 5% level             ***: significant at 1% level
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Table 2.7 – Continued
Panel B: Growth portfolio
[1] [1b] [1c] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Constant 0.0026 0.0047 0.0015 0.0032 0.003 0.0024 0.0022 -0.0047 -0.0011 0.0048 0.0049
(0.55) (1.01) (0.31) (0.69) (0.64) (0.55) (0.51) (-0.63) (-0.34) (0.85) (0.87)
Rm-Rf 0.9084 0.9407 0.9138 0.9491 0.9687 0.9645 0.9791 0.9396 0.9363 1.0023 1.0001
(32.9***) (33.9***) (32.6***) (33.6***) (33.2***) (36.5***) (35.8***) (43.4***) (44.3***) (58.3***) (54.5***)
HML -0.1312 -0.1356 -0.1756 -0.2064 -0.2346 -0.2651 -0.2567
(-4.27***) (-4.4***) (-5.03***) (-6.7***) (-6.9***) (-13.1***) (-11.2***)
SMB 0.0489 0.0657 0.0889 0.0391 0.0575 0.0522 0.0517
(1.13) (1.57) (2.08**) (0.99) (1.43) (2.22**) (2.17**)
DIV 0.0928 -0.0894 -0.0861
(0.72) (-0.90) (-0.87)
TERM -0.2960 0.0162 -0.0678 -0.0995
(-1.18) (0.03) (-0.35) (-0.50)
DEF -0.06529 0.0231 -0.0566 -0.0571
(-3.05***) (1.53) (-3.49***) (-3.50***)
STBill 0.0973 0.0445 0.0468
(0.57) (0.34) (0.36)
TURN 0.0817 0.0619 -0.0071
(2.35**) (1.89*) (-0.30)
WML -0.2028 -0.1966 0.0154
(-6.2***) (-6.1***) (0.64)
Adj R2 79.78 81.99 80.80 82.10 82.41 84.42 84.58 89.70 89.38 94.10 94.07
s.e. 0.2734 0.0711 0.0734 0.0709 0.0703 0.0661 0.0658 0.0474 0.0482 0.0359 0.036
F-stat 108.1 586.1 541.8 393.8 302 349.1 282.9 406.9 654.6 532.0 411.4
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
*: significant at 10% level           **: significant at 5% level             ***: significant at 1% level
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Table 2.8: Panel regressions
Panel A:
Panel regression of excess returns on the 10 regressors (incl. intercept) listed in the first column, subsequent columns report estimation results for 
each models.  The models numbered in the table are respectively: [1] the CAPM, [2] Fama-French (1993)’s (in bold), [3,4,5] Fama-French 
model augmented by TURN, by WML factor, and by both factors, [6] model proposed by Petkova (2006), [7] model suggested by Hahn and Lee 
(2006), and [9] model combining all factors so far. For the sake of brevity, in the Hahn and Lee’s (model 7), TERM and DEF represent for 
ΔTERM and ΔDEF. Estimated coefficients, t-statistics (in parentheses), ܴ2 and standard errors (s.e.) are adjusted for degrees of freedom. F-
statistics and their p-value test the joint significance of the corresponding loadings. Adjusted R2s and Pricing errors are reported in percentage 
form. For presentation purposes, this table inserts asterisks indicating statistical significant level next to t-statistics. See notes to Table 2.3 for 
explanations of variables.
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Table 2.8 – Panel A - Continued
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [9]
Constant 0.0029 -0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0011 -0.0013 0.0114 -0.0020 0.0085
(0.01) (-0.01) (-0.05) (-0.12) (-0.14) (0.55) (-0.22) (0.41)
Rm-Rf 1.1376 1.0832 1.1071 1.1001 1.1189 1.2194 1.2018 1.1786
(22.0***) (20.0***) (19.6***) (20.5***) (20.0***) (20.2***) (20.7***) (17.5***)
HML 0.2140 0.1652 0.1331 0.0979 0.0361
(3.6***) (2.4**) (2.1**) (1.40) (0.43)
SMB -0.0150 0.0134 -0.0454 -0.0224 -0.0842
(-0.19) (0.16) (-0.56) (-0.27) (-0.96)
DIV -0.0598 -0.0140
(-0.17) (-0.04)
TERM 0.0467 -1.2836 0.2672
(0.07) (-0.94) (0.37)
DEF -0.0364 -0.0013 -0.0387
(-0.61) (-0.03) (-0.65)
STBill -0.3327 -0.3489
(-0.70) (-0.73)
TURN 0.0998 0.0773 -0.0623
(1.48) (1.16) (-0.72)
WML -0.2315 -0.2239 -0.1496
(-3.5***) (-3.4***) (-1.70*)
Adj R2 79.47 82.47 82.49 82.47 82.49 80.71 80.92 80.80
s.e. 0.1745 0.0924 0.0922 0.0903 0.0903 0.0874 0.0870 0.0872
Pricing error 1.84 1.84 1.83 1.80 1.79 1.74 1.74 1.72
F-statistics 383.5 269.1 227.7 232.6 206.5 186.2 244.2 148.5
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
*: significant at 10% level           **: significant at 5% level             ***: significant at 1% level
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Table 2.8 - Continued
Panel B: Augmented models
The models numbered in the table are respectively: [1b, 1c] Fama-French (1993)’s 2 factor model, [8] Fama-French three factors plus Perkova’s factors, [8b, 8c] 
are augmented versions of model 8 by TURN, and then by WML factor, [6b, 6c, 6d] model 6 augmented by TURN, by WML factor and by both factors, [7b, 7c, 
7d] model 7 augmented by TURN, by WML factor and by both factors. For the sake of brevity, in the Hahn and Lee’s augmented models (models 7b, 7c, 7d),
TERM and DEF represent for ΔTERM and ΔDEF. Estimated coefficients, t-statistics (in parentheses), ܴ2 and standard errors (s.e.) are adjusted for degrees of 
freedom, and F-tests report the joint significance. Adjusted R2s and Pricing errors are reported in percentage form. For presentation purposes, this table inserts 
asterisks indicating statistical significant level next to t-statistics. See notes to Table 2.3 for explanations of variables.
[1b] [1c] [6b] [6c] [6d] [7b] [7c] [7d] [8] [8b] [8c]
Constant -0.0005 0.0026 0.0114 0.0083 0.0086 -0.0021 -0.0030 -0.0028 0.0088 0.0089 0.0081
(-0.05) (0.29) (0.55) (0.34) (0.42) (-0.23) (-0.33) (-0.31) (0.42) (0.43) (0.39)
Rm-Rf 1.0851 1.1389 1.2207 1.2079 1.1962 1.2042 1.1898 1.1799 1.1934 1.1877 1.1952
(20.4***) (21.67***) (19.4***) (19.9***) (18.7***) (19.8***) (20.4***) (18.9***) (18.8***) (17.6***) (18.9***)
HML 0.2130 0.0918 0.0959 0.0318
(3.6***) (1.23) (1.25) (0.38)
SMB 0.0115 -0.0705 -0.0735 -0.0748
(0.14) (-0.81) (-0.84) (-0.86)
DIV -0.0599 -0.0364 -0.0333 -0.0001 0.0029 -0.0201
(-0.17) (-0.10) (-0.09) (-0.00) (0.01) (-0.06)
TERM 0.0465 0.2694 0.2943 -1.2840 -0.9823 -0.9539 -0.0253 -0.0279 0.2396
(0.07) (0.38) (0.41) (-0.94) (-0.71) (-0.69) (-0.04) (-0.04) (0.33)
DEF -0.0362 -0.0368 -0.0382 -0.0014 -0.0080 -0.0083 -0.0387 -0.039 -0.0369
(-0.60) (-0.62) (-0.64) (-0.03) (-0.19) (-0.20) (-0.65) (-0.66) (-0.62)
STBill -0.3313 -0.3575 -0.3724 -0.3016 -0.3055 -0.3330
(-0.69) (-0.75) (-0.78) (-0.63) (-0.64) (-0.70)
TURN 0.0059 -0.0487 0.0108 -0.0392 -0.0210
(0.07) (-0.57) (0.13) (-0.45) (-0.25)
WML -0.1392 -0.1538 -0.1301 -0.1417 -0.1320
(-1.87*) (-1.95*) (-1.76*) (-1.81*) (-1.56)
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                                                Table 2.8 – Panel B - Continued
[1b] [1c] [6b] [6c] [6d] [7b] [7c] [7d] [8] [8b] [8c]
Adj R2 82.57 81.27 80.60 80.99 80.92 80.81 81.16 81.07 80.70 80.59 80.86
s.e. 0.1922 0.1947 0.1877 0.1869 0.187 0.1872 0.1866 0.1868 0.1874 0.1876 0.1871
Pr. Error 1.80 1.72 1.74 1.72 1.72 1.74 1.73 1.73 1.74 1.75 1.74
F-stat 254.1 241.3 71.7 72.8 62.4 107.96 109.44 87.45 61.8 54.0 54.6
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
*: significant at 10% level           **: significant at 5% level             ***: significant at 1% level
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Table 2.9: Explaining Momentum returns
Panel A: Fama-French 3 factor Time-series Regression Estimates on Excess Returns of Winner and of Loser Portfolios.
The two portfolios are constructed in accordance to study of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). The 11-month past returns are used to distinguish the 
winners from the losers. More specifically, the top 30% stocks (the bottom 30% stocks) are classified as the winners (the losers). The monthly 
portfolio returns are calculated at July, year t with 1-month lag and value weighted by the market value at the end of June, year t and the 
portfolios are rebalanced annually. t-statistics are in parentheses. ܴ2 and standard errors (s.e.) are adjusted for degrees of freedom, and F-stat and 
their p-value testing the joint significance of corresponding factors. Adjusted R2s are reported in percentage form.
Panel B: Fama-French 3 factor Panel Regression Estimation on momentum return
*: significant at 10% level           **: significant at 5% level             ***: significant at 1% level
a b HML SMB Adj R2 s.e. F-stat
Winner-Rf -0.0027 1.0355*** -0.1050*** -0.0081 87.66 0.0631 609.5
(-0.65) (41.23) (-3.84) (-0.22) 0.00
Loser-Rf 0.0014 0.9587*** 0.2445*** 0.1231** 77.51 0.0920 296.3
(0.23) (26.2) (6.13) (2.26) 0.00
a b HML SMB Adj R2 s.e. F-stat
Estimate -0.0006 0.9971*** 0.0697*** 0.0575* 80.14 0.0833 693.9
t-statistics (-0.17) (42.53) (2.73) (1.65) 0.00
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Table 2.10: Panel regressions on E/P portfolios
Panel regression of excess returns on the 10 regressors (incl. intercept) listed in the first column, subsequent columns report estimation results for each models. See 
notes to Table 2.3 for explanations of variables and to Table 2.8 for model description. Accordingly, estimated coefficients, t-statistics (in parentheses), ܴ2 and 
standard errors (s.e.) are adjusted for degrees of freedom, and F-tests report the joint significance. Adjusted R2s are reported in percentage form. For presentation 
purposes, this table inserts asterisks indicating statistical significant level next to t-statistics.
[1] [1b] [1c] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [8] [8b] [8c] [9]
Constant 0.0052 0.0050 0.0028 0.0028 0.0037 0.0028 0.0038 0.0043 0.0035 0.0046 0.0034 0.0044
(1.29) (1.22) (0.68) (0.69) (0.92) (0.69) (0.93) (0.47) (0.37) (0.50) (0.36) (0.48)
Rm-Rf 0.9289 0.9254 0.9391 0.9405 0.8992 0.9405 0.8960 0.9313 0.9465 0.9072 0.9469 0.9030
(35.2***) (34.0***) (35.8***) (34.5***) (31.3***) (34.5***) (31.0***) (34.1***) (33.4***) (30.6***) (33.3***) (30.4***)
HML 0.0170 -0.0063 0.0223 -0.0056 0.0063 -0.0181 0.0105 -0.0285 -0.0172
(0.52) (-0.19) (0.67) (-0.15) (0.17) (-0.54) (0.31) (-0.76) (-0.45)
SMB 0.1346 0.1361 0.1147 0.1361 0.1116 0.1355 0.1148 0.1347 0.1099
(3.5***) (3.5***) (3.0***) (3.5***) (2.9***) (3.5***) (3.0***) (3.5***) (2.5***)
DIV -0.2745 -0.2785 -0.2580 -0.2820 -0.2659
(-1.68*) (-1.70*) (-1.60) (-1.7*) (-1.65*)
TERM 0.8802 0.8782 0.8603 0.9242 0.9972
(2.8***) (2.8***) (2.8***) (2.8***) (3.1***)
DEF 0.0071 0.0059 0.0011 0.0062 0.0014
(0.26) (0.22) (0.04) (0.23) (0.05)
STBill 0.1198 0.0838 0.0566 0.0783 0.0365
(0.55) (0.39) (0.27) (0.37) (0.17)
TURN -0.1486 -0.1603 -0.1453 -0.1645
(-4.0***) (-4.2***) (-3.9***) (-4.3***)
WML 0.0015 -0.0418 -0.0229 -0.0694
(0.04) (-1.11) (-0.61) (-1.79*)
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Table 2.10 - Continued
[1] [1b] [1c] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [8] [8b] [8c] [9]
Adj R2 72.64 72.60 73.30 73.24 74.09 73.19 74.11 72.95 73.53 74.35 73.50 74.47
s.e. 0.0852 0.0853 0.0842 0.0843 0.0829 0.0844 0.0829 0.0847 0.0838 0.0825 0.0839 0.0823
F-
statistics 1241.0 619.7 642.0 427.1 334.9 319.6 268.3 252.9 186.3 170.0 162.9 152.4
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
*: significant at 10% level           **: significant at 5% level             ***: significant at 1% level
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Table 2.11: Panel regressions on DY portfolios
Panel regression of excess returns on the 10 regressors (incl. intercept) listed in the first column, subsequent columns report estimation results for each models. See 
notes to Table 2.3 for explanations of variables and to Table 2.8 for model description. Accordingly, estimated coefficients, t-statistics (in parentheses), ܴ2 and 
standard errors (s.e.) are adjusted for degrees of freedom, and F-tests report the joint significance. Adjusted R2s are reported in percentage form. For presentation 
purposes, this table inserts asterisks indicating statistical significant level next to t-statistics.
[1] [1b] [1c] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [8] [8b] [8c] [9]
Constant 0.0065 0.0071 0.0046 0.0052 0.0056 0.0052 0.0056 0.0080 0.0096 0.0101 0.0096 0.0101
(1.66*) (1.80*) (1.17) (1.32) (1.41) (1.31) (1.41) (0.86) (1.04) (1.10) (1.04) (1.09)
Rm-Rf 0.9537 0.9636 0.9593 0.9724 0.9516 0.9724 0.9506 0.9531 0.9814 0.9635 0.9814 0.9620
(37.6***) (37.0***) (38.0***) (37.4***) (34.2***) (37.4***) (34.1***) (35.2***) (35.0***) (32.5***) (35.0***) (32.3***)
HML -0.0310 -0.0641 -0.0488 -0.0641 -0.0535 -0.00811 -0.0681 -0.0831 -0.0781
(-1.64) (-2.1**) (-1.53) (-1.92*) (-1.59) (-2.5**) (-2.0**) (-2.2**) (-2.1**)
SMB 0.1036 0.1141 0.1038 0.1141 0.1028 0.1253 0.1159 0.1251 0.1141
(2.8***) (3.1***) (2.8***) (3.1***) (2.7***) (3.3***) (3.0***) (3.3***) (2.9***)
DIV -0.2077 -0.2564 -0.2471 -0.2571 -0.2499
(-1.28) (-1.59) (-1.53) (-1.59) (-1.55)
TERM 0.5273 0.5825 0.5744 0.5916 0.6240
(1.68*) (1.87*) (1.84*) (1.84*) (1.95*)
DEF -0.0037 -0.0026 -0.0047 -0.0025 -0.0046
(-0.14) (-0.10) (-0.18) (-0.09) (-0.17)
STBill 0.1054 0.0624 0.0500 0.0613 0.0427
(0.49) (0.30) (0.24) (0.29) (0.20)
TURN -0.0750 -0.0783 -0.0661 -0.0730
(-2.1**) (-2.1**) (-1.79*) (-1.9*)
WML -0.0001 -0.0148 -0.0045 -0.0251
(-0.00) (-0.43) (-0.12) (-0.64)
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Table 2.11 - Continued
[1] [1b] [1c] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [8] [8b] [8c] [9]
Adj R2 74.22 74.30 74.57 74.74 74.91 74.69 74.87 74.15 74.81 74.93 74.76 74.90
s.e. 0.0864 0.0845 0.0840 0.0838 0.0835 0.0839 0.0836 0.0839 0.0828 0.0826 0.0829 0.0826
F-
statistics 1414.3 710.9 721.0 485.3 367.5 363.2 293.5 269.0 199.1 175.5 173.9 155.8
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
*: significant at 10% level           **: significant at 5% level             ***: significant at 1% level
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Table 2.12: Vector AutoRegressive (VAR) Estimations
The table shows time-series VAR results of excess returns on value and growth portfolios. Exogenous variables are listed in the first column, subsequent columns 
report VAR estimation results with lags (1 2) for each models. The models numbered in the table are respectively: [2] Fama-French (1993)’s three-factor (in 
bold), [4] Fama-French model augmented by WML factor for value stocks, [6] model proposed by Petkova (2006), and [8] model combining the Fama-French’s 
and Petkova’s factors. Estimated coefficients, t-statistics (in parentheses) are presented. ܴ2 (in percentage) and standard errors (s.e.) are adjusted for degrees of 
freedom. F-statistics and their p-value test the joint significance of the corresponding loadings. See notes to Table 2.3 for explanations of variables.
Excess return on Value portfolio Excess return on Growth portfolio
[2] [4] [6] [8] [2] [6] [8]
Constant 0.0218 0.0209 0.0609 0.0451 0.0039 -0.0032 0.0055
(1.37) (1.32) (1.63) (1.22) (0.97) (-0.44) (0.99)
Rm-Rf 1.2440*** 1.2553*** 1.4286*** 1.3155*** 0.9440*** 0.9350*** 0.9989***
(12.9) (13.0) (13.1) (11.8) (38.7) (43.6) (59.1)
HML 0.5934*** 0.5027*** 0.4687*** -0.1234*** -0.2644***
(5.9) (4.57) (3.6) (-4.8) (-13.3)
SMB -0.0687 -0.0785 -0.1203 0.0177 0.0633
(-0.49) (-0.56) (-0.79) (0.50) (2.71)
DIV -0.9214 -0.6139 0.0517 -0.1109
(-1.40) (-0.94) (0.40) (-1.13)
TERM 0.9336 0.5468 -0.3253 -0.1022
(0.74) (0.44) (-1.31) (-0.54)
DEF 0.0446 0.0298 -0.0612*** -0.0533***
(0.41) (0.28) (-2.89) (-3.34)
STBill -0.1823 -0.0745 0.1915 0.1027
(-0.21) (-0.09) (1.10) (0.78)
TURN
WML -0.2445**
(-2.00)
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Table 2.12 - Continued
Excess return on Value portfolio Excess return on Growth portfolio
[2] [4] [6] [8] [2] [4] [6]
Adj R2 84.31 84.85 80.00 82.29 85.83 89.95 94.32
s.e. 0.2313 0.2299 0.2372 0.2317 0.0584 0.0469 0.0352
F-statistics 61.6 52.6 34.3 29.4 309.9 298.9 431.1
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
*: significant at 10% level           **: significant at 5% level             ***: significant at 1% level
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CHAPTER 3: FAMILY OWNERSHIP AND STOCK PERFORMANCE
3.1. Introduction
Family firms account for a significant proportion of many economies. For example, 
Faccio and Lang (2002) found that among 5,232 listed firms in 13 Western European
countries, 44 percent are held by families. In the U.S., founding families own at least 
one third of the largest listed firms (Anderson and Reeb 2003a). There are two-third of 
French stock market that are family firms (Sraer and Thesmar 2007) and a similar 
proportion is observed in nine East Asian countries (Claessens, Djankov and Lang 
2000). In Turkey, family firms also account for more than one third in number and one
fifth in market capitalisation of the ISE.
The significant influence of large block shareholders on firm performance has been 
discussed widely in the literature while the interesting case where large shareholders are 
members of the same family has been unnoticed until very recently. Because of their 
very different characteristics from other large shareholdings, family ownership is 
documented to have a strong positive relation with the firm performance. Since the 
relation between firm performance and stock returns is well recognised, it is natural to 
ask if family ownership has any impact on the firm stock performance. A few studies 
have addressed the issue but from a relatively narrow approach. They tend to link the 
stock prices with the presence of the founders or founder/CEOs in the firms. Hence, a 
broader question of whether stock performance is also driven by the nature of family 
firm ownership seems to have been overlooked.
It is worth noticing that the majority of research concerning the subject was done in the 
U.S, with fewer studies looking at markets characterized by family-owned businesses, 
such as Hong Kong, Italy, Russia, South Korea, Thailand and Turkey. Among the latter 
studies, family firms in Continental Europe and East Asia were the main testing target. 
The present chapter shows that a Middle Eastern country with a long history of family 
ownership like Turkey can offer a fresh view of how their typical characteristics are 
reflected in the way market values them.
High concentrated ownership, excess cash flow rights (i.e. insider system) achieved 
through pyramid structures and complex business groups are common in many 
countries and especially prevalent in emerging markets, where investor protection and 
takeover markets are underdeveloped. Distinct advantages of the two types of structure 
107
for affiliate members in terms of financing, payoffs and tax expenses make them 
potentially attractive; these systems however can potentially harm minority shareholders’ 
interests. In an analysis of eighteen emerging markets including Turkey, Lins (2003) 
shows that highly concentrated ownership coincides with low investor protection and 
civil law system. In Turkey, a large proportion of firm shares concentrated in the hands 
of an individual or a family who prefers to retain their controls over the firm. If that 
culture really signals a low protection system over minority shareholders, it is natural to 
ask whether outside investors and the market view stocks of family firms in a different 
way from those of non-family firms and, if so, what the underlying reasons behind this 
divergence are.
This chapter contributes to the existing literature on family firm performance in the 
following main respects. Firstly, unlike most previous studies, beside direct ownership, 
indirect ownership is also identified and included. This is crucial for studying family 
firm behaviour, especially within the complex businesses which are commonly seen in 
civil law countries. Especially in Turkey, most family firms keep their indirect controls 
via holding firms. Thus, failure to taking indirect shareholdings into account may bias 
the results. Secondly, unlike previous studies, the chapter covers not only the largest 
firms but also small and medium size businesses which are how most family firms 
started. Moreover, studying only the largest companies could lead to favouritism toward 
family firms. This is because, in practice, many new businesses do not survive in the 
first five years of starting up and among the survivors, not all could carry on and grow 
to reach the top group. Hence, those which could achieve that level while still retain 
family control are usually exceptionally strong firms. Examining smaller firms will 
allow the performance of firms at all stages of business life cycle and scope to be 
revealed. Last but not least, although there has been a large amount of research done on 
family firms, few studies have looked at how the market views family firms in stock 
markets, and in particular whether outside investors are afraid of having little voice in 
the firm over-controlled by the owner family or they trust the family’s strong 
commitment and simply imitate the insiders’ investment behaviour.
The results of both univariate and multivariate analyses indicate that in Turkey stocks of 
family firms do not indeed outperform non-family stocks. Although the benefits of 
family ownership seem to exceed the costs and the potential issues relating to excess 
voting rights are less serious in Turkey, there is no evidence suggesting a market’s 
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favouritism towards family firm stocks. The return differential between family firm 
stocks and their non-family firm counterparts is statistically insignificant. However, 
family ownership factor plays an important role in explaining the sensitivity of firm size 
and B/M with the ownership characteristics. Moreover, B/M effects seem to be stronger 
in large firms and the relations between firm age, recent stock prices and stock 
performance are positively significant only among small firms. The results are robust 
after controlling for possible endogeneity and non-spherical disturbances such as 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the data.
The organisation of the rest of the chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 outlines typical 
characteristics of Turkish ownership system which have driven the choice of sample.
Section 3.3 briefly reviews recent literature on the relation between stock returns and 
highly concentrated ownership structure. Data and methodology are described in section 
3.4. Section 3.5 summarises and discusses the main findings while the final section 
offers concluding remarks.
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3.2. The Turkish ownership system
This section will highlight some key characteristics of Turkish ownership structure that 
play an important role in understanding the stock market performance of publicly listed 
firms in the country. This is driven by a study of Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2007) who 
show that country-specific characteristics do capture more of the changes in firms’ costs 
and benefits in improving corporate governance measurements than firm-level 
characteristics. Additionally, having an overview of the market will provide a better 
understanding of how the market operates, of the investors’ behaviour and of level of 
risks priced in stock returns. It will also help motivate the choice of explanatory 
variables used later in this chapter in order to capture the stock price movement.
Being pervasive in Turkey, family firms are those generally characterised by high 
concentrated ownership retained over many generations. They also normally hold 
excess control rights via pyramid structure, complex business groups, and/or special 
voting rights. Apart from those common characteristics, in Turkey almost every 
business groups have their own banks and most private banks are under control of some 
of the wealthiest families. The next sections will describe the main characteristics of 
ownership system in Turkey and discuss how they may affect firm stock market 
performance.
3.2.1. High concentrated ownership
It is not unusual to have large shareholders present in a firm. Gursoy and Aydogan 
(2002) observe that most of public listed firms in Turkey are high concentrated 
ownership firms. They can be block shareholders, such as institutional or state 
shareholders. However, firm ownership concentrated in the hands of an individual or 
families exposes to different styles of corporate governance and risk taking which can 
lead to interesting behaviour, especially when it becomes a common phenomenon in an 
economy. This chapter therefore will study the impacts of large shareholders who are 
relatives in the same family.
Although the literature on family ownership is widespread, there has not been a 
standard definition of family firms. In general, family firms are those where the 
founders or their descendants keep ultimate control of the firms. Family firms, in 
particular, typically have a poorly diversified shareholding, a longer investment horizon, 
and often retain control at the senior management level. 
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In the early stage of the ISE establishment, during the 1990s, the government 
intervention on firm operations was significant, especially within key sectors such as 
banking, and oil and gas (Demirag and Serter 2003). This practice did not create an 
attractive enough environment for investors to set up their own businesses in industries 
that were left for private sector. After the major economic and banking reform which 
took place in 2001, the number of firms increased rapidly as a result of privatisation and 
a more liberal investment environment for private investors. Besides family firms with a 
very long history, such as Anadolu group found in 1950s by Yazici and Ozilhan 
families, the number of new family businesses was also growing and taking a dominant 
role in the economy during that blooming period. It is noticed that over the period of our
analysis, the number of family firms has increased significantly, especially within the 
last decade. Family firms, moreover, account for a considerably large value of market 
capitalisation in the stock market and play a growing important role in the key sectors.
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 describe the market shares of family firms in the Turkish economy. 
As can be seen from Figure 3.1, in Turkey family firms account for about one third of 
almost every sector in number and are mostly present in the sectors of non-cyclical 
consumer goods, basic industries, general industries and financial services. It is also 
worth mentioning that family firms seem to monopolise cyclical services, such as repair 
and transportation services.
In terms of market capitalisation, the first impressions may not reflect the real picture. 
From Figure 3.2, it seems that families tend to own small and medium size businesses 
and with exception of non-cyclical consumer goods (e.g. food producers and pharmacy 
providers), financial sectors and basic industries. However, as mentioned earlier, 
business group system is a common mechanism of corporate governance in Turkey. 
Within business groups, a range of firms are connected in either a complicated web of 
affiliated members or are operating in different management levels, i.e. a pyramid 
structure. When families get involved in a business group, even though the owner 
family owns the ultimate control (i.e. voting rights or cash flow rights) over some key 
members only, it holds the central position in the board of the “parent company”. 
Technically, the family has no ultimate control over the rest of the business group. 
These firms will therefore be classified as non-family firms. However, the owner family 
practically has significant influences on those non-family firms of the group.
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Take Dogan Group (registered under the name of Dogan Sirketler Grubu Holding A.S.) 
as an example. The original company was found in 1961 by Aydin Dogan who is also 
currently the president of the group. There are 139 subsidiary members18 cross the 
border in which, 69 members are based in Turkey, and operating in six major business 
areas, which are oil and gas, auto parts, retail, real estate, tourism and media. Among 
the firms based in Turkey, only about 10 percent are recognised as family firms while in 
practice, they are mostly controlled by the Dogan family. The following section will 
discuss these structures in a deeper level.
Although it is difficult to distinguish such management influence of an owner family, it 
is possible to capture the impacts, if any, of family ownership in stock markets. In 
theory, in an efficient market, any influences should be appraised by the market and be 
fairly reflected in stock prices. It also raises the need of examining the actual roles of 
family firms in countries characterised by family ownership. This chapter, therefore, 
will address these questions in the case of Turkey.
It is worth noticing that unlike other concentrated ownership countries, in Turkey, many 
family firms were originally set up by the government and were later privatised. Thus, 
the founder’s impacts do not seem to have the same meaning to these in other countries. 
Moreover, it is interesting that in Turkey majority of the first member of the family set 
up or took over a privatised firm and transformed it to family firm still remains in the 
board. It is therefore more sensible to address the potential impacts of family ownership 
on the firm than being limited in the founder/CEO relation.
From a legal prospective, Turkey is considered to have a weak minority investor 
protection system. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) notice that 
countries with common law legal origin seem to have better protection of minority 
shareholders than civil law countries, of which Turkey is a member. Although family 
ownership has advantages of eliminating conflicts of interest between management and 
ownership, we should be instead concerned about the interest conflicts between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. These are considered to be the main 
                                                            
18 They are firms whose the financial and operating policies the Dogan Group has the power to control because it
holds more than 50% voting rights or in accordance to the firm policies. Data are from Dogan Group consolidated 
financial statements.
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agency problems concerning family firms. Arguments on these problems will be 
discussed from both sides in section 3.3.1.
Technically, according to Turkish Company Law, firm fundamental decisions require 
approval of at least two-thirds of total voting rights and whoever holds one third of the 
voting rights will have the veto power. Since not all minority shareholders exercise their 
voting rights, owning a lower percentage could be enough to take control over the firm 
decision making process. Indeed, the system seems to show favour toward large 
shareholders. Although minority investors can intervene if they own at least 10 percent 
of total voting rights of the firm, there is however no official statistics on whether or not 
they actually exercise their rights in practice.
Another mechanism via which ultimate control can be hidden is using complicated firm 
business structure. It is a common practice in many countries with civil law origin that 
high concentrated ownership is not clearly seen in firm published reports. As mentioned 
earlier, the real ownership is preferred to be retained inside a complicated web of 
business groups or pyramid structure. The next section will introduce how the ultimate 
control of family firms can be spread out under these two structures.
3.2.2. Business groups and Pyramid structure
Let us first look at business groups which normally consist of a number of companies 
affiliated with each other around one holding firm. It is believed that the business group 
system prevalent in Turkey had played a special part in reduce negative impacts of high 
inflation and unstable economic condition during 1980s and 1990s (Yurtoglu 2000). 
With advantages of minimising asymmetric information and risk sharing among 
members, business groups are likely to be less affected by changes in market conditions 
than other entities. Supporting this view, Khanna and Palepu (1997, 1999) and Kim 
(2004), to name but a few, indicate that business groups can enhance firm values and 
fulfil the gap of missing labour market and/or financial market. The structure also 
allows money to be injected into poorer performing members when it is needed 
(Friedman, Johnson and Mitton 2003) and gain significant competition advantages from 
having “deep pockets” (Cestone and Fumagalli 2005, p.194).
Company members in business groups are related to each other in a couple of ways. 
They could be affiliated without a direct link in management. Firms could also be 
organised in a pyramid structure in which one firms controls a number of other firms 
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and those firms again control another groups of firms and so on. In this way, voting 
rights would be spread out in several levels of the pyramid but the ultimate control 
could remain in the hands of a few legal entities located at the top level. Figure 3.3 
quoted from Yurtoglu’s (2000) study provides examples of a complex web of 
ownership and a pyramid structure illustrating the two types of organising business 
groups in Turkey. These complicated structures of business groups allow large 
shareholders, especially families, to have low percentage of direct shareholdings but to 
remain as the ultimate owners because of their much greater proportion of indirect 
shareholdings. This practice is particularly common as Turkish law does not limit cross-
ownership in corporate governance.
Figure 3.3 takes Hurriyet Gazetecilik, a publishing company, of Dogan group as an 
example. At the end of 1996, the firm had two largest shareholders, Dogan Yayin 
Holding and Iktisat Bank. Directly, Aydin Dogan, the founder of Dogan Holding, did 
not have control over Hurriyet Gazetecilik. He however owned 66% shares of Dogan 
Holding which had 71.24% of the total shares of Dogan Yayin Holding which again 
owned 68.2% shares of Hurriyet Gazetecilik. Thus, indirectly, Aydin Dogan held the 
ultimate control of Hurriyet Gazetecilik company although his cash flow rights was 
about 32% (equals to 68.2% multiplied by 71.24% and 66%). In this example, Dogan 
Holding was the firm on the top of Dogan group pyramid and through this structure, an 
individual who could have voting rights exceed cash flow rights in a firm at a lower 
level of the pyramid therefore held a significant control over the firm.
Another example is a structure with a complicated web of affiliates in Eczacibasi group, 
founded and controlled by Eczacibasi family. Let us start with Eczacibasi Ilac, a 
pharmaceutical company, as the centre of the web. The firm had two main shareholders, 
Finans Yatirim (28.26%) and Eczacibasi Yatirim Holding (21.62%). The second 
diagram of Figure 3.3 illustrates the complicated shareholding between members where 
the two-way ownership is common. Ultimately, Eczacibasi family used two holding 
firms, Eczacibasi Yatirim Holding and Eczacibasi Holding, to exercise their control 
rights over affiliated firms like Eczacibasi Ilac. Ultimately, they held about 78% of the 
firm voting rights.
Having considerable advantages, pyramid ownership structure in business groups is 
particularly popular and in some countries, it is even referred to a specific type of 
business, such as oligarchs in Russian or chaebols in Korea. A study by Burga (1994) 
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points out many benefits of pyramid structure for affiliated members including tax 
advantages and financial advantages. He argues that pyramid system could avoid double 
taxing on revenues one firm receives from its affiliates. Even after the benefit was 
removed in 1986, firms still can defer paying this tax to the following year. Moreover, 
organisations operating under pyramid structure have another advantage of transfer 
pricing between their legal entities of the same group, which could again benefit the 
firms in reducing significantly tax expenses. Furthermore, pyramid structure is an useful 
tool to minimise shares owned by controlling shareholders while maximising dilution of 
minority shareholders (Burkart, Groomb and Panunzi 1997), to limit owner family’s 
liability (Barca 1995) and to enable them to easily share management roles (Khana and 
Palepu 1996). In terms of financing, Burga (1994) also indicates that holding firms 
could gain capital from the increase of their affiliated members’ share capital after 
revaluation. In addition, it seems to be more flexible to reallocate capital within 
members which otherwise requires financial services from outside which service fees 
are required. It even becomes more convenient when banks are also affiliated in the 
pyramid, which is a common case in Turkish business groups. 
In addition, a pyramid structure allows cash flow rights to be separated from voting 
rights, in other words, it is argued to create a higher level of separation between 
ownership and control within business groups. For instance, Claessens et al. (2000) 
provide a series of examples supporting such separation in nine East Asian companies. 
Nevertheless, Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006) show that the popularity of pyramidal 
business groups is not because the groups pursue this objective, but more importantly to 
benefit from the financial and cash flow advantages of the structure. 
In Turkey, a pyramid structure is built by setting up holding firms which own majority 
shares of their affiliate members. It is common in Turkish business groups that large 
shareholders in the top level own a modest amount of shares in the parent company but 
hold a large proportion of shares of the holding firm that ultimately provides them with 
large indirect ownership over the affiliate members. As a result, the large shareholders 
in the business groups will benefit not only from common advantages of a pyramid 
system but also from the diversion of cash flows. These could explain the growing 
number of new holding companies in Turkey.
Another problem investors in Turkey might concern is that in contrast to common-law 
courts, civil-law countries do not have a strong minority shareholder protection system. 
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Studying several legal cases in both common-law and civil-law systems, Johnson, La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2000) document the different views when courts 
dealing with tunneling- the transfer resources out of the firms to controlling 
shareholders- in the two legal regimes. They show that while in common-law system, 
self-dealing transactions which may lead to tunneling could be challenged by outside 
investors, in civil-law countries, if there are plausible business reasons, it is viewed as 
acceptable. Supporting this view, Yurtoglu (2000) argues that pyramid structure might 
put the minority shareholders’ interests at risk in civil-law countries. Ugurlu (2000) also 
concerns that entrenchment problem is widespread in Turkish manufacturing sector. On 
the contrary, in common-law system, the burden of providing proof for transactions 
dealing within the management can be heavy and tends to favour toward small 
shareholders. Those concerns are perhaps the reasons why pyramidal group structure is 
rather rare in common-law countries, such as the U.S and the UK. These corporate 
governance issues will be discussed further in section 3.3 which however shows that 
these problems can also exist in developed markets (although less serious) as well as in 
less developed markets.
The next section introduces insider system which is common in civil-law legal regime 
where majority of country wealth is concentrated in the hands of a few.
3.2.3. Insider voting right system
A majority of Turkish firms do not follow the “one-share one-vote” principle. In other 
words, companies can issue shares with different cash flow rights and special voting 
rights. This allows family shareholders to have their voting rights exceeding their cash 
flow rights. Their control over the firms therefore does not necessary reflect their 
investment in the firms. More interestingly, Demirag and Serter (2003) point out that in 
Turkey, any decisions relating to issuing new shares with excess voting rights are 
required to be taken at any general shareholder meeting level while decisions of 
reducing special voting rights can only be taken upon an approval of the owners of the 
special shares themselves. In addition, the special voting right holders are not given a 
deadline to approve these voting right limit proposals. That means they can delay 
making decisions. The favouritism toward shareholders with special voting rights, who 
are normally family members, raises a concern over minority shareholder protection in 
family firms. Supporting this view, Yurtoglu (2000) agrees that outside investors do not 
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have much control or influence on the firm decision making process in an insider 
system of corporate governance.
Further adding to those characteristics, Demirag and Serter (2003, p.47) refer to Turkey 
as an “insider system country” where the country’s wealthiest families are dominant 
shareholders. The term insider system refers to a corporate governance system with a 
smaller equity market, a less active market in corporate control, high concentrated 
ownership, less takeover activities and a complicated web of inter-corporate holding 
companies (Franks and Mayer 2001). This system is likely to mostly benefit the owner 
families in retaining their control and avoiding hostile takeovers19. Indeed, in 2013, a 
Family Business survey on Middle East region done by PwC, one of the four leading 
auditing firms, reports that Middle Eastern family firms are less concerned about 
investing on new technology or impacts of global economy but instead concerned about 
the probability of consolidation. In contrast, Fahlenbrach (2009) finds U.S. 
founder/CEOs in family firms actively search for merger and acquisition opportunities. 
This difference in attitude towards consolidation affects corporate governance and stock 
performance of family firms between those countries. It is therefore especially 
interesting to examine how Turkish family firms maintain a great wealth for the owners 
while still enjoy capital flows from outside investors who perhaps favour the richest 
family reputation.
In theory, the insider system may raise concerns that excess voting rights can lead to 
capital exploitation of outside investors. According to Barca (1995), excess voting 
rights allow owners of family firms to retain a significant control while limiting their 
liability obligation. The structure is also used to exploit as much funding from the 
outsiders as possible (Bianchi and Casavola 1996).
However, Demirag and Serter (2003) believe that the excess voting rights in relation to 
cash flow rights is less problematic in Turkey in comparison with other insider system 
countries. The cash flow and voting rights seem to be rather aligned. Thus, it might not 
be very useful to track voting rights and cash flow rights to identify ultimate control in 
Turkish firms. This instead can be done by tracking backward of the pyramid for 
indirect ownership, and that is the method this chapter will use.
                                                            
19 Hostile takeovers are mergers or acquisitions in which bidders can take over a target firm whose managers and the 
company’s board are not willing to accept the offer.
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3.2.4. Conclusion
Family firms are particularly pervasive in Turkey. They are defined as firms which have 
high level of ownership concentration in the hands of individual or family members. In 
Turkey, family firms account for about one third of total firms in almost every sector 
but difficult to identify as the proportion of shares directly owned by family members 
are diluted in business groups. They are usually organised in a complicate web of firms 
or a pyramid structure. These structures are however a useful device to retain their 
ultimate ownership without showing it in the annual reports. Some advantages such as 
reducing tax expenses, payoff and financing have made business group structure a
popular type in many civil-law countries including Turkey, and it appears to be 
particularly beneficial for family businesses.
On one hand, there are some common characteristics that Turkish family firms share 
with those in other countries where the wealthiest families dominate the economies. As 
a country with a civil-law origin, Turkey has a rather weak minority shareholder 
protection system. Therefore, the dominance of families in family firms over minority 
investors in the decision making process and benefit sharing is concerned. Moreover, 
the insider system may favour the large shareholders, especially with an absence of the 
“one-share one-vote” rule. Issues relating to the excess voting rights, however, seem to 
be less serious in Turkey since the relation between cash flow rights and voting rights is 
relatively aligned.
On the other hand, Turkish family firms have distinctive characteristics which may 
influence the way firms and stock prices perform. Firstly, most family firms were 
originally set up by the government and were then privatised. Thus, in Turkey, the 
founder’s impacts do not seem to have the same meaning to those in other countries and 
will not be our main focus. Secondly, Middle Eastern family firms seem to be more 
concerned about being acquired or merged, so they tend to retain a high level of shares 
owned within family members and are not likely to diffuse the ownership. Last but not 
least, most of family firms in Turkey are under business groups. The complicated 
structure of those groups tends to spread out the actual ownership through a long chain 
of member companies. This raises the need of tracing out indirect ownership of 
individual firm members within a business group to avoid any misleading results. 
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Next, the chapter will provide a closer look at potential costs and benefits of family 
firms for the firms and investors as well as some recent discussions on the subjects.
3.3. Literature review
This section’s main objective is to review the existing literature on potential impacts of 
large shareholders and the role of family ownership on firm related aspects, and to 
motivate our research questions. Recent studies tend to agree that firms with large 
shares concentrated among the founders and/or their successors generally perform better 
than non-family firms but at the same time concern about potential negative impacts of 
this structure toward minor shareholders. This section will start by briefly giving an 
overview of potential problems caused by such ownership structure.
3.3.1. The potential costs of family ownership
Firstly, with a substantial ownership of voting rights and cash-flow rights, large 
shareholders can use their controlling power to intervene in the firm decisions towards 
their benefits, which are not necessary in line with those of the firm. For example, Fama 
and Jensen (1983) show that the complex system of combining ownership and control 
creates an opportunity for large shareholders to exchange firm profits for private rents. 
In addition, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest that the significant premium associated 
with superior voting rights and control rights induces large shareholders to seek to 
extract benefits of control from the firms. Perhaps most damning, Johnson et al. (2000) 
point out that controlling shareholders (including owner families) have incentives and 
power to transfer resources out of the firms, especially during crisis times. Firm 
resources could include but not limit to assets, firm profits, opportunities and financial 
advantages. This allows the controlling shareholders to benefit themselves at the 
expense of small investors and creditors. Through case studies, they show that this 
practice, known as “tunneling”, legally occurs not only in emerging markets like 
Russia20, but also in effective law countries, such as France, Italy and Belgium.  
Secondly, Bebchuk, Kraakman and Triantis (2000) reveal that managerial agency 
problems between management and large (non-management) shareholders in emerging 
markets are larger in an order of magnitude than those in developed markets. There are 
several reasons for this issue. For example, the Economist Intelligence Unit (1998 cited 
                                                            
20 Similar cases observed in Korea (Bae, Kang and Kim 2002) and India (Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan 2002).
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in Lins 2003, p. 160) reports that in emerging economies, markets for mergers and 
acquisitions are underdeveloped. It therefore does not create an encouraging 
environment for ownership diversification. Moreover, since most firms in emerging 
markets have a relatively smaller size in comparison to those in developed countries, 
perhaps the need of attracting external capital are not large enough to compromise 
controlling powers. Furthermore, La Porta et al. (1998) indicate that emerging markets 
have weaker legal systems and lack of effective creditor and shareholder protection 
mechanisms. Lins (2003) also suggests that high concentrated ownership coincides with 
low investor protection system in emerging markets, and thus smaller investors tend to 
seek for high control rights as a tool of self-protection.
Another issue concerning family firms is agency problem but in different form. Under 
family ownership, one special case of large shareholdings, it is less likely to involve 
agency problems between management and ownership but potential raises a new type of 
agency issues, the conflicts of interests between large and minority shareholders. Indeed, 
Faccio, Lang and Young (2001) find that family ownership in East Asian firms causes 
numerous agency conflicts with other shareholders, these are costly for the firms as well 
as minority shareholders. They argue that large insiders can choose low or even 
negative return investments which provide them with expropriation opportunities in 
exchange. Also, corporations with a loose affiliate connection with business groups are 
likely to pay outside investors much lower dividends as they learn that the outsiders are 
less aware of the expropriation issues within such corporations. A series of earlier
studies such as Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2000) to name 
but a few, also describe individual cases where founding families influenced firm 
decisions to maximise their utility, but not firm growth or profits. This sometimes can 
lead to poor firm performance and stock returns in relative to non-family firms.
Thirdly, in terms of accounting profitability, some studies indicate that the positive 
impacts of family ownership on firm performance are far from certain. A case in point is 
the study by Denis and Denis (1994) who show that although most of majority-owned 
firms they studied are family firms, they do not find evidence of better performances. 
Supporting this view, Pedersen and Thomsen (1999) studying the largest firms in 12 
European countries document that the association between ownership concentration and 
return on equity (ROE) is insignificant. They however point out that the institutional 
differences in country level as well as firm level do matter when testing the association. 
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Fourthly, economic and political intervention could be a problem in family countries. In 
a comprehensive study in 2005, Morck, Wolfenzon and Yeung observe that a 
significant proportion of many economies are ended up in the hands of a few families21. 
They argue that controlling large sectors of an economy (which excesses their cash-flow 
rights) allows extremely wealthy families in large corporations to influence economic 
growth and politics. This can raise problems of resource misallocation, less innovation,
hence loss of external capital supply, and public policy distortion, which they denote as 
“economic entrenchment” problems.
Finally, in terms of human resources efficiency, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) show that 
keeping family control can be one of the biggest costs for a firm when the family 
members are not or no longer competent to actively run the business. It may also drive 
talents away. According to Anderson and Reeb (2003a), restriction of some executive 
positions among family members could lead to competitive disadvantages in terms of 
attracting qualified and talented professionals. They further use an example of Wang 
Laboratories, a high profitable firm under its founder but suffered serious losses under 
the management of his son, for illustration purposes22. In addition, Hamelin (2012) finds 
that family ownership affects inversely on firm growth in French small and medium 
firms due to their conservative behaviour when it comes to growth.
In summary, many studies seem to support that firms with large ownership and control 
diffused among family members can be less efficient comparing with dispersed 
ownership firms. However, if family owned firms involve such many problems, why 
they are still viable for generations, able to raise outside funds and pervasive in many 
markets. The next section is going to discuss recent findings on the benefits of family 
ownership structure for the firms as well as for their minority shareholders. 
3.3.2. The potential benefits of family ownership
The first significant benefit of family ownership is reducing agency problems. Since 
large shareholders have greater incentives and power to monitor managers, it is likely 
                                                            
21 Morck, Stangeland and Yeung (2000) compare the proportion of billionaire wealth in GDP around the world and 
point out that Turkey is among the top individual countries in which richest persons own nearly 30 million per billion 
dollars of GDP. 
22 Villalonga and Amit (2006) study Fortune-500 firms and also suggest that family ownership creates firm value 
only under the founders’ power but not under the successors’.  
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that agency conflicts between ownership and control are mitigated. It is minimised 
especially when family members also serve as managers of the firms. For example, a 
study by Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) finds higher agency costs under outsider 
management and an inverse relation between agency costs and fraction of shares owned 
by the managers. Supporting this view, Anderson and Reeb (2003a) find strong 
evidence that when family members are also CEO firms perform better than with 
outsiders.
The notion that family members’ main objective is to benefit themselves even with the 
costs of firm profitability is not a universal view. Fahlenbrach (2009) points out that to 
the founders, their firms are more like their life time achievement, which motivates 
them to look for optimal strategies to maximise shareholder value. Also, majority of 
family shareholders’ wealth seems to be in their businesses, profits of the firms 
therefore largely affect theirs. Indeed, Anderson and Reeb (2003a) observe that on 
average, families in both Forbes’ Wealthiest Americans Survey and the S&P 500 invest 
more than 69 percent of their wealth in their firms. Further evidence by Casson (1999) 
and Chami (1999) indicates that families do not consider their firms as wealth to enjoy 
but rather inheritances to pass on to their heirs.
Contrary to the belief that family shareholders seek to expropriate minority investors, 
Anderson and Reeb (2003a) show that minority shareholders are not negatively affected 
by family ownership. Their study in 2003b extends this argument and indicates that 
although family firms do not seek for low-risk investments, the founder families do not 
risk minority shareholders wealth with promising but risky investments. Moreover, 
Bianco, Bontempi, Golinelli and Pargi (2013) reveal that family firms are even more 
risk averse than non-family firms. Although minority shareholder expropriation can be a 
problem in some East Asian and Latin American family firms, Faccio et al. (2001) note 
that the presence of the family holdings in the firms is more beneficial for minority 
shareholders in well-regulated markets with a high level of transparency. In fact,
countries with more effective law enforcement, such as the U.S. and the UK, can expect 
to see more of the bright side of family ownership. 
Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer (2003) further document that in developed countries, the 
presence of family members in the firm instead of selling out may even add competitive 
advantages to the firm. Supporting this view, Adams, Almeida and Ferreira (2009) and 
Fahlenbranch (2009) among others show that there is a significant positive causation 
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effect of family structure on firm value when the founders remain as CEOs of the firms. 
Moreover, Gomez-Mejia, Nunez-Nickel and Gutierrez (2001) indicate that when agency 
problems are under control, family members acting as firm executives will improve the 
firm survival length.
In addition, family firms tend to be under more pressure to enhance reputation since 
they want to pass on to their successors a good business. Anderson and Reeb (2003a) 
add a valuable point that with a good reputation, family firms can preserve loyalty and 
are also able to pass on their long-term connections, such as suppliers, creditors or 
governing bodies. Thanks to these they would have access to debts with lower costs 
comparing with non-family firms (Anderson, Mansi and Reeb 2003).
Moreover, the view that family ownership is less profitable than non-family is debatable. 
Despite the scepticism about agency conflicts and expropriation, a large number of 
recent studies have indicated that family firms are in fact more efficient than non-family 
firms in many countries. Anderson and Reeb (2003a) show that it is also the case in the 
U.S. Sraer and Thesmar (2007) find that family firms outperform their non-family 
counterparts in France while Barontini and Caprio (2006) confirm the results in 11 
Continental European countries. 
There are a number of explanations for the out-performance of family ownership. 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) posit that family members (either the founder or his 
successors) have strong incentives to mitigate agency conflicts and to maximize firm 
value because their wealth is largely close to firm welfare. Interestingly, Villalonga and 
Amit (2006) observe that within Fortune-500 firms, when founders remain as CEOs, the 
agency conflict between family and other shareholders is far less than agency problems 
between managers and shareholders in non-family firms. Those firms also have better 
performance in comparison to their counterparts (Adams et al. 2009). In addition, 
Baghdasaryan and Cour (2013) imply that concentrated ownership is favoured over 
dispersed ownership as an effective ownership structure if competition level is high.
Furthermore, James (1999) points out that family shareholders have much a longer 
investment horizon and hence have superior investment efficiency. Besides the benefits 
of longer experience with the firms, longer horizon management enables the firms to 
invest in projects that normally firms with a shorter investment horizon possibly cannot. 
It is because of the agency conflicts between shareholders and managers that make 
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long-term investments less attractive in the firm financial statements. Supporting this 
view, Stein (1988, 1989) indicates that long investment horizon firms tend to experience 
less managerial myopia and less likely to exchange promising projects for short-term 
profits. In addition, thanks to their longer horizons, family firms are able to manage 
human resources more efficiently by offering more secured contracts with their 
employees in exchange for slimmer wages (Sraer and Thesmar 2007). 
Regarding to labour restriction within family members, Anderson and Reeb (2003a) 
argue that family members contribute to the firms special skills and qualities, such as 
innovation, value-added expertise (Morks, Shleifer and Vishny 1988) and reputation 
effects (Anderson et al. 2003), that outsiders do not have. It is not unusual that some 
specialised knowledge and techniques may only be passed on within family members, 
especially in industries relating to special formula or recipes. 
3.3.3. Family ownership and stock performance
This section however particularly addresses the relation between stock returns and the 
proportion of shares owned by owner families since their theoretical connection is not 
obvious, and it is also important to later examine the behaviour of stock prices 
concerning family firms.
Starting from agency theory, there is ground to believe that investors are more interested 
in family firms as they have the advantages is eliminating agency conflicts between 
managers and owners. By holding a significant amount of shares, family members 
retain both cash flow rights and control rights over the firm’s major decisions. Even 
when the voting rights are not in accordance with the cash flow rights, managers are 
likely to be monitored more closely by the families than in non-family firms as family 
members have greater incentives to do so (Anderson et al. 2003). The issue of 
separation between ownership and control is therefore expected to be diminished in 
family businesses. With that advantage, the question is whether outside investors would 
prefer family firms to non-family firms?
Also, driven from the risk-return relation and Merton’s (1987) model, Corstjens, Peyer 
and Heyden (2005) argue that family firms bear a higher risk and thus one should 
expect to gain an abnormal positive average returns on investing on those stocks. 
Moreover, if there is a link between whether a firm is a family firm and its operating 
performance, it is natural to ask if the firm ownership status also influences their stock 
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performance. It is because in a well-informed market, firm performance is expected to 
be fully reflected in the stock prices. 
In addition, studying founder-CEO firms in comparison with successor-CEO firms, 
Fahlenbrach (2009) finds abnormal returns when taking a long position on the founder-
CEO stocks and a short position on the descendant-CEO stocks. The excess returns are 
both economically and statistically significant and not explained by the characteristics 
differences between the two groups, such as past returns, size and B/M ratio. The results 
are also not affected by extraordinarily good performance of a few large or technology 
firms during their sample period. Hence, it appears that firm ownership does matter to 
outside investors.
Interestingly, it is widely documented that shares of higher concentrated firms are 
traded at higher prices (see Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Indeed, Gompers, Ishii and 
Metrick (2003) reveal that there is a strong correlation between the level of shareholder 
rights, measured by their Governance Index, and stock market returns. They further 
show that buying stocks of firms with highest shareholder rights and sell those with 
lowest shareholder rights would gain significant abnormal stock returns. The results 
support the earlier studies by Levy (1983), and Lease, McConnell and Mikkelson (1984) 
who found positive correlations between stock prices and voting rights. A more recent 
study by Mok, Lam and Cheung (1992 p.292) also shows that stocks of family firms 
tend to experience similar movements and together form “homogeneous groups” which 
behave differently from the non-family group. In particular, Claessens (1997) provide 
evidence that the higher level of ownership concentration, the higher share prices are. 
They are especially in favour when shares are concentrated in a single insider.
Although family firm performance has attracted much attention of recent studies, few 
have addressed their stock performance associated with their typical characteristics as 
family firms. Instead, they tend to link the stock prices with the presence of the founders 
or founder/CEOs in the firms. Although the link is not always clear-cut, a broader 
question of whether the stock performance is affected by the nature of family firm 
ownership seems to be diluted in studies on block or large shareholders.
This chapter, however, will not address these roles in Turkish firms in order to avoid 
misleading interpretation but will instead address the relation between family ownership 
and stock performance. It is because in 1930s, the Turkish government was the founder 
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and manager of most of banks and large firms operating in the key sectors. Those 
companies were later allocated to the private sector, of which many firms were taken 
over by families. In addition, as mentioned earlier, since the market is young, most of 
the founders still remain with the firms. Thus, the characteristics relating to the founders 
do not seem to be profound.
The chapter hopes to uncover the link between family ownership and stock market 
performance of firms in Turkey, one of the countries with a long history of family 
businesses but surprisingly very little research has been carried out on this topic. It is 
perhaps due to the data constraint on family ownership which is a slightly sensitive 
subject in the country. The work differs from previous studies in the way that its 
analysis does not only cover a longer period but also on both large and smaller 
businesses for the following reasons. 
First of all, the practice that previous studies focusing on the largest listed firms in a 
short time frame could potentially cause bias. For the U.S. market, the largest stock 
groups such as S&P 500 and Fortune indices are the common testing objects23. For 
markets outside the U.S., Barontini and Caprio (2006), for example, focus merely on 
firms with total assets greater than 300 million euros in 11 European countries, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2002) select 539 large firms from 27 wealthy 
countries worldwide, while among few studies in Turkey, Demirag and Serter’s (2003) 
sample covers only the ISE 100 index. Additionally, the testing periods in any of those 
studies are not longer than seven years, Barontini and Caprio (2005) even focus on the 
year 1999 only in their study. A few other researches outside the U.S. may cover a 
slightly longer period but this is not a common theme.
However, studying only the largest companies could lead to favouritism toward family 
firms since about more than half of businesses do not survive in the first five years of 
starting up and among the survivors, not all could carry on and grow to reach the top 
group. Hence, those could achieve that level while still retaining family control are 
exceptionally strong firms. Examining smaller firms will allow the performance of 
firms at all stages of business life cycle to be revealed. In terms of testing horizons, 
looking at a longer period may avoid drawing misleading conclusions. If for some 
                                                            
23 For examples, studies by Anderson and Reeb (2003a, 2003b, 2004), Villalonga, B. and Amit (2006) and Miller, Le 
Breton-Miller, Lester and Cannella Jr. (2007).
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reasons, a firm performs unexpectedly well (or poorly) in one or two years, one should 
not conclude on its overall performance.
In addition, within the 27 richest economies, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1999) note that 30 percent in number and 25 percent in value of firms in the top 
20 are owned by families. These numbers are even higher among smaller firms. There is 
also a possibility that family owners prefer to keep their businesses in a moderate size in 
order to maintain control more easily over generations. Therefore, it would not provide 
a fair view if we exclude small and medium firms in examining the family effects. 
Moreover, as being documented so far, examining how small stocks behave can be 
interesting, such as the abnormal returns they could yield in relative to their large stock 
counterparts. In short, inclusion of small and medium size firms promises reliable and 
interesting findings.
3.3.4. Conclusion
Although the topic of block shareholding has been at the centre of the 1990s debate on 
corporate governance, only recently has family ownership attracted both practitioners 
and scholars interests. Perhaps one of the reasons is that family businesses are no longer 
small and isolated companies, and have become an important part of the global 
economies. In many countries, family ownership is pervasive and the owner families 
even have high level of economic and political influences. It is therefore interesting to 
see how the market and outside investors view family firms in stock markets.
There have been a number of studies arguing that large percentage of shares owned by 
individuals or families can potentially be costly for the firms. The first and perhaps the 
most serious concern is tunneling by which large shareholders extract benefits and 
resources out of firms to serve their own narrow interests. In addition, although the 
conventional agency problems between management and ownership may be reduced 
under family control, another type of agency conflicts raised is those between large 
shareholders and minority shareholders, in which, expropriation outsider investors is the 
main concern. The problem can be serious in countries that have a poor investor 
protection system. Moreover, in some economies where the wealthiest families in large 
corporations have a considerable influence on the economic growth and politics, 
economic entrenchment such as resource misallocation can be costly for the countries. 
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Lastly, a common practice among family firms that owner families hold some of the key 
management positions might lead to human resource inefficiency.
In contrast, recent research tends to agree that family ownership can benefit firms in 
many ways. First of all, there is strong evidence supporting a better firm performance 
under family control in many countries. Also, as mentioned earlier, family ownership 
can reduce managerial conflicts. This is significant for firm operation and therefore for 
firm value. In addition, the concern about expropriation seems to reduce considerably in 
effective law enforcement. More importantly, as majority of the owners’ wealth is in the 
firms, they have the incentive to maximise the firm value which in turn increases their 
wealth. Moreover, family firms tend to be passed on to the descendants, hence, a good 
business must be of their interests. They may also pass on their long-term connection 
and loyalty staffs to the next generations. Furthermore, with a longer investment 
horizon and special skills and qualities, family firm shareholders can benefit the firms 
as well as other investors.
For many years, the large literature on family firms seems to leave some areas 
untouched. It mainly looks at the potential effects of family ownership structure on firm 
operation among large-cap groups. Of which, few studies have considered the possible 
impacts of owner families on the firms reflected in stock markets. Furthermore, the 
discussion is limited on block shareholders whose long-term objectives are largely 
different to those of family firms. This chapter will, therefore, aim to explore whether 
family ownership has any impacts on stock performance in a slightly broader scale. The 
following section will describe in detail the data and methodology employed in the 
chapter.
3.4. Data and Methodology
3.4.1. Data
As discussed in section 3.3.3, although studying large cap stocks is of interests, there 
are no reasons to exclude smaller companies which are how most family businesses 
started and this can also avoid possible misleading conclusions caused by restricting the 
sample in a single group. Thus, this chapter will include all firms in the ISE National 
All-share index.
The sample consists of firms in the index with sufficient accounting data. Unlike the 
previous chapter, this chapter covers both financial and non-financial firms as it 
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addresses possible effects of family ownership rather than B/M effect. In addition, 
having a financial institution in a business group is a very common strategy to reduce 
transaction costs of Turkish corporations. Also, firms are required to consistently 
comply with requirements of publishing information on Public Disclosure Platform 
(Kamuyu Aydinlatma Platformu in Turkish), an official database managed by the ISE24, 
to be included in the sample. The total number of firms resulting from the screening 
process is 221.
Stock prices, market value and other firm characteristics data are obtained from 
DataStream Thomson Reuters database and cover 210 months from July 1993, when 
more than a single family firm are identified, up to December 2010.
For the purpose of ensuring all complicated webs of ownership are properly analysed, 
both direct and indirect ownerships will be taken into account. As discussed earlier in 
this chapter, most Turkish firms run under control of business groups whose pyramid 
structural creates an inter-corporate shareholding system. In addition, it is particularly 
common in Turkey for family members to use holding firms as a mechanism through 
which their ultimate ownership is exercised. Inclusion of direct and indirect ownership 
will therefore enable the analysis to capture the real picture of the family’s power. 
The chapter compiles data on direct ownership following a number of steps. The 
process of collecting data begins with obtaining the number of firm insiders and the 
proportion of shares they own from Bloomberg databases. This gives the primary list of 
firms with a large part of shares directly held by the insiders. There is certainly a 
possibility that those large inside shareholders may not be members of the same family. 
Hence, for firms with two large insiders or more, we check their relationship on other 
sources, such as press and media. The results are then cross checked for accuracy 
against other sources which are firms’ profiles and firms’ annual reports published on 
the ISE main website. Those sources provide the list of the top shareholders and their 
shareholdings. Thus, they also can identify outside individuals or other members of the 
family directly hold a large proportion of the total shares outstanding. However, many 
of the firms’ profiles and reports show the top shareholders are holding firms which are 
discussed earlier to be an effective device to achieve control rights via indirect 
                                                            
24 Website: http://www.kap.gov.tr/yay/English/ek/index.aspx
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ownership. The next objective is to trace out this indirect ownership for all firms that 
have not been in the primary family firm list.
Since there has not been any comprehensive databases recording the proportion of 
indirect shares owned, data on indirect ownership is hand-collected from firms’ annual 
reports updated on the Public Disclosure Platform together with information on 
individual company websites, in which family members are recognised by their family 
names25. If the ultimate controllers of a given firm cannot be identified through the 
above procedures, which is rare in the sample, the firm will be classified as a  non-
family firm. One may concern about the potential data inconsistency between data 
sources. The chapter eliminate this risk by (i) identifying firms by their unique ticker 
symbols instead of company names or database codes when cross checking, (ii) using 
only one database, DataStream, to extract firm-level data once firms have been sorted 
into two groups. 
Interestingly, Turkish firms do not display a tendency to change ownership over time. 
Indeed, Yurtoglu (2000) for example documents that during the period of 1987 to 1996, 
only one merger took place and only six state companies were privatised. The other 
firms did not change their ownership. Subsequently, ultimate owners of family firms 
tend to reduce their direct shareholdings but increase their indirect ownership via 
holding companies. The practice is considered as an effective way for families to retain 
their ultimate control over their firms. The ownership classification therefore does not 
change much over the testing period, however, due to the nature of portfolio formation 
and rebalancing process, the list of firms in each category will change accordingly.
As de-listed firms have no record on ownership, they are dismissed in this analysis. 
During the 2001 economic reform, majority of firms delisted were due to being forced 
to merge or acquired by better performers, which did not necessarily imply a problem 
with their ownership structure. Also, we notice that there were only a couple of firms 
being de-listed in every two years during the testing period. Thus, although there is 
possibility that our analysis may suffer from survivorship bias, there is no reason to 
expect this would materially affect its main findings.
                                                            
25 There exists a probability that family members do not carry the founder’s family name, and it is not possible to 
trace this information for each large shareholder. Fortunately, family firms tend to spread controls among a few 
family members, especially, in Turkey, they either hold a significant amount of shares or a nominal proportion. Thus, 
unidentified status of one member is not likely to affect the firm’s classification.
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3.4.2. Methodology
3.4.2.A. Dependent variables
In this thesis, a family firm is defined as a firm in which an individual or several 
members of the same family jointly own directly or indirectly at least 20 percent of the 
total shares outstanding. This allows family characteristics to be captured precisely and 
ultimate ownership in business groups via pyramid structure is also identified. Since 
scholars have not come to agree on an exact definition of family firms, the literature on 
family ownership uses different thresholds26. Unsurprisingly, studies in the U.S looking 
only at the largest firms, such as Fortune 500, S&P 500, unusually use a lower threshold 
at 10% shares, whereas studies outside the U.S. or on multiple markets tend to have a 
stronger definition of family ownership. That could ensure family members to have 
significant influence on the firm decisions. This is to distinguish their impacts as a 
family rather than just an ordinary large shareholder.
The chapter uses La Porta et al.’s (1999) 20 percent threshold instead of five or ten 
percent when it examines markets outside the developed world. This is to ensure that 
family members own enough shares to have ultimate control rights over the firms. It is 
particularly important for small and medium size firms whose each share tends to have a 
lower price per unit compared to big firms. Thus, it is likely that in those firms, holding 
10 percent of total shares or less does not necessarily guarantee an ultimate control over 
the firms. 
Moreover, under Turkish legal system, investors must own at least 10 percent of the 
total shares outstanding to be able to call for an extraordinary general meeting or to 
request an investigation (Yurtoglu 2000). In other words, investors with 10 percent 
shareholdings or slightly more are still considered as minority shareholders. This 
provides further support for the choice of a higher threshold used in this chapter.
In time-series analysis, stocks are split into two portfolios, family and non-family 
groups, based on their percentage of shares owned by family members. Family portfolio 
consists of firms whose shares concentrated in the hands of an individual or a multiple 
members of the same family with a minimum cash flow rights of 20 percent. Individuals 
representing for the shares owned by institutions or government are not considered as a 
                                                            
26 See Miller et al. (2007) for a survey of different family firm definitions used in literature.
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family firm owner. Private firms are not considered as family firms and not included 
since their stocks are not traded to the public. Firms which have shareholders owned 
less than the 20 percent threshold are classified as non-family firms even if successors 
of the founders are still with the firms. Value weighted and equally weighted portfolio 
returns are computed from July year t to June year t+1 and the portfolios are reset each 
July. The weights of stocks in each portfolio are based on their market capitalisation at 
the end of June, year t, one month before taking a long or a short position.
In panel estimation analysis, stock return of individual firm is estimated in regressions 
with the same weight (equally-weighted) or weighted based on their market value one 
month prior to the formation date (value-weighted).
3.4.2.B. Control variables
The list of control variables can be found in Panel C of Table 3.1, in which, the chapter 
includes all firm characteristics identified by Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam 
(1998) but some were altered with more appropriate proxies for Turkish firms. Turnover 
is employed to proxy for trading activities in Turkey while it is normally represented by 
NYSE-AMEX or NASDAQ volume in the U.S. market and WML stands for past return 
effects. It is based on the Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) momentum strategy of buying 
high 11-month past returns and selling low 11-month past returns also with a lag of 1 
month. Dividend yield and share prices are constructed similarly to the way Brennan et 
al. (1998) do. More specifically, dividend yield is the sum of all dividends paid over the 
12 month period divided by share price and Ln (1/P) is the natural logarithm of the 
reciprocal of the share price at month t-2 (a proxy for immediate stock price changes). 
Following Fahlenbrach (2009), the Fama and French’s (1993) three factors are also 
included in the stock performance analysis in which the excess market returns, Rm-Rf, is 
the return differential between the market portfolio and 1-month LIBOR which stands
for the risk-free rate of return. The proxies for size and book-to-market value effects are 
SMB and HML respectively. The HML and SMB portfolios meant to mimic the risk 
factor in returns associated with B/M and size, respectively, with a 1-month lag.
Motivated by previous studies, such as Villalonga and Amit (2006), and Anderson and 
Reeb (2003a), who document that family businesses which perform well are younger 
family firms, the chapter also controls for firm age, Ln (Age), which is measured by the 
natural logarithm of the time passing since firms were first listed in the ISE (in months).
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Also, a dummy variable, DFamily, is also included in panel regressions for the purpose of 
separately capturing family effects, if any. The binary variable equals to one when the 
firm is a family firm and equals to zero otherwise.
One may concern about possible misspecification caused by endogenous biases. For 
example, Claessens (1997) among others points out that if ownership structure is 
endogenous to firm value, a simple estimation on stock prices on ownership structure 
can be biased. Later in the chapter, section 3.5.3 will provide detail diagnostic analysis 
results on the tests for endogeneity.
3.4.2.C. Descriptive and Univariate statistics
Panels A, B and C of Table 3.1 provide descriptive data of the sample. Panel A 
summaries means, medians, standard deviations, maximum values and minimum values 
which describe the main characteristics of the sample. Panel B presents the stock market 
perform and results of a difference of means test on family firms in comparison with 
non-family firms. It is the two-sample t-statistics test on the null hypothesis that family 
firm and non-family firm groups have the same sample mean. Panel C reports a 
correlation matrix for all the variables in the regression analysis. 
As can be seen from Panel A, Turkish market expresses a high level of diversity. The 
market consists of firms whose market value as small as TRY 2 million (equal to about 
GBP 710 thousand) as well as much larger firms of almost TRY 31 trillion 
(approximately GBP 11.12 trillion). In overall, Turkish firms are medium size of about 
TRY 184.8 million (about GBP 66.15 million). This provides further support to the 
inclusion of small and medium capitalisation companies in the sample testing on 
emerging or less developed markets.
Overall, Turkish firms seem to be at a mature stage of around 14 years in business. The
a substantial economic reform in 2001 in Turkey, which involved a major privatisation 
programme and a large number of mergers and acquisitions, seemed to largely 
contribute to the significant change in business structure and market value of firms. For 
more details, section 3.5.2 of the chapter will give a closer look at the possible impact of 
that restructuring on the overall performance of stocks in the ISE.
From Panel A, it can also be seen that share prices are sometimes overvalued with 
unusually high P/E ratios. Even after taking out the outliers, the average value of P/E of 
Turkish firms are still relatively high compared to those in other countries of the similar 
size. A similar trend is observed for firm annual returns and 12-month revenues. These 
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might be presence of huge business groups and large scale firms which dominate the 
market operating along with much smaller independent businesses.
Panel B of table 3.1 presents results of difference of means tests between family and 
non-family firms. First of all, on average the total market value of family and this of 
non-family firms are not statistically different. Additionally, there is no evidence that 
Turkish family firms are much different from their non-family counterpart in terms of 
firm age, stock prices and revenue. The only exception is P/E ratio, which is statistically 
higher in non-family companies. It lends further support to an the interesting finding 
reported at the end of panel B that portfolios consisting of non-family stocks appear to 
outperform family firm portfolios. Both value-weighted portfolio formation method 
(which takes firm size into account) and equally-weighted method confirm the same 
results. More specifically, if one buys stocks of all non-family listed firms and sells 
stocks of all family firms, and rebalance his portfolios in July of every year, on average, 
he would gain a monthly return of 0.41% and 0.45%, respectively. The return 
differential between investing on family firms and on non-family firms in Turkey is 
however found to be statistically insignificant.
The results on stock market performance of family firms versus non-family firms are 
inconsistent with those observed in developed markets. As discussed in the literature 
review section, most studies find that family firms do better than non-family firms in 
terms of stock market performance. Among them, Corstjens et al. (2005) report 
significant abnormal returns received by investing on French family stocks in 
comparison with the benchmark portfolios and non-family firms while Fahlenbrach 
(2009) observes similar findings for founder/CEO firms in the U.S. market. 
The difference in stock market performance of Turkish family firms in comparison with 
those in developed countries is perhaps driven by several factors. Firstly, as documented 
in section 3.2, the system to protect minority shareholders in Turkey is relatively weak 
and although the potential problems of family ownership are documented to be less 
serious, it still seems to drive outside investors away. For example, Lins (2003) assesses 
the relation between concentrated ownership and firm value across 18 emerging markets 
(including Turkey) and finds that investors discount firms with high concentrated 
ownership which may potentially involve entrenchment and agency problems. The 
study has further confirmed the negative relation between ownership and firm value is 
due to the weaker investor protection in those countries. Secondly, the nature of Middle 
Eastern firms could partly explain the difference since Middle Eastern family firms 
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seem to be more concerned about possibility of consolidation than family firms in other 
regions. They tend to retain high concentrated ownership to avoid hostile mergers and 
acquisitions. That perhaps makes their shares less attractive to outside investors. Finally, 
unlike in other countries, Turkish family firms tend to hold several key management 
positions over generations. As can be seen from Figure 3.4, it is common that key 
members of firm management also hold a large proportion of the firms’ shares and this 
practice seems to be more popular among family firms. For non-family firms, that could 
give a positive signal to outsiders. It however may not necessarily be the case for family 
firms, since the high level of shares owned by those managers is expected and does not 
necessarily imply positive inside information on the firm performance.
Panel C of table 3.1 presents the correlation between explanatory variables used to 
assess stock performance of family firms in comparison with those of non-family firms. 
Family firm dummy appears to have a negative relation with most of the key variables. 
To some extent, this is explained by the fact that the majority of family firm equities are 
growth but low liquidity stocks. The negative relation between family ownership and 
firm age and firm size is expected and also observed in the U.S. by Anderson and Reeb 
(2003a). For a more in-depth analysis, the following sections will perform multivariate 
regressions on stock excess returns of family firms versus non-family firms.
3.4.2.D. Valuation methodology
To assess the relation between family ownership and performance of stock returns, the 
chapter uses basic OLS regressions in which stock excess returns on family and non-
family firms are dependent variables and a range of control variables described earlier 
are independent variables. The regression equation the chapter employs takes the 
following form:
Stock performance = δ0 + δ1DFamily +∑8௜=1 σiXi +∑8௜=1 θiDFamilyXi + ε                                (3.1)
where stock performance is the monthly excess returns on each stock, family firm 
dummy, DFamily, takes the value of 1 when the firm is a family firm and the value of zero 
otherwise, and 8 control variables, Xi, are listed in Panel C of Table 3.1  with a full 
description in section  3.4.2.B).
The chapter estimates both equal- and value-weighted return regressions to investigate 
if extremely large firms influence the results. It also analyses the interaction between 
observations in time-series and cross-sectional dimensions.
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The next section will presents the results of time-series regression using the Fama-
French asset pricing model (Fama and French 1993) with a momentum control variable 
proposed by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and the panel regressions with some 
additional control variables that are identified by Brennan et al. (1998) and Anderson 
and Reeb (2003a) and are relevant to Turkish market. The chapter does not engage in 
the ongoing debate on the ability to proxy for the risk element in returns of these 
variables for family firms, it rather aims at answering the question whether the return 
differential between investing on stocks of family firms and on those of non-family 
firms is driven by the difference in the ownership structure. In order to take into account 
potential impacts of family structure on control variables, the chapter also includes 
(DFamily Xi) terms in the regressions. Once at a time, the experiment removes any 
insignificant impact, the final results reported in Table 3.4 will only show the significant 
effect (if any) of the dummy variable on the control variables.
In robustness tests, the chapter checks if the 2001 economic reform which has 
considerably changed the number of firms and firm ownership structure in Turkey could 
explain the results. It also performs diagnostic tests on the possible presence of 
endogeneity of firm ownership, heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the analysis. 
The results are found to be statistically similar to those previously reported.
3.5. Multivariate analysis results
3.5.1. Time-series analysis
As shown in section 3.4.2.C, buying stocks of family firms and selling stocks of non-
family firms does not seem to promise positive abnormal returns and the results hold 
after firm size has been taken into account in the portfolio allocation. In fact, non-family 
firms yield higher returns than family firms. This section will now seek the underlying 
reasons for the return differentials.
Table 3.2 presents the estimation results, in which the intercepts (δ0) denote the extra 
returns received on top of what has been captured by Fama-French’s and momentum 
factors. The first row of the table shows that after controlling for the four factors, the 
monthly δ0 is -0.05 basis points (bps) for value-weighted family portfolio and is 0.31 
bps for value-weighted non-family portfolio. They correspond to an annual rate of -0.60% 
and 3.72% respectively. The annual returns are -0.12% and 3.12% in equally weighted 
portfolio formation approach. These results provide further evidence supporting the 
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findings in previous studies that difference in ownership structure leads to variation in 
stock performance. However, unlike these studies, the results in this chapter show the 
outperformance of stocks issued by non-family firms over those of family firms in 
Turkey.
As can be seen from table 3.2, the factor loadings associated with the market systematic 
risk, B/M factor and size effects are statistically significant at a high level of confidence 
with an exception of the value-weighted non-family portfolio. Most of the coefficients 
associated with these factors are significant at 1% level, confirming their strong abilities 
to capture the time-series movement of stock returns. 
It is also worth noting that momentum factor does not seem to add much weight in 
explaining the return differentials between the two groups. Both value-weighted and 
equal-weighted portfolio returns are negatively related to the past return effects. In other 
words, family firms do not seem to dominate the successful performer group. 
Interestingly, for non-family firms, the momentum factor is not significant for value-
weighted portfolio but becomes significant at 1% level for equal-weighted portfolio and 
its factor loading changes sign. This means that the value-weighted strategy seems to 
put higher weight on high past return non-family firms while equal-weighted portfolio 
invests more in low past return firms.
Next, time-series analysis also considers the possible impacts of the 2001 economic 
reform on the components of both family and non-family portfolios in table 3.3. The 
economic reform started in the second half of 2001 in order to deal with Turkish 
2000/2001 currency crisis when the market hit the trough on the “Black Wednesday”, 
19th February, 2001. The sample is split into two sub-samples with a cut-off point at 
June of 2001. Since the past return effects do not seem to play a significant role in 
explaining the difference in time-series returns between family and non-family stocks, 
the sub-period estimation does not include this factor in its analysis. 
Controlling for Fama-French three factors, table 3.3 finds that the poorer performance 
of family firms is not a result of sample period specification. The significant change in 
number of firms and firm ownership during the 2001 economic restructuring does not 
seem to distort the firm stock performance in the market’s view. The estimation results 
on two sub-periods of a similar sample length show that both value-weighted and equal-
weighted non-family portfolios yield positive excess returns during the periods before 
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and after 2001. The opposite is true for family portfolios. The net average return of the 
two strategies is however statistically insignificant. This confirms the earlier results in 
univariate analysis.
To investigate the firm stock performance in a broader scale, beside the four factors, the 
exposures to the market, size, B/M and momentum, the chapter also controls for a 
number of other equity characteristics. They are firm age, current price, dividend yields 
and trading liquidity. The cross-sectional results are discussed in the following section.
3.5.2. Panel analysis results
Panel regressions are estimated for both value-weighted and equal-weighted stock 
returns on a number of firm-level and equity characteristics. Table 3.4 presents the 
results of the four-factor model (model 2 in this chapter) and of model with all relevant 
explanatory variables (model 3). The control variables are listed in the first column of 
the table and calculated as described in section 3.4.2.B.
In the first model, the coefficient on the family dummy has a value of -0.1139 for value-
weighted returns and as low as 0.43 bps for equal-weighted returns. They are 
insignificant in both value and statistical terms. In most cases, the dummies have a 
negative effect on the overall portfolio returns. This implies that in terms of accounting 
performance and past returns, stocks of family firms tend to underperform those of 
other firms but the difference in returns is economically and statistically insignificant. 
The results again confirm the earlier findings reported in this chapter. 
These findings seem to suggest that from the market’s point of view, whether a firm is a 
family firm does not influence their stock returns but this can also be interpreted that 
family firm performance is more stable and more predictable than non-family firm, the 
profits from stock price changes in the secondary market therefore tend to be slimmer 
for safer investments. The absence of abnormal returns after controlling for a wider
range of risk factors can also be interpreted that investors efficiently price stocks of 
family firms.
Nonetheless, the results are different from those in the previous studies in similar areas. 
For examples, earlier works suggest that there are abnormal stock returns on investing 
in excess voting right firms (Cremers and Nair 2005) or on founder/CEO firms 
(Fahlenbranch 2009) in comparison to their counterparts. Perhaps, the different research 
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objects could explain that results. It also implies that studying family ownership is not a 
subsection of those studies.
The extended model, however, sees an exception in the case of value weighted stock 
returns. The family dummy coefficient is statistically significant at 1% level. It is worth 
noticing that not only the dummy, some other factors such as HML, TURN and firm age 
also show a much higher level of significance comparing to those in equally weighted 
stock returns. These are driven from the fact that Turkish family firms are mostly old 
medium size businesses and less active in stock trading activities. As discussed earlier, 
although having been around for a much longer period, the family businesses prefer 
keeping the size of their business and the amount of stocks offering to the public at a 
moderate level for the purpose of retaining their family control over the firms. This 
trend is however difficult to see if firm size effects are overlooked.
Regarding to the CAPM factors, consistent with the theory, in Table 3.4, the market 
factor still plays a substantial role in capturing cross-section movement of stock returns. 
The betas are largely significant in absolute value as well as in statistical terms. The 
results are similar in both value-weighted and equally weighted approaches. Likewise, 
B/M effects are statistically significant except for the equally-weighted regression in 
model 3. This clearly indicates that the B/M effects appear to be stronger among large 
firms and giving equal weights to all firms could flatten the effects.
In contrast, the exposure to market capitalisation and dividend yield does not seem to 
contribute much in explaining the differential in returns between stocks of family firms 
and non-family firms. The coefficients associated with size effects range from -0.1087 
to 0.0460 with less than 2 standard errors from zero. Similarly, the effects of dividend 
payment changes are economically and statistically insignificant. This implies that in 
terms of dividend policy for outside investors, the two ownership structures do not 
exhibit much difference.
On the other hand, the exposure to 11-month past returns and immediate stock prices is 
statistically significant regardless the weighting approach. The coefficients associated 
with WML effects are negative and slightly more significant in the equal-weighted 
method. They are from -6.61 bps (t-statistics -1.98) to -4.73 bps (t-statistics -1.39) from 
zero. It is in line with the findings in the previous chapter that the winner-minus-loser 
factor plays a significant role in explaining cross sectional stock returns. This is also 
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consistent with previous studies, such as Fahlenbranch (2009) who founds that the 7 to 
12 month past returns could well capture the movement of stock returns at a high level 
of confidence. Similarly, the exposure to stock prices is consistently significant 
indicating a strong relation between recent trading prices of stocks and stock returns in 
Turkey. 
Unlike any variables discussed so far, the combined effects of family dummies and 
exposure to other explanatory variables are much stronger in the case of traditional 
HML (growth prospects) and/or SMB (size prospects). Although the dummies have a 
negative effects on stock excess returns, in combination to the other two factors, they 
turn out to have significant positive impacts on the sensitivity of HML and SMB 
exposure in relation to the excess stock returns. As can be seen from Table 3.4, (DFamily
x HML) plays an important role in explaining the excess returns on equally weighted 
regressions in model 2 and value-weighted approach in both models. Interestingly, the 
exposure on (DFamily x SMB) shows a strong explanatory power in explaining equally-
weighted excess returns but does not appear to have any significant role in value-
weighted regressions. The size effects, perhaps, have been well captured by the value 
weighting approach.
In terms of magnitude, take value-weighted approach in model 2 as an example, the 
exposure of growth prospects on non-family stock return is -0.42 but the interaction 
between the HML and family factor helps change the negative sign to +2.41. This 
means that within high B/M firms (i.e. low growth prospects), the exposure to family 
factor is about +1.99 (equals to -0.42 plus +2.41). Those interesting results show that 
although family ownership does not have significant impacts across the whole market, 
firms with certain characteristics react differently to the family effects. More 
specifically, within the group of firms with high growth prospects (i.e. low B/M equity), 
family firms tend to underperform non-family firms. The opposite is true among low 
growth prospects firms.
Similarly, firm characteristics as regards to their market capitalisation also show a 
different reaction to the family ownership. Accordingly, small firms witness a better 
performance among family firms over their non-family counterparts. As firms grow in 
size, non-family firms tend to outperform family firms. Unsurprisingly, this trend is 
only observed in the equally-weighted approach. When size effects have been taken into 
account in form of value-weighting returns, such combination effect is no longer shown.
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Overall, the results so far in this chapter imply that the market seems to be concerned
about issues associated with family ownership such as outside investor expropriation. 
Hence, the family firm title does not necessarily benefit firms in the stock market. 
However, analysing cross-section relation between the two groups provides a more 
comprehensive view. It appears that their typical characteristics regarding to ownership 
structure do play an important role in explaining the average stock returns. Although the 
matter of whether or not a firm is a family firm does not create significant differences 
on its own, its effects have, in fact, incorporated in other related factors. Some examples 
are book-to-market equity effects, turnover ratio, firm age, and the sensitivity of HML 
and SMB to whether a firm is a family owned business. Interestingly, among low 
growth prospects firms and/or small firms, family firms outperform non-family firms 
and as firms grow in size and growth prospects, non-family firms appear to perform 
better.
Perhaps the long presence of family firms in countries characterised by family 
ownership, like Turkey, has diluted investors’ excitement, if any, for wealthy owners of 
family firm or their fears of expropriation. A fair view of family firm performance not 
their status is therefore fully incorporated into the share prices. Another valuable 
observation is that although it is common around the world for firms to start as a family 
or private firm and the ownership changes gradually as the firm grows, family firms in 
Middle East particularly concern about mergers and acquisition. In other words, they 
tend to act more caution when it comes to their shareholdings related issues to ensure 
their ownership over the firms is retained. The difference in culture and attitude towards 
consolidation is perhaps the main driving force of the different corporate governance 
and stock performance of family firms in Turkey.
To ensure the above results are not driven by statistical biases, the following section 
will perform several diagnostic tests on the same groups of regressions.
3.5.3. Diagnostic tests
3.5.3.A. Endogeneity and Heteroskedasticity
This section will first look at two main problems concerning ownership analysis, which 
are endogeneity and heteroskedasticity in regressions.
Regarding to the possibility of endogeneity, the analysis may suffer from the 
endogeneity problem if family ownership is in fact an endogenous factor. More 
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specifically, there is a possibility that ownership concentrated in the hands of families 
leads to poorer stock performances as a result of the market’s concern over costly 
agency problems. However, there is also another explanation is that stock 
underperformance leads to stocks being less attractive to outside investors and since it is 
in line with the owner families’ objectives, the concentrated ownership is maintained. 
Or, family shareholders retain their high shareholdings because of having positive 
insider information that could excite the market. Also as mentioned in section 3.2, 
Turkish family firms seem to concern more about the troubles of mergers and 
acquisitions and prefer to retain their large shareholdings, a poor stock performance 
may serve the purpose. It is especially convenient for extreme long-term investors like 
themselves when changes in stock prices are not a main source of income but dividends 
and cash flows generated by firm business operation are.
When there is an endogeneity between dependent variable and independent variables, it 
is difficult to make a causal inference of the relation. This problem can be approached 
with instrumental variable (IV) regressions which adjust for endogeneity when 
estimating the relation between concentrated ownership and firm stock returns (see 
examples of Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia 1999, Demsetz and Villalonga 2001, and 
Lins 2003).
This section checks the robustness of the results using two-stage least squares 
instrumental variable (2SLS -IV) regressions to estimate equation (3.1). It regresses 
stock market excess returns on firm ownership, the excess market return, B/M factor, 
size and past return effects (model 2), and trading liquidity, dividend yield, firm age and 
price (model 3) with a selected set of instruments. Instruments in model 2 are all 
explanatory variables apart from the dummies and their combinations. Model 3 has 
some extra instruments which are the lags of those independent variables to ensure the 
number of instruments complies with 2SLS regression’s rules. As a result, the 2SLS 
estimation procedure will capture the endogenous effects, if any, between firm 
ownership and changes in stock market prices.
In terms of heteroskedasticity, if there is, the problem could cause serious biases, 
especially in cross-sectional analysis. One of the key assumptions of OLS method is 
that error terms have a constant variance for all independent variables. If this 
assumption is violated, the error terms are heteroskedastic and there is a 
heteroskedasticity problem in the estimation. Although heteroskedasticity does not lead 
to bias in regression coefficients, it might cause at least two problems. First, the 
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regression estimators are no longer efficient estimates, in other words, they do not have 
minimum standard errors. The second is that bias standard errors can lead to incorrect 
conclusions about rejection or acceptance of null hypotheses. Since heteroskedasticity is 
largely a cross-section problem, it is important to correct biased standard errors in the 
analysis considering a large number of firms. 
This section will estimate the 2SLS regressions controlling for possible 
heteroskedasticity using White cross-section method. The procedure corrects standard 
errors of the estimation and therefore the t-statistic values will differ from those 
reported earlier in table 3.4. Although there are several ways to control for 
heteroskedasticity, the correction method depends a great deal on whether the variances 
in error terms are positively or inversely related to the variable changes. The White 
cross-section method will allow both possibilities to be adjusted.
Table 3.5 summaries the estimation results of the 2SLS-IV regression following White 
cross-section method to adjust for the potential endogeneity and heteroskedasticity
problems in the estimation.
Columns 2 and 4 of the table show results of model 2, and columns 3 and 5 present 
results of model 3. Adjusted R2s report the goodness of fit and F-statistics show the 
overall significance of the models. In addition, the table also shows J-statistics of 
Sargan’s (1958) test checking the validity of the set of instrumental variables used in 
those models.
In general, the absolute values of t-statistics tend to be lower than those in the OLS 
regressions. However, conclusions on the significant level of individual explanatory 
variables are not substantially affected. After controlling for endogeneity and 
heteroskedasticity, family dummy variable mostly remains negatively insignificant, 
except for model 3 on value-weighted portfolio returns. This suggests that although on 
average, stocks of family firms tend to have slightly lower returns than those of non-
family firms, firm ownership seems to significantly influence the firm’s stock prices 
through its effects on other factors. Also, the large values of J-statistics validate the 
choice of instruments used in the 2SLS-IV tests. In short, the consistency in results after 
controlling for endogeneity and heteroskedasticity implies that there is no simultaneity 
between stock returns and firm ownership status. 
The next sections will present additional robustness checks to rule out the possibility 
that the results are purely driven by statistical non-spherical disturbances in the data. 
More specifically, they further control for both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation 
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in error terms which could lead to incorrect interpretation of the significance of 
estimated coefficients.
3.5.3.B. Serial correlation in residuals and Heteroskedasticity
Although like the previous problems, serial correlation does not bias the partial 
regression coefficients, its presence might render the estimation inefficient. In this 
section, panel regressions on both value-weighted and equal-weighted excess returns 
will allow for the presence of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity (clustered 
covariance) to be adjusted using Panel Corrected Standard Error (PCSE) methodology. 
As a result, even though the estimated coefficient values are unaffected, the t-statistics 
have changed after adjusting for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. If there is a 
serial correlation between successive values of the residuals, the t-statistics generated by 
OLS method tend to be inflated. This may lead to a Type I error which is incorrectly 
rejecting a true null hypothesis about parameters. 
Table 3.6 shows the results of another robust check which controls for not only 
heteroskedasticity but also possible serial correlation in residuals. In the table, next to 
the explanatory variable list, columns 2 and 4 represent the four-factor model, and 
columns 3 and 5 control for four more variables, trading liquidity, dividend yield, firm 
age and stock prices. From the table, accounting for serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity yields statistically similar results to those found in the OLS before 
adjusting and those in the 2SLS-IV regressions. Comparing to the t-statistics reported in 
table 3.4, most of the values are lower but still high enough to keep the key findings 
unaffected.
As can be seen from table 3.6, for value-weighted return regressions, the excess market 
return and HML keep showing their strong explanatory power in capturing the 
movement of stock returns cross-sectionally. When adding more variables, liquidity 
effects become statistically significant while momentum appears to lose its weakly 
significant role. Moreover, effects of the family dummies on the sensitivity of HML 
continue to contribute to the overall significance of the models. They are about 1.7 to 
2.4 above zero (t-statistics of 1.95 and 3.10 respectively). 
In equally weighted return estimations, model 2 continues to see the dominant roles of
the market beta and momentum effects while in the expanded model (model 3), turnover, 
firm age and stock prices substantially add their parts in the overall explanatory ability 
of the whole model. Interestingly, TURN variable becomes statistically significant and 
changes sign. The change, however, does not offer a clear explanation in this case. In 
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contrast, it is not surprising that the exposure to book-to-market value effects, the 
variable that was significant at only 10% level before controlling for the non-spherical 
disturbances, cannot keep up its role in the four-factor model. Apart from these, 
majority of other variables remain their roles as before the adjustment was made.
To sum up, the panel analysis results reported for the OLS regressions are relatively 
robust after controlling for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in error terms. 
Although t-statistics have a decreasing tendency, the ability to reject the null hypothesis 
of zero coefficients remains strong. A few exceptions appear in weakly significant cases 
but the changes do not seem to significantly affect the findings.
3.5.4. Conclusion
Empirical results suggest that in Turkey, investing in stocks of firms mostly owned by 
families does not provide abnormal returns compared to those of non-family firms. In 
fact, that strategy may even lead to a slightly lower return on average. Both time-series 
and panel analyses agree on the important roles of family firm status on their stock 
market performance. In that sense, the results are consistent to those in developed as 
well as in other emerging economies. However, this chapter does not confirm the 
abnormal returns should investors put a long position on family firm stocks and a short 
position on stocks of non-family firms. The underlying reason behind this anomaly is 
that unlike in other markets, Turkish family firms are strongly concerned about 
consolidation issues, such as hostile takeovers. They therefore tend to retain a high 
percentage of shareholdings and also hold the firm management positions. In addition, 
their dividend policies are not much different from those in non-family firms. These are 
perhaps the main reasons for the indifference of outside investors to whether or not a 
firm is a family firm. The family ownership effects are, however, incorporated in factors 
relating to stock prices, such as past returns and current stock prices. This is also in line 
with the market efficiency theory, which implies that all relevant and available 
information should be incorporated in the prices.
Further analysing the data, we finds that whether a firm is a family firm or not does not 
directly explain the return differentials between stocks of family and non-family firms 
but their effects on the sensitivity of other variables do. Among low growth prospects 
firms and/or small firms, family firms outperform non-family firms and as firms grow 
in size and market value to book-value, non-family firms appear to perform better. In 
addition, other factors that show significant explanatory power in capturing the return 
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differentials are the market beta, exposure to B/M, size, past returns, liquidity ratio, firm 
age and immediate stock prices. Among large firms, older firms and those with higher 
recent stock prices are more likely to have higher stock returns. The results hold after 
controlling for possible impacts of the 2001 economic reform, possible endogeneity, 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation biases in the analysis.
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3.6. Conclusions and Further research
Among countries that are characterised by family businesses, Turkey with its own 
interesting characteristics has shown how the family shareholders attitude can influence 
the stock market and lead to different stock behaviour than in other countries. Because 
of their highly concentrated ownership in the form of a pyramid or a complex structure, 
family firms could raise serious concern over minority shareholder protection issues. 
However, in Turkey, excess cash flow rights, an effective tool for expropriating 
minority shareholder, are documented not to be popular. In addition, the attitudes of 
Turkish owner families on mergers and acquisitions are rather negative. Thus, 
examining the way outside investors view Turkish family firms in relation to non-
family firms promises different findings to previous studies, and the results in this 
chapter indeed confirm that.
While the literature on corporate ownership structure mainly addresses large 
shareholding, family ownership has recently seen interesting characteristics brought by 
the owner families. Since they normally hold some management positions and wish to 
pass a successful business to the next generations, they tend to preserve loyalty and 
bring special skills. The managerial agency problems in family firms are also eliminated. 
However, some concerns over the operation inefficiency, tunneling and excess cash 
flow rights arise largely among family firms.
By contrast, recent research provides a great deal of support for a better performance of 
family firms over non-family firms. This is attributed to their lower agency conflicts, 
longer investment horizon and more efficient investment policies. However, a majority 
of those studies seem to pay attention on the largest firms leaving the results 
unrepresentative.
This chapter covers not only the largest firms but also small and medium size 
businesses. It also traces ultimate control of both direct and indirect ownership. This is 
particularly vital in examining family corporations whose complicated ownership 
structures show little sign of ultimate owners at first glance. By doing that, the chapter 
aims to provide a more comprehensive analysis on the relation between family 
ownership and stock market performance.
Generally, the results show that family firms’ stocks do not perform as well as their 
non-family stock counterparts. The finding is consistent with the view that while family 
ownership brings many benefits to the firms, the typical attitude of Turkish owner 
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families toward avoiding takeovers or losing their ultimate control may reduce outside 
investors’ interests. However, that relation between family ownership and stock market 
returns is still strong enough to explain the cross-section differential in stock returns 
between family and non-family firm groups. Although family ownership does not 
appear to directly capture the return differentials, its effects on the sensitivity of other 
factors do largely explain the difference. One possible reason for this result is that since 
Turkish firms seek to maintain a balance between cash flow rights and voting rights, the 
benefits of large family shareholders are broadly in line with those of the firms. Hence, 
the market values stocks of family firms are based on their expected risk loadings rather 
than on the fear of extra agency costs likely caused by the owner families. Another 
underlying reason for the insignificant difference in stock returns between the two 
groups is that investors appear to efficiently price stocks of family firms and many other 
firm characteristics.
The variables that have a strong ability to explain most of the cross-section pattern in 
the return differentials between stocks of family and those of non-family firms are, in 
fact, well-known factors, such as the CAPM’s market beta, the Fama and French’s 
(1993) three factors, the Jegadeesh and Titman’s (1993) past returns, liquidity ratio, 
firm age and immediate stock prices. Among large firms, firm age and recent stock 
prices can largely contribute their explanatory abilities in capturing the cross-section 
returns. 
More interestingly, within firms with low growth prospects and/or small firms, family 
firms outperform non-family firms and as firms grow in size and market value to book-
value, non-family firms appear to perform better. The results are robust to a number of 
possible data biases as well as to the Turkish economic restructuring in 2001.
One question that would be of interest for further research is why, as family firms grow 
bigger and stock returns get lower, owner families in Turkey do not leave the firms. It is 
possible that at the firm level, with comprehensive inside information and a long history 
of presence, family shareholders do not leave the firms even if they experience a long 
period of low stock return because they have adequate information to fairly anticipate a 
better performance of the firms in the long run. However, firm level analysis is beyond 
the scope of this chapter and that perhaps leaves room for further research.
Another piece of information from the previous observations could potentially be an 
interesting topic for future research. As seen earlier in Figure 3.4, within family and 
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non-family firm groups, there are a large number of firms whose largest shareholders 
are not present in the management. They would have strong incentives to monitor the 
firm performance and act like independent protectors for the interests of other outside 
investors. Lins (2003) even refers to large non-management shareholders as effective 
external governance mechanisms which can increase firm value in low protection 
countries. Therefore, it may be interesting to look at whether the presence of large non-
management shareholders in almost a half of the total firms in Turkey contributes to 
explaining the behaviour of family and non-family stocks.
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Figure 3.1: Number of firms by sector (2012)
The figure presents number of family firms in total number of firms by sector as at December 
2012. In the total of 325 listed firms, the figure graphs on the 286 firms which have sector 
classification provided in DataStream. Utilities consist of firms providing electricity, gas 
distribution and water. Resources companies operate in mining, oil and gas sector. Non-cyclical 
services are food, drug retailers and telecommunication service providers. Cyclical services
provide industrial transportation and support services. Non-cyclical consumer goods are 
beverages, food producers and processors, health services, packing, personal care and household 
products, pharmaceuticals and tobacco. Cyclical consumer goods supply automobiles and parts, 
household goods and textiles. Financial firms include banks, life and non-life insurance firms, 
investment companies, real estate and other financial service firms. General industrials includes 
firms in aerospace and defence, diversified industrials, electric and electrical equipment, and 
engineering and machinery sub-sectors. Basic industries consist of firms producing chemicals, 
construction and building materials, forestry and paper, steel and other metal products.
A family firm is a firm in which an individual or multiple members of the same family together 
own directly or indirectly at least 20 percent of the total shares outstanding. Firms which no 
individual or families hold more than 20 percent and those do not have information on 
ownership which are rare in the testing sample are classified as non-family firms.
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Figure 3.2: Market value of firms by sector (2012)
The figure presents market value of family firms in total market value of firms by sector as at 
December 2012. In the total of 325 listed firms, the figure graphs on the 286 firms which have 
sector classification provided in DataStream. Utilities consist of firms providing electricity, gas 
distribution and water. Resources companies operate in mining, oil and gas sector. Non-cyclical 
services are food, drug retailers and telecommunication service providers. Cyclical services
provide industrial transportation and support services. Non-cyclical consumer goods are 
beverages, food producers and processors, health services, packing, personal care and household 
products, pharmaceuticals and tobacco. Cyclical consumer goods supply automobiles and parts, 
household goods and textiles. Financial firms include banks, life and non-life insurance firms, 
investment companies, real estate and other financial service firms. General industrials includes 
firms in aerospace and defence, diversified industrials, electric and electrical equipment, and 
engineering and machinery sub-sectors. Basic industries consist of firms producing chemicals, 
construction and building materials, forestry and paper, steel and other metal products.
A family firm is a firm in which an individual or multiple members of the same family together 
own directly or indirectly at least 20 percent of the total shares outstanding. Firms which no 
individual or families hold more than 20 percent and those do not have information on 
ownership which are rare in the testing sample are classified as non-family firms.
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Figure 3.3: Examples of pyramid and complex web of ownership
The diagrams are Figures 1 and 2 from Yurtoglu’s (2000 p.203-204) study illustrating a 
pyramid structure (the first diagram) and a complex web of ownership (the second diagram) in 
Turkey.
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Figure 3.4: Management versus Ownership
The figure compares the number of firms which have the top management also owning a large 
amount of shares and presenting in the board of directors in family firms with those in non-
family firms.
A family firm is a firm in which an individual or multiple members of the same family together 
own directly or indirectly at least 20 percent of the total shares outstanding. Firms which no 
individual or families hold more than 20 percent and those do not have information on 
ownership which are rare in the testing sample are classified as non-family firms.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics for Family and Non-family firms
The table describes summary statistics for the sample. The data covers from July 1993 to 
December 2010 for ISE-National All share firms. A family firm is a firm in which an 
individual or multiple members of the same family together own directly or indirectly at 
least 20 percent of the total shares outstanding. Firms which no individual or families hold 
more than 20 percent and those do not have information on ownership which are rare in 
the testing sample are classified as non-family firms. Firm age is the number of years 
since the firm setting up and Price is the closing share price. The excess market returns, 
Rm-Rf, is the return differential between market portfolio and 1-month LIBOR which 
stands for the risk-free asset. The High-minus-Low, HML, and Small-minus-Big, SMB, 
portfolios meant to mimic the risk factor in returns associated with B/M and with size, 
respectively, with 1-month lag. Turnover, TURN, proxy for liquidity factor, is a 
mimicking portfolio that long in low turnover stocks and short in high turnover ratio 
stocks. Turnover ratio is defined as trading volume divided by number of shares 
outstanding. The momentum factor is Winner-minus-Loser, WML, based on the 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) momentum strategy of buying high 11-month past returns 
and selling low 11-month past returns, lagged 1 month. DIV is the one-year aggregate 
dividend yield. Ln (Age) is the natural logarithm of the time passing since firms were first 
listed in the ISE (in months). Ln (1/P) is the natural logarithm of the reciprocal of the 
share price at month t-2.
Panel B reports results of the difference of means tests between family firms and non-
family firms. The asterisks indicate significance at the ten percent level and t-statistics are 
two-sample t-tests on the null hypothesis that the two groups have the same mean value. 
Panel C provides the correlation matrix for all explanatory variables used in the analysis 
of this chapter.
Panel A: Summary statistics
Mean Median
Standard 
Deviation
Max. Min.
Market capitalization 
(millions TRY)
1,464.2 184.8 4,122.4 30,996.0 2.0
Firm age (years) 14.2 14.7 6.9 23.3 1.5
Price (TRY) 11.0 2.5 30.1 300 0.2
P/E 28.4 11.1 59.3 594.9 1.5
Annual Returns (%) 18.4 10.6 42.2 302.6 -72.8
12-month Revenue
(millions TRY)
1,843.7 253.7 6,088.6 73,584.8 0.2
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Panel B: Difference of means tests
Family firms Non-family firms t-statistics
Number of firms 57 164
Market capitalisation (millions TRY) 923 1,738 -1.53
Ln(Age) 5.09 5.24 -1.51
Price (TRY) 22.45 25.02 -0.28
P/E 7.50 13.47 -1.90*
Monthly average returns % (Equally-weighted) 4.45 4.86 -0.27
Monthly average returns % (Value-weighted) 4.16 4.61 -0.28
12-month Revenue (millions TRY) 1,7829 1.518 0.29
*: significant at 10% level           **: significant at 5% level             ***: significant at 1% level
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Panel C: Correlation matrix
Family firms Rm - Rf HML SMB WML TURN DIV Ln (Age) Ln (1/P)
Family firms 1.0000
Rm - Rf -0.1383 1.0000
HML 0.0133 0.2679 1.0000
SMB -0.0443 -0.0827 0.1846 1.0000
WML 0.0576 -0.1297 -0.4396 -0.1348 1.0000
TURN 0.0052 -0.2806 0.0318 -0.0808 -0.2228 1.0000
DIV -0.4727 0.1183 -0.0932 -0.0423 0.0405 -0.0287 1.0000
Ln (Age) -0.6180 0.1805 0.0394 -0.0445 -0.0604 0.0006 0.7570 1.0000
Ln (1/P) 0.9058 -0.1576 -0.0289 0.0214 0.0625 -0.0166 -0.4820 -0.7706 1.0000
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Table 3.2: Regressions on Excess Returns of Family and Non-Family firm Portfolios
The table shows time-series results of excess returns on Family (Panel A) and Non-family
portfolios (Panel B) formed in both equal-weight and value-weight methods. Model including 
the Fama and French three factors, i.e. the market, size and B/M, is numbered as model [1]. 
Beside these three, model [2] also controls for momentum variable. Regressors are listed in the 
first column, subsequent columns report estimation results for Fama and French (1993) three 
factor (model 1) and also with momentum factor by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) (model 2). 
Estimated coefficients, t-statistics (in parentheses) are presented. R2 (in percentage) and 
standard errors (s.e.) are adjusted for degrees of freedom. Adjusted R2s are reported in 
percentage form. F-statistics and their p-value test the joint significance of the corresponding 
factor loadings. See notes to Table 3.1 for explanations of variables.
Panel A: Family firm portfolio
Value-weighted Equal-weighted
[1] [2] [1] [2]
Intercept -0.0004 -0.0005 0.0001 0.0001
(-0.07) (-0.08) (0.03) (0.02)
Rm-Rf 1.0526*** 1.0523*** 1.0238*** 1.0282***
(25.9) (25.9) (35.1) (35.0)
HML -0.1360*** -0.1539*** -0.0857** -0.0959**
(-2.6) (-2.66) (-2.29) (-2.30)
SMB 0.1131** 0.1118** 0.2775*** 0.2768***
(2.01) (1.98) (6.8) (6.8)
Momentum -0.0379 -0.0218
(-0.70) (-0.56)
Adj R2 76.72 76.66 86.04 85.99
s.e. 0.0825 0.0826 0.0595 0.0596
F-stat 230 172 430 322
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel B: Non-Family firm portfolio
Value-weighted Equal-weighted
[1] [2] [1] [2]
Intercept 0.0031 0.0031 0.0027 0.0026
(1.13) (1.13) (1.01) (0.98)
Rm-Rf 1.0112*** 1.0112*** 0.9740*** 0.9735***
(55.0) (54.9) (54.2) (55.0)
HML 0.0215 0.0222 0.1029*** 0.0738***
(0.92) (0.85) (4.5) (2.9)
SMB 0.0018 0.0019 0.1948*** 0.1926***
(0.07) (0.07) (7.8) (7.9)
Momentum 0.0016 -0.0616***
(0.07) (-2.6)
Adj R2 94.07 94.04 94.10 94.26
s.e. 0.0373 0.0374 0.0365 0.0359
F-stat 1106 826 1111 859
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
*: significant at 10% level           **: significant at 5% level             ***: significant at 1% level
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Table 3.3: Stock performance before and after the 2001 economic reform
The table shows time-series results of excess returns on Family (Panel A) and Non-Family
portfolios (Panel B) before and after the 2001 economic reform. The analysis uses the Fama and 
French three-factor model including the market, size and B/M. Regressors are listed in the first 
column; subsequent columns report estimation results for Fama and French (1993) three factor. 
Estimated coefficients, t-statistics (in parentheses) are presented. R2 (in percentage) and 
standard errors (s.e.) are adjusted for degrees of freedom. Adjusted R2s are reported in 
percentage form. F-statistics and their p-value test the joint significance of the corresponding 
factor loadings. See notes to Table 3.1 for explanations of variables.
Panel A: Family firm portfolio
Value-weighted Equal-weighted
Jul 1993-
Jun 2001
Jul 2001-
Dec 2010
Jul 1993-
Jun 2001
Jul 2001-
Dec 2010
Intercept 0.0024 -0.0064 -0.0029 -0.0022
(0.19) (-1.63) (-0.33) (-0.84)
Rm-Rf 1.0420*** 1.0593*** 1.0456*** 0.9984***
(15.8) (28.1) (22.3) (38.8)
HML -0.768** 0.2359*** -0.1177** 0.1326***
(-2.3) (3.2) (-2.2) (2.6)
SMB 0.1350 -0.1265 0.2430*** 0.5628***
(1.64) (-1.55) (4.2) (10.1)
Adj R2 72.45 88.89 84.34 93.73
s.e. 0.1125 0.0389 0.0805 0.0779
F-stat 84 302 172 534
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel B: Non-Family firm portfolio
Value-weighted Equal-weighted
Jul 1993-
Jun 2001
Jul 2001-
Dec 2010
Jul 1993-
Jun 2001
Jul 2001-
Dec 2010
Intercept 0.0058 0.0031 0.0022 0.0004
(1.24) (1.13) (0.43) (0.22)
Rm-Rf 1.0101*** 1.0112*** 0.9720*** 0.9907***
(41.1) (54.9) (35.5) (49.9)
HML 0.0014 0.0222 0.0915*** 0.1771***
(0.05) (0.85) (2.9) (4.5)
SMB 0.0077 0.0019 0.1637*** 0.4451***
(0.25) (0.07) (4.8) (10.4)
Adj R2 95.10 94.04 93.76 96.12
s.e. 0.0422 0.0374 0.0470 0.0205
F-stat 616 826 477 933
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
*: significant at 10% level           **: significant at 5% level             ***: significant at 1% level
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Table 3.4: Panel regressions
The table presents panel regression estimation on individual stock return with the same weight 
(Equally-weighted) or according to the market value one month prior to the formation date 
(Value-weighted). Model including a family dummy, DFamily, and the four factors, i.e. the 
market, size, B/M and momentum effects, is numbered as model [2]. Model [3] includes four 
extra control variables, which are trading liquidity, dividend yield, firm age and price. Estimated 
coefficients, t-statistics (in parentheses), R2 and standard errors (s.e.) are adjusted for degrees of 
freedom. F-statistics and their p-value test the joint significance of the corresponding factor
loadings. Adjusted R2s are reported in percentage form. See notes to Table 3.1 for explanations 
of variables.
Value-weighted Equally-weighted
[2] [3] [2] [3]
Intercept 0.0209 -0.1984** -0.0010 -0.0572
(1.41) (-2.2) (-0.09) (-0.82)
DFamily -0.1139 -0.5932*** 0.0043 -0.1924
(-1.49) (-3.0) (0.07) (-1.27)
Rm-Rf 1.0279*** 0.9936*** 1.0010*** 0.9810***
(42.1) (38.9) (53.2) (49.2)
HML -0.4202*** -0.3218** -0.1841* -0.0306
(-3.2) (-2.4) (-1.77) (-1.13)
SMB 0.0460 0.0240 -0.1087 -0.0658
(1.36) (0.73) (-0.82) (-0.49)
WML -0.0473 -0.0661* -0.0558** -0.0494*
(-1.39) (-1.98) (-2.1) (-1.92)
TURN -0.1153*** 0.1107
(-3.2) (1.09)
DIV 0.1012 -0.0793
(0.35) (-0.35)
Ln (Age) 0.0955*** 0.0494*
(2.6) (1.73)
Ln (1/P) 0.0162* 0.0156**
(1.70) (2.1)
DFamily x HML 2.4089*** 1.7243** 1.1774*
(2.9) (2.0) (1.73)
DFamily x SMB 2.2004*** 1.9107**
(2.6) (2.2)
Adj R2 84.47 85.07 89.78 89.96
s.e. 0.0639 0.0626 0.0494 0.0490
F-statistics 381 240 527 342
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
*: significant at 10% level           **: significant at 5% level             ***: significant at 1% level
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Table 3.5: Two-stage least-squared Instrumental Variable regressions
The table presents estimations on Value-weighted and Equally-weighted stock return using two-
stage least-squared Instrumental variable regressions that control for endogeneity and possible 
cross-section heteroskedasticity. See notes to Table 3.1 for explanations of variables. 
Instruments include all explanatory variables in apart from the dummies in model [2], with an 
addition of lags in model [3]. Accordingly, estimated coefficients, t-statistics (in parentheses),
R2 and standard errors (s.e.) are adjusted for degrees of freedom, J-statistics are Sargan test of 
the over-identifying restrictions and F-tests report the joint significance.
Value-weighted Equally-weighted
[2] [3] [2] [3]
Intercept 0.0304 -0.2331 0.0205 -0.0252
(1.35) (-0.97) (0.77) (-0.28)
DFamily -0.2012 -0.6923 -0.1388 -0.2595
(-1.63) (-0.86) (-0.89) (-1.57)
Rm-Rf 1.0295*** 0.9921*** 0.9934*** 0.9787***
(34.6) (33.4) (36.3) (47.8)
HML -1.6673*** -0.3312** -0.7698* -0.0206
(-3.2) (-2.2) (-1.81) (-0.78)
SMB 0.0129 0.0222 -1.4655 -0.1414
(0.30) (0.63) (-0.93) (-1.1)
WML -0.1576*** -0.0658* -0.0986* -0.0546**
(-2.7) (-1.96) (-1.94) (-2.13)
TURN -0.1146*** -0.0627**
(-3.2) (-2.3)
DIV 0.0965 -0.1188
(0.32) (-0.51)
Ln (Age) 0.1123 0.0620**
(0.80) (2.2)
Ln (1/P) 0.0191 0.0187*
(0.62) (1.9)
DFamily x HML 1.8808*** 0.7912* 1.1662*
(3.1) (1.85) (1.79)
DFamily x SMB 1.8956* 1.3785***
(1.76) (2.8)
Adj R2 80.12 85.06 84.67 85.88
s.e. 0.0723 0.0627 0.0605 0.0491
J-statistics 27 30 29 31
F-statistics 389 233 521 372
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
*: significant at 10% level           **: significant at 5% level             ***: significant at 1% level
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Table 3.6: Panel regressions controlling for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation
The table presents estimations on individual stock return with the same weight (Equally-
weighted) or according to the market value one month prior to the formation date (Value-
weighted), using panel data regressions that control cross-section heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation in residuals. Model including a family dummy, DFamily, and the four factors, i.e. the 
market, size, B/M and momentum effects, is numbered as model [2]. Model [3] includes four 
extra control variables, which are trading liquidity, dividend yield, firm age and price. Estimated 
coefficients, t-statistics (in parentheses), R2 and standard errors (s.e.) are adjusted for degrees of 
freedom. F-statistics and their p-value test the joint significance of the corresponding factor 
loadings. Adjusted R2s are reported in percentage form. See notes to Table 3.1 for explanations 
of variables.
Value-weighted Equally-weighted
[2] [3] [2] [3]
Intercept 0.0209 -0.1984* -0.0010 -0.0476
(1.28) (-1.81) (-0.08) (-0.68)
DFamily -0.1139 -0.5931*** 0.0043 -0.1814
(-1.49) (-2.6) (0.07) (-1.06)
Rm-Rf 1.0279*** 0.9936*** 1.0010*** 0.9799***
(38.2) (31.5) (43.7) (40.1)
HML -0.4202*** -0.3218** -0.1841 -0.0209
(-3.0) (-2.1) (-1.55) (-0.48)
SMB 0.0460* 0.0240 -0.1087 -0.1401
(1.39) (0.80) (-0.72) (-0.96)
WML -0.0473 -0.0661 -0.0558* -0.0554**
(-0.98) (-1.38) (-1.89) (-2.0)
TURN -0.1153** -0.0627**
(-2.2) (-2.2)
DIV 0.1012 -0.1135
(0.35) (-0.53)
Ln (Age) 0.0955** 0.0485*
(2.4) (1.58)
Ln (1/P) 0.0162 0.0163*
(1.45) (1.7)
DFamily x HML 2.4089*** 1.7243* 1.1774*
(3.1) (1.95) (1.77)
DFamily x SMB 2.2004*** 2.3790***
(2.8) (3.1)
*: significant at 10% level           **: significant at 5% level             ***: significant at 1% level
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CHAPTER 4: PRIVATISATION AND FAMILY INVOLVEMENT: A CASE 
STUDY OF TUPRAS COMPANY
4.1. Introduction
After a long period of being viewed favourably, nationalisation programmes and state 
ownership which were usually connected with socialism started to be re-examined from 
both a political and an economic standpoint27. For many years, in spite of scepticism 
from many economists, state ownership dominated not only socialist economies but also 
market economies, such as Japan, Germany and the U.S. It was particularly popular in 
key industries, such as land, mining, banking, and iron and steel. The question of the 
extent to which government should involve in regulating and controlling the national 
economy is still an open issue.
Among several ways to understand the concept of privatisation, this chapter uses the 
definition suggested by Megginson and Netter (2001) in their comprehensive survey, 
that privatisation is a method of transferring ownership, in which government sells 
state-owned enterprises or their assets to private entities. 
There was a significant privatisation wave in industrial countries during the 1980s, 
during which the most prominent and historically important programme was launched 
by Margaret Thatcher after the conservative government came to power in Great Britain 
in 1979. Although it was not the first, the programme set an example for other 
governments to follow. The 1990s continued to see another trend of privatisation around 
the world, especially in developing and transition countries where the programme 
considerably changed the face of their economies. Although Turkey was among the first 
country to adopt the programme since 1985, its privatisation progress was rather slow 
(Ercan and Onis 2001). Under huge pressure to implement economic reforms in order to 
overcome the country crisis in 2001 and repay a large international debt owned of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Turkish government finally decided to sell all 
their stakes in a large number of state-owned enterprises to balance their deficit: many 
of them were among the largest companies in Europe. 
                                                            
27 See Lewis (1949), Meade (1948) and Allais (1947) for arguments supporting nationalisation and Jewkes (1948) 
and Samuelson (1948) and Friedman (1962) for the opposite view.
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During more recent times, privatisation saw almost every sector of the economy 
involved and the growing number of new privatisation proposals provides a rich source 
of information for modern research. It is however worth noticing that privatisation deals 
in recent times tend to be on large firms and/or in key sectors which are very much 
handled on a case-by-case basis. The case-by-case performance of privatised firms is 
also unpredictable enough to deserve particular attention.
The chapter will study one of such privatisation cases in Turkey for the following 
reasons. First of all, since the privatisation wave in this country is only significant in the 
more recent period, studies on Turkish privatisation are unsurprisingly limited and 
outdated. Secondly, it is worth mentioning that among the scarce sources of case studies 
on privatisation, few were done in industries other than railway and airline services. 
Perhaps the convenience of assessing service fares and the fact that almost all firms 
operating in these sectors have been privatised had facilitated the comparison between 
pre- versus post-privatisation performance. At the same time, this limits our 
understanding of privatisation transactions to a few sectors. Thirdly, privatisation deals 
in Turkey tend to take much longer than in any other countries and involved unusual 
mixtures of different methods of privatisation as well as ownership structures. Thus, this 
offers an ideal case study to compare and contrast the impact of different privatisation 
methods on the same object. One type of ownership that attracts our interest is the 
involvement of family firms and this chapter aims to examine the potential impacts of 
such ownership on a privatised firm.
Having that in mind, we select Tupras to test our hypotheses. Tupras or Turkey 
Petroleum Refineries Joint-stock Company (i.e. Turkiye Petrol Rafinerileri Anonim 
Sirketi in Turkish) is a Turkish-based company operating mainly in refining and 
distributing petroleum products. From being a state-owned monopoly firm, Tupras went 
through several phases during its 15 year privatisation via block sale and share issues, 
and was fully privatised in 2006 with more than 50% of its shares owned by a family 
business, Koc Holding.
The questions this chapter aims to address are how privatisation affects the Tupras 
operating performance and its stock performance in both the short run and long run. 
More importantly, which privatisation methods seem to be more beneficial to the firm 
and whether Tupras’s existing shareholders should be concerned about the involvement 
of the Koc family.
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The results in this chapter show that both share issue and block sale privatisation 
methods had positive impacts on boosting the firm revenue and productivity. Using the 
direct sales method appears to be a more suitable option for oil and gas firms. In terms 
of stock performance, the immediate reaction of the market to the privatisation was not 
positive due to a long experience of privatisation failure in Turkey. However, in the 
long run, the firm stock prices experienced a long period of high profit even after 
adjusting for the market and industry index movement. More interestingly, after the 
ownership transfer, new investment plans and dividend policies launched by Koc 
Holding seem to favour those shareholders whose investment horizon is in line with that 
of the family, but not those shareholders with a shorter investment plan.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 outlines the privatisation programme in 
Turkey and describes the special case of Tupras. Data and methodology are presented in 
section 4.3. Sections 4.4 and 4.5 examine the impacts of each method of privatisation 
that Tupras has experienced. Section 4.6 particularly analyses the role of the Koc family, 
the new ruling owner, in Tupras’s new dividend policy and investment styles. Finally, 
section 4.7 summarises and discusses the main findings.
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4.2. Tupras privatisation
This section briefly outlines the history of Turkish privatisation programme and 
provides some background information about Tupras, Turkey’s largest petrochemical 
enterprise, and its long and drawn out privatisation process. As mentioned earlier, 
although the 2001 economic reform had seen an extensive wave of privatisation in 
Turkey across a wide range of industries, key sectors such as energy and electricity 
were retained in the Government’s hands for economic control purposes. Subsequently, 
the majority shares owned by the state in some companies, including Tupras, were 
eventually opened to public bidders, both domestic and foreign. The firm privatisation 
however experienced a longer and more problematic process than any others.
4.2.1. Privatisation in Turkey
Historically an economy heavily depending on state-owned enterprises, Turkey first 
adopted the privatisation programme when the new Prime Minister, Turgut Ozal, of the 
Motherland Party came to power in 1985 (Okten and Arin 2006). Although the Turkish 
privatisation was designed to follow the example of the British privatisation programme 
with strong support from the new government, it was not until the 2000s that 
privatisation became a key government strategy. After launching a big privatisation plan 
in 2000 which raised nearly 3 million dollars revenue, the Turkish government slowed 
down the process as a result of the 2001 crisis and only picked up speed again in 2004. 
As can be seen from Figure 4.1, during the year 2005 alone Turkey raised more than 8.2 
million dollars from selling state-owned companies, twice as much as revenue of the 
whole 1985-1997 period. The following three years from 2006 to 2008 continued to see 
a huge contribution of privatisation to the Turkish government budget: the revenue from 
the scheme was 8.2, 4.3 and 6.3 million dollars, respectively. Up to 2010, the process 
seemed to be rather slow but still contributed more than 2.5 million dollars to the 
government budget every year.
It is worth mentioning that a driving force for a faster and larger privatisation process in 
Turkey was the pressure from IMF for major economic reforms. This enabled the 
economy to repay its large international debt of 16.7 billion dollars with the IMF (out of 
a 63.5 billion dollar foreign loan and 139.3 billion dollar domestic debt as at the end of 
2003, according to FTSE Global Markets28). For the energy sector in particular, another 
                                                            
28 http://www.ftseglobalmarkets.com, issue 2 July/August 2004.
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important reason for resorting to privatisation was the insufficiency of public funds for 
the investment required to respond to the increasing demand of energy in Turkey 
(Eyyubglu 2006).
There are at least three methods of privatisation which have been adopted in Turkey: 
direct sales in auctions, share issue privatisations (SIPs), and private negotiations. The 
first method appears to have been the preferred ones. As can be seen from Figure 4.2, 
about 53% of the sales were made via block sales and another 26% via asset sales. 
Accounting for about 18% of the privatisation revenue, the SIPs method only became 
more profitable in the recent years when the stock market became better regulated with 
more trading instruments available. The first privatisation in Turkey was the sale of a 
successful telecommunications firm, Teletas, in 1988 via fixed-price SIPs method. 
Subsequently, the 1990s witnessed a small number of privatisations across various 
industries from cement, steel to banking and electricity industries. This was followed by 
a quiet period until 2005 when there was a boost from large flows of foreign direct 
investment into the country. Regarding government priority in privatisation, Okten and 
Arin (2006) notice that in Turkey the government chose to privatise more profitable 
cement plants first due to the heavy pressure of budget deficits and loan repayments. 
Possibly, due to such pressure of quick privatisation, the programme in Turkey was 
launched without much regulatory and public preparation. That in fact had led to a slow 
privatisation process with many embarrassing experiences. More specifically, according 
to Okten and Arin (2006), the privatisation programme faced many legal and political 
constraints as well as huge opposition from labour unions. As pointed out in Palmer’s 
(2010) study, for many years the Turkish government used the Laws of Motivate 
Savings and Accelerate Government Investments as a legal framework for privatisation. 
This did not clearly state the government roles as well as issues related to layoffs, 
compensation and competition in the privatisation process. Although most firms 
privatised in the early stage of the programme were profitable firms, only a small 
number were privatised without a long delay or serious legal opposition. For example, 
the sales in the late 1980s of Citosan and Petkim were brought to court by the labour 
union for violating their employee rights. The lack of a sufficient and consistent legal
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framework and of stronger action by politicians has considerably slowed the sales 
process down. Some of them took up to ten years to complete29. 
Although it was one of the first groups being targeted for privatisation, it took until the 
2000s for key sectors such as oil and gas to start being privatised. Oil and gas were 
among the main energy sources in Turkey. Although compared with other resources, 
such as coal, lignite and geothermal, Turkey’s oil and gas reserves are much lower, 
about 66% of total energy consumption of the Turkish economy was from oil and gas 
sources (Demirbas 2002). Hence, the sale of these industries was carefully planned and 
was mostly carried out in block sales transactions.
This chapter studies the privatisation of Tupras for a number of reasons. Firstly, there 
have not been many efforts looking at privatisation in key sectors like energy. As 
discussed earlier in the chapter, governments tend to keep control over strategic sectors 
and thus many of them were privatised only recently. In addition, among the limited 
number of studies on the energy sector, surprisingly none has looked at oil and gas 
industry. Secondly, studies on privatisation mainly paid attention to how firm 
performance is affected by the identity of the new owners, e.g. whether they are 
domestic or foreign investors and whether they are insiders or outsiders to the firm. 
Some compared and contrasted different methods of transferring state ownership. 
However, few have been concerned with their post-privatisation ownership structure, 
especially if the new owner is also a family firm owner. As family ownership is well 
documented to have significant impact on corporate governance, dividend policy and 
the long-term strategy of firms, it is natural to ask if the family characteristics would 
affect firm post-privatisation performance. Thirdly, Tupras offers a unique opportunity 
to compare and contrast the effectiveness of different privatisation methods in one case 
study. Previous studies on this matter are generally carried out on different firms where 
institutional factors could affect the findings. Finally, before the full privatisation in 
2005, a number of Tupras shares had been sold to the public in 1991. It is therefore 
interesting to study how such the substantial change in ownership in 2005 affected the 
benefits of both new and existing shareholders and whether the controlling family 
expropriates the existing minority shareholders at Tupras.
                                                            
29 For instance, Eyyubglu (2006) provides an example of a privatisation of power and coal plants in the Cayirhan 
district, which has been an on-going process since 1995, to illustrate the extreme slow pace of the Turkish 
privatisation programme.
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4.2.2. Tupras prior to full privatisation
Tupras is a Turkish-based company, founded in 1983 under Law no. 2929, aimed at 
reorganising state-owned enterprises to increase their productivity and efficiency. 
Accordingly, the government brought all four state-owned refineries, including Izmit 
refinery of Istanbul Petrol Rafinerisi A.S. corporation and three refineries of Turkiye 
Petrolleri A.O. (Izmir, Kirikkale and Batman), under the single roof of Tupras 30 . 
Owning four out of the total of five refineries in Turkey, Tupras is holding a nearly 
monopoly power in the refinery industry, especially in supplying energy for 
consumption. The other plant is ATAS, a private plant just recently established in 2004. 
The firm is operating mainly in refining and distributing petroleum products including 
No. 2 fuel oil (heating oil), diesel fuel and asphalt. It is the largest industrial company in 
Turkey and also among the top 10 largest refining companies in Europe according to 
Reuters News (on 20th August 2010). It also has the advantage of being located near 
consumption cities and of being the only refining company operating in four big oil 
areas in Turkey. 
With four large oil refineries scattered over Turkey, Tupras has a processing capacity of 
about 28.1 million tons crude oil per year. As can be seen from table 4.1, which reports 
Tupras capacity and production as at the end of 2010, the four refineries can process 
about 560 million barrels per day, of which Izmit and Izmir refineries are the two main 
contributors with 220 million barrels per day each.
In terms of production output, Tupras produces more than 547 million barrels per day, 
of which nearly a half is distillate products, such as fuel oil and jet fuel. For these 
products, Tupras consistently owns about 90% share of the domestic market, and the 
firm is a monopoly in supplying asphalt for Turkish market. Other important products 
produced by Tupras are diesel and gasoline, which provide 56% and 83% of the market 
share in Turkey, respectively.
Regarding profitability, Tupras was not a profitable firm although a minor restructuring 
had been done prior to the privatisation. The firm even experienced a great loss during 
1994-1997 period, with the net income being between -TRY 386 million and -TRY 188 
million. Additionally, before the privatisation decision was announced in 1991, Tupras 
net sales were about TRY 10.2 million, operating profits of TRY 240 thousand and 
                                                            
30 Source: Tupras 2002 annual report, at http://www.tupras.com.tr/uploads/Annual_Report_2002.pdf.
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earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) more than TRY 320 thousand. These figures 
alone could show the large expenses and investment a refinery firm needs to put in 
processing crude oil to gain one unit of revenues (98% in the case of Tupras). This is 
not surprising since refinery firms usually require larger investment than in other sectors. 
For example, British Petroleum also spent about 93% of its revenues to cover costs at 
the time. However, Tupras profits seemed to be rather low compared to the other oil and 
gas producers in the country (EBIT of TRY 320 thousand compared to TRY 405 
thousand of OMV Petrol, for example). 
As at the end of 2010, Tupras revenue stood at about TRY 26.2 billion, much higher 
than it was in 1991. Section 4.4 later will analyse this improvement in the firm 
performance over time and discuss the driving causes. As can be seen from table 4.1, 
besides the main income from refinery activities, the firm also had additional revenue of 
more than TRY 4.2 billion from providing petroleum transportation. This is mainly 
contributed by DITAS, a subsidiary of Tupras joining the firm in late 2002. Ownership 
of DITAS is important not only to expand the firm investment but also to benefit from 
DITAS services in transporting their petroleum products.
First listed in the ISE in 1991, with a total market capitalisation of nearly five million 
TRY in the domestic market, Tupras is now trading in Borsa Istanbul (a combination of 
the former ISE and the Istanbul Gold Exchange) under the ticker TUPRS and in the 
London Stock Exchange under the symbol TPRD with the size of TRY 12,897 million 
(about EUR 5,030 million) and EUR 3,561 million, respectively (data as at the end of 
2012). The stock performance of the firm over several privatisation stages will be 
further discussed in the empirical sections.
4.2.3. The struggling privatisation process
The history of Tupras privatisation was a gradual but smooth process in the beginning, 
however it became mired into a series of legal battles and opposition during the later 
stages. The firm was transferred to Privatisation Administration Council for 
privatisation on 10th July 1990 and in 1991, about 2.5% of its shares started to be sold to 
the public under “class A” shares.  The Council however still kept a majority of Tupras 
shares as class C shares or golden shares. The privatisation process was relatively slow. 
As at the end of 1999, only about 3.58% shares of Tupras were trading in the domestic 
stock market. The second public offering was launched in April 2000, offering 31.66% 
of Tupras total capitalisation (or class A shares) to the ISE and the London Stock 
Exchange. The third public offering was delayed due to a poor condition of the whole 
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market after the 2001 crisis but when it took place, the last sale faced strong opposition 
and a series of legal troubles. 
4.2.3.A. The first challenge
According to Oker (2014), with more than 31.66% shares traded in the stock markets, 
the initial purpose of selling 65.76% of total shares was to reduce the percentage of 
stated-owned shares in Tupras to less than 50%. On 7th June 2003, the Turkish 
government announced the decision to privatise the remaining part. Unlike the previous 
two public offerings, this was done via a block sale method in auctions. Using the direct 
sale method, the Privatisation Administration Council perhaps wanted to quickly sell 
the largest part of Tupras at an optimal price. The final negotiations of the sealed-bid 
auction were held in January, 2004.
Nevertheless, this first attempt to sell the remaining of Tupras owned by the state was 
not very successful. It started with little opposition but the legal setbacks became more 
serious at later stages. A leading labour union in Turkey, Union of Petroleum Chemical 
and Rubber Workers of Turkey (Petrol-IS), claimed that the process had violated 
competition rules. After a long delay, the auction was still carried on and completed in 
January 2004. On 9th February, 2004, the Turkish Finance Minister, Kernal Unakitan 
approved the privatisation, in which the government would sell the remaining 65.76% 
state-owned shares to a German-based corporate named Efremov-Kautschuk GMBH 
group, a joint-venture between a Russian energy company, Tatneft, and a German 
holding firm. The result was a joint bid between Efremov-Kautschuk and a local 
company, Zorlu Holding. The sales price was more than 1.3 billion dollars, which was 
believed to be too low. Following a tender cancellation of Tekel privatisation, a large 
monopoly tobacco company, by the government in November 2003, critics seemed to 
very much doubt the outcome of Tupras privatisation. One of their concerns was that 
the reason given by the government for cancelling Tekel sale results was also that the 
winning bid was too low. 
Later, the sale was in fact cancelled because the tender had violated the privatisation 
law and public interest. Like many other privatisations, the sale of Tupras faced strong 
opposition from the labour union, represented by Petrol-IS, which raised much concern 
about a mass lay-off during and after the full privatisation. Together with Privatisation 
Board, the Union brought the case to Regional Administrative Court of the 10th district. 
There were also several other legal issues the court pointed out, such as the lack of 
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compliance in information filing, practicing and low competitive auction (Law No. 
2004/8257, Decision No. 2004/7618). 
During the course of the trials, Petrol-IS, representing for Tupras’s workers, had filed 
about 125 lawsuits including 8 cancellation claims against the firm privatisation 
(Yeldan 2005). The Union claimed that beside low wages (about half the salary their 
European counterparts received based on the 2000 data), the number of employees in 
Tupras kept falling during the privatisation process despite a significant increase in 
labour productivity and jobs needed in the company. After the claims were submitted to 
the Supreme Court, the transaction was blocked for months and the Court eventually 
cancelled the deal. Additionally, the firm share prices dropped immediately following 
the news about the court’s decision. Although the Privatisation Administration Board, 
who supervised the transaction, had appealed the cancellation in the Council of State, 
the court’s decision was not reversed.
4.2.3.B. The second attempt
The next effort to sell the remaining 65.76% of Tupras was done with caution after the 
failures to sell the block in June 2003 and in May 2004. This time, the shares were split 
into two parts. On 4th March 2005, a smaller part of 14.76% total shares was offered to 
foreign investors using the SIPs method. This action can be considered as a “tester” to 
assess investors’ reaction before privatising the remaining 51% of Tupras stake. In April 
2005, the third public offering was launched with another cautious step was taken by the 
Privatisation Administration. They tried to sell 17% shares using SIPs. However, the 
offer was not accepted as it was claimed to be a non-legal deal (Oker 2014).
After that unsuccessful attempt aiming to give the private Tupras greater managerial 
freedom, the Privatisation Administration Board decided to sell the block of 51% 
Tupras shares in a new auction open to both domestic and foreign investors. On 29th
April 2005, the Administration announced an invitation to tender for privatising the 
remaining stated-owned shares at Tupras. However, the struggling privatisation so far 
had somewhat damaged its reputation. Some bidders from the previous auction such as 
the Russian oil company Tatneft decided to drop the plan of acquiring Tupras due to 
“high risks” in the transaction (according to Shafagat Takhautdinov, CEO of Tatneft, 
answering an interview with ICIS News31 on 27th May 2005). However, the auction 
                                                            
31 Independent Chemical Information Services (ICIS) is an independent organisation providing data, reports and 
analyses on petrochemical industries worldwide. http://www.icis.com.
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seemed to be carried out with a greater care and transparency. The managers even had 
many official negotiations with the labour union before the auction. 
On 12th September 2005, among 13 qualified bidders32, a consortium of Koc Holding 
Joint Stock Company, thereafter Koc Holding, one of the largest Turkish holding firms, 
and Shell, a Dutch energy firm, won the auction at a price of 4.14 billion dollars. The 
winning bidder was a new joint venture firm named Enerji Yatirimlari A.S. formed 
between Koc Holding, Aygaz A.S. Opet Petrolculuk A.S. and Shell Overseas 
Investment B.V. It is however worth mentioning that in the joint win, Koc Holding held 
75% while Shell owned only 2% of the total shares they won in Tupras33. As a result,
Koc Holding was the largest block shareholder of Tupras and the actual transfer took 
place in January 2006. As can be seen from Figures 4.1 and 4.2, which show the 
organisation structure of Tupras and Koc Holing respectively, at least four members of 
the Koc family and the CEO of Koc Holding are holding key positions in Tupras’s 
Board of Directors and its implementation committee.
However, in February 2006, the Council of State once again suspended the privatisation 
transaction due to another call for cancellation from Petrol-IS labour union. Among 
many lawsuits, the Petrol-IS claimed that Tupras stopped recruiting new employees 
since 1996, when the first privatisation announcement was made, and had fired more 
than 16% of its total employees after transferring its largest part of ownership to Koc 
Holding. In addition, they believed that some contract terms between Koc Holding and 
Shell in oil price agreements would go against Tupras’s benefits and its employee rights 
(ICIS News, 3rd February 2006). According to that arrangement, Tupras would import 
40% of the oil they needed from Shell with a higher price than Tupras currently paid. 
Fortunately, two months later, the Council announced a rejection of the claims since 
they were not made from a legal aspect, and Koc Holding finally became the largest 
shareholder of Tupras.
Overall, the process of privatising more than 96% of Tupras took nearly seven years 
from 2000 up to 2006. It faced strong legal opposition, reputation damage and was 
challenged to be cancelled at least three times, of which one succeeded. The case has 
                                                            
32 Although there were 13 qualified bidders, they mostly bid as a consortium. Foreign investors were Indian Oil 
Corporation, Austria’s OMV, Royal Dutch Shell, Spain’s Repsol, Italy’s Eni, Hungarian group MOL and Poland’s 
PKN Orlen. Domestic bidders were Petrol Ofisi, Zorlu Group, Oil Office, OYAK, Opet, and Koc Holding.
33 Source: Tupras main website, at http://www.tupras.com.tr/file.debug.php?lFileID=2023
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also raised the crucial lesson for policy makers that building a transparent and well-
regulated legal framework as well as ensuring proper implementation and sufficient 
employee benefits is essential in order to achieve a successful privatisation programme.
4.2.4. Koc Holding  – the winning bidder
Founded in 1963 by Vehbi Koc, Koc Holding is the only Turkish firm named in the 
Fortune Global 500, the list of the world 500 largest corporations by revenues. Its owner, 
the Koc family is one of the wealthiest Turkish families, also named in the Forbes 2005, 
the list of the world richest people, and the third generation is now controlling the 
business group. With at least four family members in the Board of Directors (as at the 
end of 2012), the family directly owns more than 24% shares of Koc Holding. The firm 
is a good example of a family business group organised in a complex ownership 
structure which results in a much higher indirect control over its subsidiaries. 
For example, in Tupras, Koc Holding directly owns approximately 38% (75% times 
51%) of the total shares, in which the Koc family owns about 10% (38% times 24%). 
Thus, in theory, the Koc family does not own a significant amount of Tupras total 
shares outstanding and Tupras is still classified as a non-family firm. However, as 
mentioned earlier, there are at least four members of the Koc family holding key 
positions at Tupras’s Board of Directors, including the Chairman and the Vice-chairman 
while the Board consists of only eight members. Moreover, they are also in most of the 
other company committees, such as the implementation committee and the corporate 
governance and risk management committees, according to the firm 2010 corporate 
governance compliance report. As a result, the Koc family would have a considerable 
influence on Tupras corporate governance and operating performance. Figure 4.3 shows 
the organisation chart of Koc Holding which has only one family member in the Board 
while the structure of Tupras displaying in Figure 4.4 clearly shows more involvement 
of the Koc family in Tupras.
In terms of business areas, the Koc conglomerate group invests in almost every sector 
worldwide from energy and automotive to education and financial services. Along with 
Tupras, Koc Holding also holds a number of other energy related firms, such as a fuel 
distributor (Opet), natural gas providers (Aygaz, Aygaz Dogal Gaz and Aes Entek) and 
shipping (Ditas Denizcilik). It is expected that the cooperation between subsidiaries will 
bring significant cost reduction advantages to the group as well as to each member.
Koc Holding is trading in the ISE under the symbol KCHOL with the total market value 
of TRY 23,482 at the end of 2012.
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4.2.5. Conclusion
The privatisation programme in Turkey has a history of nearly 30 years, but it only 
recently became prominent both in terms of numbers of firms involved and revenues
raised. Under pressure to repay a huge international loan and overcome the economic 
crisis in 2001, Turkish privatisation targeted many key sectors, such as 
telecommunication, cement, electricity and energy. In their privatisation schedule, the 
Turkish government also tended to sell more profitable companies first and most 
transactions were carried out in auctions with the aim of quickly increasing government 
income. 
Because of a nearly monopoly position in the oil and gas industry in Turkey, Tupras 
was regarded as a suitable target for privatisation. The firm was operating quite 
efficiently in comparison to its European counterparts but was not a very profitable 
producer compared to other Turkish oil and gas firms. This may have been the reason 
why the Turkish government decided to privatise Tupras in several stages. Starting with 
a small offer of 2.5% shares in 1991, Tupras privatisation was a long and troubled 
process until its eventual completion in 2006. It also used various privatisation methods, 
involved a large number of investors, including the most influential family owned group 
in Turkey, Koc Holding. This experience, therefore, provides an interesting case study 
for examining the performance of different privatisation methods and to assess, for the 
first time, the impact of family involvement in a privatised firm.
4.3. Data and Methodology
4.3.1. Data
Firm stock prices and market value were obtained from DataStream database. Most 
other firm specific data, such as financial statements, segment production and dividend 
payment methods were provided by Bloomberg Professional data services. Details on 
organisational structure, investment and new projects were obtained from the firm 
annual reports. Additionally, information on the firm announcements, news and public 
reports was collected from a range of mainstream media sources and will be specified 
where appropriate.
The sample spans from 31st June, 1991 to 31st December, 2010 (234 months) to ensure 
the whole privatisation process is covered. The coverage period starts in 1991 when the 
first part of Tupras was initially offered to the public, covering subsequent partial sales,
and up to five years after its full privatisation in 2006. For the first part, tests of the 
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impacts of share public offerings will cover the period from July 1991 to February 2005 
and the second period up to the end of 2010 will be employed for direct sale analysis.
4.3.2. Methodology and Hypotheses
4.3.2.A. Existing methodological issues 
Due to the nature of privatisation transactions, there are a number of methodological 
obstacles concerning the privatisation literature. The first issue is the lack of data or 
poor data availability. For example, Temple (1999) and Tybout (2000) observe higher 
data availability in developed countries than in less developed economies and notice 
that there are more data for better performing enterprises compared to less profitable 
firms in one country. Thus, they argue that such under-represented data could yield 
biases. The criticism is not implausible when one links it with a dominant finding in the 
literature that firms perform better after privatisation. This could be simply due to the 
fact that their data happen to mostly consist of well performing firms. In addition, 
Megginson and Netter (2001) indicate that when firm managers manipulate accounting 
figures around privatisation deals, analysis based on such “bad” data is unreliable.
The second problem is pointed out in the Megginson and Netter (2001) survey and 
concerns the possibility of omitting variables and endogeneity in estimation. Although 
there have been some efforts in seeking relevant explanatory variables in the function 
explaining firm post-privatisation performance, the list has never satisfied researchers. 
For examples, Aghion and Blanchard (1996) suggest firm’s incentives to restructure 
before privatisation, and Che (2009) adds buyers’ financial constraints and level of the 
legal protection over private property rights. In addition, Vickers and Yarrow (1988) 
emphasise the role of competition level and Norback and Persson (2012) include 
government incentives to invest in to-be-privatised firms in their model, while 
Bennedsen (2000) adds the possibility of international pressure on governments and
political intervention, which Perotti and Oijen (2001, p.43) call the “political risk” in the 
regressions. However, besides the fact that most of those factors are proposed from 
theoretical standpoints and are hard to measure or proxy, there can be other variables, 
for instance technology changes which can distort the results (Norback and Persson 
2012)34. 
                                                            
34 See Ramamurti (2000) for a more comprehensive range of variables at firm-level, industry-level and country-level 
that may affect firm performance in privatisation.
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Regarding the endogeneity problem, the question of whether either privatisation 
improves performance or better performing firms tend to be privatised was left 
untouched for many years. Although a similar branch of research has looked at potential 
endogeneity between firm performance and ownership in general and private versus 
state ownership in particular (see the large body of studies which carefully discussed 
this issue in chapter 3), it was not until the 2000s that this issue in privatisation 
programme literature started to be explored. This is also largely supported by newly 
developed statistical techniques. Some of the most commonly used techniques in this 
respect are two-step instrumental variables approach, 2SLS-IV 35, two-stage conditional 
maximum likelihood (Arin and Ulugasoglu 2009), and adjusting for endogenous 
variation of related variables (Bennett et al. 2007).
The third issue is that the selection of an appropriate set of measurements of 
privatisation outcome and firm performance is crucial but difficult. Firm performance 
can be viewed from both business and stock market standpoints. Though measurements 
of firm stock performance are relatively straightforward, operating performance appears 
to be difficult to compare across different sample periods and markets (Megginson and 
Netter 2001). Over the last three decades, there have been many efforts to measure the 
operating performance of privatised firms. Among the proposed indicators are net 
incomes, profitability, sales, assets, employees (Megginson, Nash and Randenborgh 
1994, La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes 1999 among others), productivity growth (Ehrlich, 
Gallais-Hamonno, Liu and  Lutter 1994), corporate value (Tian 2000), labour 
productivity, wages (Estrin, Hanousek, Kocenda and Svejnar 2009), material costs over 
revenue (Frydman, Gray, Hessel and Rapaczynski 1999), capital spending, and leverage 
(D’Souza and Megginson 1999). However, a comprehensive set of variables is not yet 
finalised.
Fourthly, almost all cross-section privatisation research is subject to selection bias. As 
discussed earlier, a large amount of studies indicates that there are not only economic 
motivations but also political reasons behind the choice of firms as candidates for 
privatisation. Many have noted that the sequencing of reform is such that governments 
tend to select good firms to privatise first. This is meant to create a good impression of 
                                                            
35 See examples of 2SLS-IV in the works of Boubakri and Hamza (2007), one of the early tests of privatisation 
impacts on firm stock performance adjusting for endogeneity, Chong, Guillen and Lopez-de-Silanes (2011) for these
impacts on labour policies, and Che (2009) for the causation tests on legal protection power and buyers’ financial 
constraints.
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privatisation programme or to offer an opportunity for the public to familiar themselves 
with the programme. As a result, not all state-owned firms are treated in the same way 
in a privatisation programme. Even when there is no sequencing in privation, not every 
firm with similar characteristics is involved in the privatisation programme (Sprenger 
2011). This practice, thus, would lead to an initial selection bias when forming samples. 
Additionally, in the last two decades, privatisations tended to scatter over a wide period 
with huge differences in macroeconomic conditions, regulation and market conditions 
(Megginson and Netter 2001). Multinational analysis even faces another problem due to 
country-specific conditions. As also pointed out by Megginson and Netter (2001), the 
impacts of privatisation are strongly correlated with the level of market competition and 
the strength of existing private sector. In incomplete markets like in developing 
economies, Baland and Francois (2005) argue further that although helping to achieve 
higher efficiency, privatisation can still damage individuals’ benefits. Political and legal 
systems also have significant impacts on a privatisation plan and its implementation. 
Failure to take into account these differences may lead to a biased conclusion. 
Last but not least, since privatisation tends to be accompanied with a large legal and 
economic reform, it is hard to imagine one could isolate the impact of privatisation 
programme from other factors on firm performance. Also, since privatisation is a 
programme launched by governments, it is possible that some policies aim at a 
particular firm or industry to ensure the success of their privatisation (Bennedsen 2000). 
Thus, it is difficult to compare the performance of these firms or industries before and 
after being privatised and to those still in government hands.
Most recent studies have taken selection bias into consideration. It is, however, well 
acknowledged that government intervention such as restructuring firms before 
privatisation or sequencing in choosing to-be-privatised firms could not be eliminated. 
In practice, there are at least two approaches which have been adopted by past studies to 
look at the potential impact of privatisation on firm performance: a large scale or a case-
by-case approach. However, the methodological issues discussed above appear to be 
more problematic in the former than the in the latter approach. The reason is that 
privatisation is complex in nature. Some firms are selected to be privatised, some are 
not. Also, depending on their situation, privatisation method and timing would vary case 
by case. In addition, differences in economic conditions, legal system and government 
objectives make it difficult to form a set of comparable firms (Meggison and Netter 
2001). Fortunately, some studies, such as Vickers and Yarrow (1991) show that 
177
although a comparable set of firms is scarce in large scale samples, it is possible to find 
a like-with-like firm in case-by-case analysis.
Other problems such as selection bias might also affect the ability to draw broad 
conclusions from case-by-case privatisation analysis; however the bias, if any, is less 
likely to be serious. Moreover, examination at an individual level has a distinctive 
advantage of providing an in-depth analysis and insight that could be useful for more 
general cases while limiting the serious methodological problems that have been 
discussed so far. Furthermore, privatisation at present is no longer carried out under a 
mass programme but rather as a single deal treated on an individual basis. Therefore, it 
seems to be more meaningful to analyse it at the firm level. These considerations have 
partly guided the choice in this chapter to test its hypotheses with a case study approach.
4.3.2.B. Methodology
This chapter employs both case studies techniques and comparative analysis methods to 
assess the performance of the privatised firm in terms of operating and stock return 
indicators.
Firstly, the firm operating performance is evaluated by a wide range of accounting 
measurements, including revenue, operating margin, net income, return on assets, 
export sales, labour productivity and enterprise value. The Tupras performance will also 
be put in comparison to other oil and gas firms in Turkey to adjust for possible industry 
effects. For the purpose of creating a comparable set of measurements across firms and 
periods, the chapter uses the annual growth rate rather than raw figures. 
In terms of stock performance, the subsequent sections analyse both the share issuing 
and direct sale privatisation methods in Tupras privatisation. The SIP offers an 
opportunity to study both short-term and long-term reactions of the market to the 
transaction. Regarding the short-term effects, case studies techniques will be applied to 
measure the potential impact of privatisation around the announcement dates. The long-
term analysis looks at 5-year stock performance of Tupras shares after each transaction. 
In order to eliminate the possible changes in business setting over a long sample period, 
the results will also be adjusted for the market and industry index movements.
4.3.2.C. Hypotheses
Proposition 1: Privatisation has positive impacts on firm operating performance.
There has been a large debate on the impact of privatisation on a firm. The chapter will 
first revisit the question of whether privatisation helps boost the firm productivity and 
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profitability. Since there have not been many efforts to study the energy sector, with 
few of them looking at oil and gas industries, the chapter hopes to fill this gap in the 
literature.
Additionally, recent studies have found a strong link between identity of the new 
owners and post-privatisation performance of a firm but family involvement has not 
been considered. For instance, Omran (2009) indicates that post-privatisation 
performance of Egyptian firms was strongly associated with ownership structure and 
ownership identity. He finds that if ownership was concentrated in the hands of foreign 
investors, privatised firms experienced a significant positive improvement, however the 
opposite was true when major shares were held by domestic insiders. Nevertheless, one 
of the reasons why family ownership has not earned enough attention is that family firm 
involvement in privatisation deals only become popular recently. This chapter will aim 
to capture their impact, if any, on the privatised firm.
Proposition 2: Privatisation has positive impacts on firm stock performance.
This study is perhaps the first one to examine stock performance in the privatisation 
literature. This is because it is not very common that firms have already traded in stock 
markets before their full privatisation and that the active trading period is long enough 
for the stock performance testing. The case of Tupras privatisation offers just that. The 
process was carried out in several stages, scattered over a period of almost 15 years. 
This setup allows our analysis to explore how the stocks of a firm react to the news on 
its own privatisation. The empirical analysis will address the market reaction under both 
short-term and long-term horizons.
Proposition 3: Privatisation by direct sale is more profitable than by share issue.
Given an objective of maximising the sales price under a tight deadline, it was an 
optimal choice for the Turkish government to sell Tupras in auctions. However, both 
direct sales and SIP methods were chosen on their own merits. This chapter aims to test 
which method better served the Turkish government in the case of Tupras. The 
application of these findings is perhaps not limited to one firm. Lessons learnt from 
Tupras could at least benefit investors and policy makers in privatising firms in the oil 
and gas sector. Also, in most cases, since governments tend to share the same objective 
of maximising privatisation revenue, choosing the right method is crucial to reach the 
largest potential group of investors.
More importantly, it is worth mentioning that there have not been any efforts to test 
comparative performance across privatisation methods. This is possibly due to the fact 
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that, generally, each firm uses solely one privatisation method and the benefits of each 
method heavily depend on economic aggregate and individual firm conditions. Since it 
offers the advantage of experiencing two of the most commonly used privatisation 
methods in the recent time, Tupras offers a unique case study to contrast and compare 
them.
Proposition 4: Family owners pursue a dividend policy which is biased in favour of 
their own interests after privatisation.
Among new market participants, family firms are increasingly important in many 
countries and are starting to show more interest in taking over state-owned enterprises. 
Interestingly, family-owned firms seem to have the corporate governance style and 
investment behaviour of both institutional and individual buyers. While having a 
common objective of profit maximisation, family firms also have a longer term 
investment horizon and a stronger incentive to retain control over the firms. However, 
in order to retain control, one of the most commonly used methods in Turkish family 
firms to reduce the risk of hostile takeovers is to create a less attractive dividend 
payment policy. A question raised is whether their involvement in privatised firms 
could create an opportunity for exploitation as seen in many family firms.
There have been numerous studies raising the problem of poor and unfair dividend 
payout for the minority shareholders in family owned firms. For example, studying the 
Times Mirror Company, DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2000) show that minority 
shareholders suffered a significant reduction in dividend payment while the dividend for 
the owner family was kept unchanged. Thus, it is interesting to explore the dividend 
payout policy after privatisation that brought Tupras under the control of the Koc family, 
and investigate whether the changes are a result of privatisation, of family ownership 
effects or of the weak minority investor protection system.
4.4. Share issue privatisation analysis
4.4.1. Privatisation and Tupras operating performance
Table 4.2 looks at Tupras performance over the three main phases of the firm 
privatisation using the SIP method. With an unusual privatisation time frame, Tupras 
provides an exclusive case study for analysing privatisation impact on a firm in both 
short term and long term. This section analyses the firm operating performance over 
time (time-series analysis) as well as in comparison to its rivals, which have different 
levels of family interference (cross-sectional analysis). The section also selects a firm 
that has a similar proportion of shares owned by the owner family but has never 
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experienced privatisation for the purpose of assessing the impact of privatisation, if any, 
on the overall performance of the firm.
4.4.1.A. Time-series analysis
As mentioned in section 4.2.3, Tupras was privatised in at least three stages over the 
course of 15 years. After it started trading with only 3.4% of total shares in the stock 
market since 1991, Tupras’s first significant share, 31.66% shares of the firm, were 
offered to public in April 2000. The next sale of 14.76% followed after 5 years, in 
March 2005, and the last phase with the sale of the remaining 51% of the total shares 
took place in 2006.
This section will, therefore, split the sample into three main periods, from 1991- 2000, 
2001-2005 and 2006-2010 in order to compare and contrast the firm performance over 
the three privatisation phases. Table 4.2 shows the average changes in each 
measurement per year over the three sub-periods. In the table, panel A compares the 
firm overall performance with the last column showing the average change over the 
entire sample from 1991 to 2010. Panel B focuses on Tupras’s main accounting figures 
as at the end of 2010 in comparison with those of its competitors in the Turkish oil and 
gas industry. Taking a closer look at potential privatisation effects on the firm, the last 
panel analyses yearly performance of the firm comparing to Dogan Holding, a firm with 
a similar level of family ownership but which did not experience privatisation. Panel B 
and C of the Table will be discussed in the next section on the firm performance cross-
sectionally.
From Panel A of table 4.2, we can see that the SIPs in 2000 and 2005 did improve the 
firm revenue growth rate and productivity, but not profit, and the direct sale 
privatisation in 2006 was better at boosting the firm overall performance. This raises the 
question of whether the better performance in the last phase of privatisation was a result 
of privatisation or of family involvement.
On average, Tupras revenue growth rate was 8.55% per year before 2000. The growth
rate was slightly lower at 3.13% during the 2001-2005 period as a result of Turkish 
economic crisis, but quickly increased at 12% per year after the full privatisation. Thus, 
over the whole period, Tupras revenue grew about 8.01% annually, much higher than 
most of other oil and gas firms in the region. In terms of operating margin, measured by 
operating profit divided by net sales, Tupras witnessed a downward trend throughout 
the three sub-periods. After suffering a long period of profit shrinking up to 2000 with 
decreasing net income and operating margin, Tupras gradually increased its profitability 
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with an increase in net income of 0.12 per year during 2001-2005. Over the last period 
2006-2010, the firm operating margin grew slightly at 0.04 per year because net income 
increased at a higher pace than net sales. Looking at another measurement of 
profitability, return on assets ratio seemed to show a similar trend. 
In terms of productivity, Tupras saw an increase in sales per employee, implying a 
better product and sales management as the firm’s number of employees was relatively 
stable over time. On average, the labour productivity rate (measured by actual sales per 
employee) increased by about 1.32% in the first 10 years but rapidly increased at a rate 
of more than 6% and then 9% in the following five-year periods. Overall, the firm 
gained an increase of 5.63% in labour productivity per annum. 
Although Tupras does export refinery products, mostly to the U.S., the growth rate of 
export sales is not significant because Tupras mainly supplies its products to the 
domestic market. According to the Tupras 2004 report, the firm owned more than 71% 
market shares in Turkish oil and gas sector by 2003. On average, from 1991 to 2010, the 
firm increased its export sales around 10% - 20% per year. The only exception was 
during 2001 and 2005, when domestic demand was too low due to the negative impact 
of the economic crisis in Turkey and the firm decided to increase its exports by about 45% 
each year.
Another indicator of firm performance is enterprise value, which includes not only the 
part owned by shareholders, i.e. the firm market value, but also the part owned by 
creditors. As can be seen from panel A, the firm value increased at a higher pace in ten 
years following the IPO and on average, it gained a 23% increase in the enterprise value 
over the whole period. The increase was not only a result of more shares traded in the 
stock markets but also of higher debt used by the new owners.
In addition, over the whole period, Tupras experienced a steady increase in sales 
revenue. A similar trend was seen in export sales and firm value. The profitability 
growth rate, however, decreased and only started to increase in the recent years from 
2006 up to 2010. 
There are three possible explanations for the firm lower profitability rate during the first 
two SIPs and the higher rate following the direct sale. The first is the negative impact of 
the Turkish economic crisis in 2001, which became less significant in the period from 
2006 to 2010. The success of the Turkish 2005 economic reform could also have been a 
boost for the economy. Secondly, perhaps the lower profitability rate was caused by the
huge investment by the firm in a number of long-term projects after privatisation. This 
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is because investment in infrastructure in the refinery industry is generally large and has 
slow turnover. Therefore, the investment plans only started to yield profits in the recent 
years from 2006 up to 2010. Lastly, the better performance in the later phase could be a 
result of the family intervention in the firm management. Section 4.6 will describe in 
detail Tupras’s management restructuring process in early 2006 after the Koc family 
took over the firm.
If the first explanation was true and indeed Tupras profitability shrank mainly because 
of the 2001 economic crisis, the rise in net income and enterprise value (average of 12% 
and 11%, respectively) did not seem to confirm that line of argument. Moreover, if the 
crisis was the main critical factor, what would be the reason for the decreasing profit the 
firm experienced many years prior to the crisis?
The second possibility did not seem to hold either. From table 4.6 which will be 
discussed later in section 4.6, one can easily identify that the period with the highest 
investment expense was after the direct sale in 2006. Hence, investing greatly in 
restructuring after privatisation would not be the main reason for the firm low profit 
before 2006.
This leads to the final explanation that, perhaps, the involvement of the Koc family in 
Tupras had a positive impact on the firm overall performance. In fact, after taking over 
Tupras, Koc Holding launched a major restructuring programme, including replacing 
the Board of Directors, raising a large amount of new capital, and retaining most of the 
firm earnings to re-invest in a wide range of new projects. Additionally, Tupras would 
benefit from internal services from other firms operating under the umbrella of Koc 
Holding. For example, DITAS provided transportation services for petroleum products. 
Also, direct sales in auctions offered the advantage of maximising sale prices which did 
contribute large revenue to help the government repay their large international loan. In 
summary, there is evidence that the success of privatisation in enhancing Tupras 
performance is a result of family involvement and the proper choice of privatisation 
method. An in-depth analysis of the Koc family intervention will be discussed further in 
section 4.6.
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4.4.1.B. Cross-firm analysis
This section will place Tupras in relation to its competitors in order to control for the 
possible market and industry effects. Besides Tupras, Turkey has three other firms 
producing petroleum products, OMV Petrol- AS (also known as POAS), Dogan 
Holding and Turcas Petrol. Among them, only POAS had gone through a privatisation 
process which was completed in 2000. About 6% of the firm total shares are directly 
owned by a family, Dogan family. The other firms, Dogan Holding and Turcas, were set 
up as private firms and have a level of family involvement of about 11% (owned by the 
Dogan family) and more than 40% (by the Aksoy family), respectively.
Panel B of Table 4.2 summarises the main characteristics of Tupras and its competitors. 
It can be seen from the panel that Tupras was significantly larger in size compared to 
the rest of the group. With total assets of nearly TRY 14 billion, Tupras was about twice 
the size of Dogan Holding, the second largest firm in the industry. In terms of market 
value, Tupras was about three times as large as POAS. The two firms, however, had a 
similar enterprise value (TRY 6.7 billion), signalling a high debt ratio in Tupras. Indeed, 
as at the end of 2010, out of Tupras’s TRY 14 billion assets, Tupras had more than TRY 
10 billion funded by borrowing. 
It is also worth noticing that volatility rates, measured by 12-month stock price changes, 
were rather low and stable among oil and gas sector. Ranking from the least to the most 
volatile stocks (from 1 to 20 according to DataStream database), the rankings of Turkish 
oil and gas firms ranged from 5 to 7, in which investing in Tupras and POAS appeared 
to be slightly safer than in Turcas and Dogan Holding.
Within the oil and gas industry, panel C aims to assess the impact, if any, of 
privatisation aside from the effects of family intervention on Tupras by comparing it to 
Dogan Holding. The firm is the second largest energy firm by total assets and has a 
similar level of family involvement but did not go through a privatisation process. The 
analysis starts from 2001, right after the first significant share sales of Tupras and spans 
the period until 2010. 
Overall, Tupras performed better than Dogan Holding under all measurements over the 
ten year period. The overall performance was, however, largely contributed by a huge 
success of Tupras after its last phase of privatisation in 2006. As can be seen from panel 
C of table 4.2, over the first two SIPs in April 2000 and March 2005, the two firms did 
not seem to behave much differently in terms of growth rates of revenue and operating 
margin. The only difference worth noticing was that Dogan Holding operating income 
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to revenue ratio increased more speedily than Tupras in 2002 and 2003. In contrast, 
Tupras gained a consistent and rapid increase in both labour productivity and return on 
assets in comparison to Dogan Holding. Upon the completion of the direct sale 
privatisation in early 2006, Tupras grew quickly and at a higher pace than Dogan 
Holding under all measurements.
In short, it can be said that overall privatisation had a positive impact on Tupras 
operating performance, but direct sales method appears to outperform SIPs. This is, 
perhaps, due to the key benefit of the former method in maximising privatisation sale 
prices which is especially important for oil and gas firms.
4.4.2. Share Issuing and Tupras stock performance
This section aims to examine the impact of SIPs on Tupras stock returns both in the 
short run and long run. This is achieved by looking at the market reaction to firm 
privatisation announcements and to firm performance after part-privatisation. 
4.4.2.A. Short-term effects on stock returns
In order to analyse the short-term effects of a privatisation, the chapter tests the impact 
of a SIP announcement on the firm stock prices by utilising event studies techniques. It 
is worth noticing that in the ISE, privatised firms’ shares are suspended from trading a 
couple of days before and after the sales date. This is to allow investors time to review 
and assess the news. Thus, the event window will be a 2-day window over the business 
day prior to and after the day of announcement. The announcements considered for each 
event include the sales announcement and trading resumed announcement.
For details, table 4.3 shows the market reaction to two announcements on the sales of 
31.66% of Tupras in 5th -7th April, 2000 (Panel A) and of 14.76% shares in 4th March, 
2005 (Panel B). The announcement dates were 30/3/2000 and 2/3/2005 and the resumed 
trading dates were 13/4/2000 and 7/3/2005, respectively. During the trading halts, 
Tupras’s stock prices were kept unchanged and the rate of return therefore is marked as 
not applicable (n.a). The two-day rates of return are not adjusted for the overall market 
effects and industry price movements. However, as DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2000) 
among others point out, price changes due to the market and industry factors over two-
day windows are generally close to zero. Moreover, those effects could be considered 
by using the following two measurements. Besides Tupras two-day rate of return around 
the announcement date, the table also reports cumulative rates of return of the whole 
market (R1) and of a portfolio consisting of all Tupras’s competitors in Turkish oil and 
gas industry (R2) over the same period. All returns are value-weighted based on the 
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market value one-month prior to the portfolio formation dates. These could provide a 
picture of their movements around the announcement dates. 
From panel A of table 4.3, it seems that the first major public offering did not receive a 
positive response from the market. Both before and after the sale, the two-day rates of 
return were negative. The rate was much lower after the trading resumed at -12.67% 
comparing to -2.74% after the sale announcement. The rates were also lower than those 
of the market and industry index over the same period. This implies that investors did 
not seem to be very optimistic about the firm future after privatisation. Indeed, since the 
first IPO in 1991 when only 2.5% shares were sold, there had been a long period of 
privatisation failures in Turkey that made a sale unattractive to investors. Moreover, the 
legal system for protecting minority shareholders was weak and only developed as the 
number of privatisations started to grow. The market, therefore, did not seem to 
consider the sale as a positive turn for the firm performance. In addition, Tupras stocks 
kept performing badly after trading resumed because of the overall industry 
performance. As can be seen from panel A, the cumulative rate of return on the market 
index was much higher than on the industry index, 12.47% and 4.98%, respectively. 
In contrast, the second phase offering 14.76% of Tupras total shares on 4th March, 2005 
appeared to receive a more positive reaction from the market. In Panel B, not only that 
the two-day rates of return on Tupras stocks over the sales were positive, but they were 
also higher than both the market and industry indices. After the sales announcement, 
Tupras stocks gained 2.98%, higher than other oil and gas firms (1.16%) and the overall 
market (2.60%). The abnormal return was much higher after the sales results were 
released (6.36% compared to 2.13% and 5.00% respectively). In other words, Tupras 
stocks generated high returns during these periods due to the positive impact of 
privatisation in addition to the overall better performance of the oil and gas industry. It 
is interesting to note that 14.76% shares were sold to an international fund. This might 
somewhat contributed to the positive reaction of the market to the sale compared to the 
previous sales since Turkish investors tend to follow foreign investors’ choices.
4.4.2.B. Long-term stock returns
This section looks at Tupras stock returns during a 5-year horizon from 2000 to 2005 as 
well as those of the other three oil and gas firms in Turkey. Table 4.4 reports simple 
cumulative rates of return, compounded rates of return, cumulative abnormal returns 
and 5-year buy-and-hold compounded rates of return on a monthly basis. It also tests the 
difference in means between Tupras cumulative returns with those of the competitors. 
186
The cumulative rate of return refers to a simple average of monthly stock returns over 
the 5 year period while the compounded rate of return is calculated under the 
assumption that dividends are re-invested annually. Cumulative abnormal return, CAR1, 
is computed as the cumulative returns on the firm in question minus the cumulative 
return on the Market portfolio and CAR2 is equal to this minus the cumulative return of 
the equal-weighted portfolio consisting of the other three comparison firms. The last 
measurement is the 5-year rate of return calculated from a strategy in which one buys 
and holds the equity for the whole period without rebalancing. Accordingly, the only 
two prices that matter are those in the buying and the selling dates.
As can be seen from Table 4.4, Tupras performed better than both the market and its 
rivals in terms of compounded rates of return and 5-year buy-and-hold returns. Dogan 
Holding, however, generated a higher income if no dividends were re-invested. Both 
firms appeared to outperform the market portfolio and the portfolios consisting of only 
their competitors. 
In comparison to the average rates of return of the other three competitors, Tupras was 
the only firm that had higher returns than the average according to all measurements. 
For the purpose of extracting privatisation effects, the last two rows of the table 
exclusively compare Tupras stock returns to the average value over a 5-year period 
prior to the Tupras first SIP in 2000. From these, it can be said that Tupras stocks 
outperformed both the market and its competitors only after privatisation.
However, one might argue that it is difficult to conclude that the better performance is 
driven by privatisation. For example, although OMV also completed its privatisation in 
2000, the firm showed no sign of a better performance in the long run. Nonetheless, it is 
worth mentioning that in most cases, a privatisation procedure critically depends on 
firm conditions, and on buyers and sales targets set by its government. The impacts, 
therefore, are expected to vary from case to case. 
In the Tupras case, as discussed in section 4.4.1, it appears that privatisation did play a 
significant role in boosting the firm operating performance which in turn enhanced the 
firm position in the stock market. Moreover, the discussion so far has shown the 
outperformance of Tupras stocks over both the market and its peers after being 
privatised but not before. Hence, the evidence suggests that privatisation has contributed 
to enhance the firm stock performance in the long run.
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4.5. Direct sales analysis
4.5.1. The legal lessons
Firstly, Turkish privatisation would have been successful in the presence of a well-
developed legal framework. As mentioned in section 4.2, under the pressure for a quick 
economic reform required to access a 16.7 billion dollar loan from the IMF, Turkey was 
in need of speedy and high-revenue privatisations. Since Tupras was the biggest oil and 
gas firm in Turkey, the government hoped to sell the firm quickly while still 
maximising the sales price. At that point, block sale via auctions seemed to be an 
optimal option that satisfied both the timing and pricing requirements. However, a sale 
of 65.76% shares the government held at Tupras in 2003 was not successful due to lack 
of sufficient legal framework in implementing and monitoring the block sale 
privatisation.
The second lesson is compliance and monitoring. A critical role is played by a legal 
institution that can interfere in any privatisation process in Turkey, the Council of state. 
The Council is the only institution that can revoke the deal and is thus considered to 
have veto power against privatisations in Turkey. Of course, not every privatisation 
faces a veto: only if there is a case opened at the Council of state, will it be considered. 
Oker (2014) observes that in Turkey privatisations in high revenue sectors such as oil 
and gas tend to be challenged more often and Tupras in fact became a target.
As mentioned earlier, the process of privatising the last part of Tupras faced strenuous 
opposition from Petrol-IS, the labour union of Petroleum Chemical and Rubber 
Workers of Turkey. The Petro-IS trade Union had used the right to challenge the 
transaction results by opening a case at the Council of state. In the first attempt to sale 
51% shares of Tupras for a joint venture between a Russian company Tatneft and a 
local firm Zorlu Holding, Petrol-IS won the trial. As a result, a sale worth more than 1.3 
billion dollars was cancelled.
According to a statement made by the Ankara 10th Administrative Court on 24th May 
2004 (Law No. 2004/8257, Decision No. 2004/7618), the main reasons for the Court 
decision were that the auction process was not transparent, the deal did not serve the 
public interest and violated competition rules. First of all, the contract was supposed to 
conclude all information of the bidders in a 3-month period prior to entering the deal. 
However, the Russian partner, Tatneft, did not disclose information relating to its 
subsidiary, and Efremov Kautschuk did not report its capacity, production, capital and 
financial structure. Moreover, the tender proposal from Efremov included some 
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conditions while making conditions in tender letters is not allowed by Turkish 
privatisation law. Secondly, the Privatisation Administration chose a closed envelopes 
bid but there was no open bidding. The lack of transparency had gone against the 
competition rules. Thirdly, the method of payment was not clear in the tender letter. 
Finally, the auction did not seem to provide a necessary competitive environment when 
there were few bidders. In addition, Zorlu Holding, a joint winner, was believed to have 
entered the bid after the closing date. A lesson to be learnt from this unsuccessful 
attempt is the need for a more transparent and a stronger monitoring system over 
privatisation processes. 
The second attempt was more successful thanks to the past experience. Besides 
following all necessary procedures, the Privatisation Administration did put an effort to 
create a more transparent auction.
An open auction was broadcasted on television on the 14th September 2005 and the 
announcement was made by the Turkey privatisation agency OIB one week before the 
event. The nine bidders shortlisted were Indian Oil /Calik Enerji (multinational), Koc 
Holding /Shell /Aygaz /Opet Petrolculuk consortium (multinational), OMV (Australia), 
PKN Orlen (Poland), Eni (Italy), MOL group (Hungary), Oyak (Turkey), Anadolu 
Tasima Joint Initiative group (Turkey) and Tupras Acquisition /Petrol Ofisi (Turkey). 
This time, the number and variety of participants clearly offered a more competitive 
environment. The broadcasted opening bidding also served to ensure the transparency 
and compliance of the transaction.
Although the Petro-IS trade union opposed the sales again, claiming that an 
arrangement on oil importing price between Shell and Koc Holding could damage the 
country interest and its employee rights, the Court decided that the claim was not based 
on legal grounds and that the privatisation result was still valid.
Last but not least, a final lesson from the analysis so far concerns the appropriate choice 
of privatisation methods. Once there is a sufficient legal framework supporting the 
privatisation process, direct sale privatisation did not only maximise the sales price but 
also boosted the firm performance. Compared to other privatisation methods, the direct 
sale method outperformed the SIPs method in terms of the timing and pricing objectives 
set by the government.
4.5.2. Long-term effects on stock performance
Generally, a full privatisation is expected to bring major changes to a firm in the long 
run, especially in terms of firm structure and management. Hence, this section will pay 
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more attention to the long-term stock performance of Tupras after the sales which 
transferred the firm completely from state-owned to private hands in 2006. This section 
uses a similar method to the previous tests on short-term effects and the results are 
summarised in table 4.5.
Table 4.5 reports Tupras average stock returns in relation to those of the market and oil 
and gas industry index 5 years after being fully privatised. According to the table, with 
the exception of Dogan Holding, other oil and gas firms seemed to perform relatively 
well, generating more than 2% returns on average, and a slightly lower compounded 
return rate at about 1.1% per month. Among them, Tupras was ranked at the second 
position after Turcas. It is, however, worth mentioning that Turcas was the smallest firm 
among the four, being less than one-tenth the size of Tupras in terms of market value. 
Also, while Tupras shares were traded at the significant higher price of TRY 38.6 per 
share, the share price of Turcas was only TRY 3.86 per share, Dogan Holding was 
traded at TRY 1.12 and OMV at about TRY 6.6 per share as at the end of 2010. Thus, 
the actual returns received by investing in Tupras will be much higher than the rest. 
In addition, comparing to the previous 5 years, Tupras also offered a higher return. The 
compounded rates of return over both one-month and 5-year buy-and-hold periods were 
at the rate of about 1.4%, whilst they were 1.1% and 1.3% previously. The abnormal 
returns over the market and the industry index during 2006-2010 were also higher at
0.75% and 0.22%, respectively, compared to 0.40% and 0.57% over the previous period 
from 2000-2005. The better performance of Tupras after adjusting for the market and 
industry movement might signal a better firm management and a positive reaction of the 
market to its privatisation.
4.6. The roles of family ownership
After taking over more than 50% shares of Tupras, Koc Holding has systematically 
changed the firm management and investment styles. This section discusses these 
changes in detail and their possible impacts from the firm’s shareholders prospective. 
In terms of management, all members of the Board of Directors including chairman and 
general manager were replaced with more members of the Koc family in the Board. 
Accordingly, Mr Omer M. Koc was appointed as the new Chairman and Mr Yavuz 
Erkuet as the General Manager. As can be seen from Figure 4.4 that details Tupras 
organisation chart, there are at least four members of the Koc family holding key 
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positions in the Board of Directors while most of other members were transferred from 
the Koc Holding Board of Directors, such as Semahat Arsel, O. Turgay Durak and 
Temel K. Atay. Also, most committee members used to be key personnel at Koc 
Holding. Kutsan Celebican, for example, was the President of the Finance Group at Koc 
group before becoming an independent member at Tupras.
Because of the significant amount of shares it holds in Tupras, the Koc family has 
incentives and power to introduce a new dividend policy and direct the firm toward 
longer-term projects that are apparently more beneficial to long-term investors. On one 
hand, after full privatisation in 2006, a new policy to better protect shareholders was 
launched. The duration that a Board member can stay in office was shortened to one 
year instead of two years. Also, Tupras has the policy of equal voting rights on shares, 
no veto or golden shares, and equal treatments policy for minority shareholders. On the 
other hand, the firm has “reference” shareholders who have the majority of the voting 
rights. In terms of dividends, Table 4.6 shows that dividends tend to be made in cash 
rather than bonuses or rights issues which were commonly used before privatisation. 
Regarding investment styles, Koc Holding doubled the amount of capital put in Tupras 
during the previous period (277.8 million dollars between 2006 and 2010 in comparison 
to 144.6 million dollars during the 2001-2005 period). Nonetheless, the corporation 
seems to aim at very long-term investors, including the owner family themselves, when 
it comes to choosing investment projects. Although the oil and gas sector may require 
huge capital and long-term investment, many projects at Tupras could take more than 
10 years before starting to yield any income for the firm.
Moreover, as can be seen from table 4.6, Tupras tends to retain increasingly high 
earnings to fund new projects, especially under the Koc Holding management. While 
the retained earnings over a 10 year period up to 2000 were about TRY 753 million, 
these increased to TRY 2,093 million in the following 5 years and TRY 3,492 million in 
the last 5 years of the sample. Since more shares are trading in the stock market, it is 
expected that dividend payment would increase over time. However, in relation to the 
firm net income, the dividend payout ratio was particularly low under the Koc Holding 
management. While the firm paid about TRY 2.26 million in dividend during 2006-
2010, increased by 79% from TRY 1.26 million in 2001-2005, the dividend payout was 
down to 0.66 from the previous value of 0.75. 
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Furthermore, besides increasing investment expenses which squeezed the firm profits, 
Tupras also increased borrowing by more than four times from TRY 477 million to 
TRY 1,659 million under the new management. These do not seem to give a positive 
signal to the market and therefore, investors may not expect a high return from trading 
Tupras shares.
Overall, unless shareholders have a very long investment horizon, the new investment 
style clearly does not serve the benefits of medium-term investors both in terms of 
dividend earnings and stock returns.
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4.7. Conclusions and Implications
Although the history of privatisation can be traced back to the 1960s, more recent 
announcements of privatisation continue to create a great deal of debate, opposition and 
lessons to be learnt. Perhaps, this is due to the nature of privatisation deals as they are 
different case by case. Additionally, recent privatisations appear to offer a more 
interesting insight with the involvement of new sectors and new economic elites, such 
as family firms and cross-border consortiums. Thus, this chapter aims to study this 
programme by applying a case study approach to one of those interesting deals.
From 1991 to 2006, the Tupras privatisation went through several stages, using direct 
sale and share issuing methods. It was finally taken over by Koc Holding, one of the 
biggest business groups in Turkey run by the Koc family. As the privatisation process 
spanned over a period of nearly 15 years, it has an advantage of providing sufficient 
testing intervals between each privatisation phase. The involvement of a family firm in 
Tupras also raises much concern about the interests of the firm and of its existing 
shareholders.
Overall, the empirical results show that privatisation had a positive impact in boosting 
the firm revenue and productivity. The direct sale method appeared to be the most 
effective method to privatise an oil and gas firm. In terms of stock performance, it is not 
surprising that the immediate reaction of the market to the privatisation was not positive 
due to a long experience of privatisation failure in Turkey. Over a 2-day window, 
Tupras stocks underperformed both the market and the industry index. However, in the 
long run, investors benefited from a long period of high profit even after the stock 
returns are adjusted for the market and industry index movement. 
More importantly, the privatisation case of Tupras, which faced much opposition and 
difficulties before its privatisation completion in 2006, could provide a number of 
lessons for a successful privatisation. These pertain to the need for a sufficient legal 
framework, for a transparent process and for a suitable privatisation method that well 
serves the government’s pre-set objectives. 
Finally, the findings of this chapter suggest that the involvement of a family firm in 
privatisation may also affect the stock performance of the firm and the benefits to the 
other shareholders. After the ownership transfer, Tupras saw a significant change 
enacted by the new owner family in terms of both its organisational structure and its 
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operations strategy. As the Koc family became involved, all Board members were 
replaced with Koc family members in the leading roles. However, there are reasons for 
concern about the interests of existing shareholders, especially those with a shorter 
investment horizon. On one hand, their long-term investment style of the Koc family 
and its dividend policy present the typical characteristics of a family business. On the 
other hand, according to the Tupras new operations strategy, unless the shareholders’ 
investment horizon is in line with that of the owner family and unless they intend to 
keep its shares for at least ten years, they would not benefit from the firm long-term 
investment projects and may even suffer from a much lower dividend payout. From a 
legal point of view, the Koc family did not violate the law or damage the firm; however 
from the shareholders standpoint, when there is a family involvement, it is important 
that their investment horizon is matched with that of the owner family.
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Figure 4.1: Privatisation revenues by years
Source: Privatisation Administration, Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry.
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Figure 4.2: Privatisation gross revenues by methods
53%
26%
18%
3% 0%
Block Sale Asset Sale SIPs ISE Sale Incompleted Asset Sale
Data: Privatisation Administration, Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry.
196
Figure 4.3: Koc Holding Organisation chart
Source: Company annual report 2012.
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Figure 4.4: Tupras Organisation chart
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Table 4.1: Tupras production
The table briefly reports the capacity, product segmentation and market share owned 
by Tupras at the end of 2010. Refining capacity is the total capacity in barrels per 
day (mbpd) of all four refineries owned by Tupras.
Segment Total
Refining capacity (mbpd) 560
- Izmit refinery 220
- Kirikkale refinery 100
- Izmir refinery 220
- Batman refinery 20
Output (mbpd) 547.38
- Distillates 209.59
- Diesel 98.07
- Gasoline 107.16
- Other 132.56
Revenue (millions TRY) 26,218.72
- Refineries 22,679.53
- Transportation 4,227.14
- Adjustments -687.95
Domestic market share 
- Gasoline 83%
- Jet fuel 89%
- Fuel oil (except bunker oil) 96%
- Asphalt 99%
- Low sulphur diesel 56%
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Table 4.2: Tupras performance 
Table 4.2 summaries the operating performance of Tupras over three periods of 
its privatisation process and in comparison to its rivals.
Panel A shows the geometric average rate of change in Tupras’s revenue 
growth rate and cumulative average of change in other accounting performance, 
such as operating margin and return on assets over three stages of the firm’s 
privatisation. Operating margin is measured by operating profit divided by net 
sales. Labour productivity is defined as actual sales per employee. Enterprise 
value refers to the total market value of the firm, including all liabilities and 
equities minus cash and cash equivalents. The far right column shows the 
average rate of change over the full sample period from July 1991 to December 
2010. 
Panel B compares the four oil and gas firms in Turkey in terms of corporate 
structure and value as at the end of fiscal year 2010. Although to date, all four 
firms are private firms, two of them are the results of privatisation. Market 
capitalization is the share price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding. 
Volatility rating measures the degree of share price changes over the previous 
12 month, and scored from 1 to 20 with 1 is the least risky stocks in 
DataStream.
Panel C reports the operating performance of Tupras in comparison to a similar 
firm in the industry, partly controlled by a family, but does not involve 
privatisation, Dogan Holding. The far right column of the panel gives the 
geometric growth rate of annual sales revenue, the average mean of operating 
margin, labour productivity and return  on assets ratios over 2001 to 2010.
Entries marked ‘n.d’ indicates the data were not disclosed for the 
corresponding year.
Panel A: Tupras operating performance before and after privatisation
1991-2000 2001-2005 2006-2010
1991-2010 
change
Revenue growth rate 
(%)
8.55 3.13 12.00 8.01
Operating margin -0.63 -0.01 0.04 -0.32
Labour productivity (%) 1.32 6.17 9.41 5.63
Return on Assets -0.50 -0.02 0.05 -0.25
Export sales 0.09 0.45 0.19 0.21
Net income -0.70 0.12 0.19 -0.27
Enterprise value 0.39 0.11 0.09 0.23
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Panel B: Tupras and three comparison oil and gas firms
Year of fully 
privatisation
Family involvement/ 
Percentage of family 
ownership
Total 
Assets
Total 
Liabilities
Market 
capitalisation
Enterprise 
value
Volatility Number of 
employees
Millions 
TRY
Millions 
TRY
Millions 
TRY
Millions 
TRY
Score 
1 to 20
Persons
Tupras 2005 Koc family/ 10% 13,918 10,017 9,666 6,662 5 5,480
OMV Petrol-AS 
(POAS)
2000 Dogan family/ 6% 6,597 4,405 3,812 6,655 5 954
Dogan Holding N/A Dogan family/ 11% 7,936 3,315 2,744 1,972 7 n.d
Turcas Petrol N/A Aksoy family/ >40% 561 14 869 735 6 34
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Panel C: Tupras and Dogan Holding
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2001-2010 
A. Revenue growth rate
Dogan Holding 0.38 -0.03 -0.03 0.09 0.27 0.23 -0.14 0.21 -0.17 -0.72 -0.06
Tupras -0.15 -0.07 0.47 0.09 0.29 0.35 0.12 0.35 -0.33 0.29 0.11
B. Operating Margin (%)
Dogan Holding 2.21 6.05 8.11 5.61 2.90 2.07 1.97 2.44 0.59 -2.84 2.91
Tupras 3.73 3.78 3.99 6.51 5.30 4.16 5.64 4.05 4.68 4.40 4.62
C. Change in Labour 
productivity
Dogan Holding 1.24 -0.16 -0.06 -0.15 0.60 0.25 -0.41 n.d n.d n.d n.d
Tupras -0.33 0.09 0.04 0.13 0.37 0.04 0.13 0.36 -0.31 0.24 0.08
D. Change in Return on Assets
Dogan Holding -3.97 1.30 4.20 2.16 6.45 11.21 4.66 0.72 -1.13 7.47 3.31
Tupras 7.20 5.93 10.58 12.74 11.88 12.92 16.15 4.88 8.60 6.11 9.70
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Table 4.3: Short-term effects of Share Issue Privatisations on stock performance
The table summarises the stock market reaction to Tupras’s two main Share Issue Privatisations
(SIPs) in 7th April 2000 and 4th March 2005, which transferred a total of 49% of shares to the 
public. The two-day return is the raw rate of return over the business day prior to and the day in 
question. Cumulative rate of return, R1 (and R2), refers to the cumulative return on the value-
weighted return of the ISE-All share index (of the comparison firms) from the business day 
prior to the trading halt to the day in question. Entries marked n.a are not applicable.
Panel A: 7th April 2000 SIP
Sales date Two-day 
return
Cumulative rate of 
return
Description
R1 R2
31/3/2000 -2.74% 1.53% 1.58%
Last date of trading before trading 
halt for the sales of 31.66% of Tupras 
shares.
5/4/2000 n.a 0.93% 0.19%
The Administration started received 
applications
7/4/2000 n.a 7.62% 7.41%
Completion of the sale for nearly 
1,105 million USD.
13/4/2000 -12.67% 12.47% 4.08% Tupras stocks resumed trading.
Panel B: 4th March 2005 SIP
Sales date Two-day 
return
Cumulative rate of 
return
Description
R1 R2
3/3/2005 2.98% 1.16% 2.60%
Last date of trading before trading halt 
for the sales of 14.76% of Tupras 
shares.
4/3/2005 n.a 1.60% 3.71%
Completion of the sale to foreign 
investors for 454 million USD.
7/3/2005 6.36% 2.13% 5.00% Tupras stocks resumed trading.
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Table 4.4: Long-term stock performance and three comparison firms
The table reports the average stock return of Tupras over a 5-year period from April 2000 to March 2005 inclusive (except the last 2 rows are from February 
1995 to March 2000), and this of three comparison oil and gas firms during the same period. CAR1 equals to cumulative returns on the firm in question minus 
cumulative return on the Market portfolio. CAR2 is the cumulative abnormal return of the firm in question over the cumulative return of equal-weighted portfolio 
consisting of the other three comparison firms. The Difference in mean is t-test on the difference in means between the average cumulative rate of return on 
Tupras stock and this of each firm. The Average shows the simple average of return rate of three comparison firms and the subsequent row compares Tupras’s 
stock return to the Average. The last two rows exclusively report the return differential between Tupras over the Average of its three rivals for the 5-year period 
prior to March 2000. All rates of return are on a monthly basis.
Firms Cumulative 
rate of return
Compounded 
rate of return
Cumulative Abnormal Return 5-year buy-and-
hold rate of return 
Difference in 
mean
t-statistics
CAR1 CAR2
Tupras 2.16% 1.14% 0.40% 0.57% 1.30% - -
OMV Petrol-AS (POAS) 1.04% -0.55% -0.72% -0.93% -0.27% 1.12% 0.585
Dogan Holding 2.43% -0.47% 0.66% 0.92% -0.18% -0.26% -0.107
Turcas Petrol 1.32% -0.58% -0.44% -0.56% -0.53% 0.84% 0.454
Average 1.60% -0.53% -0.17% -0.19% -0.33%
Relative to the Average above above Above above above
1995-2000 -0.38% -0.10% -1.62% -0.19% -0.11%
Tupras relative to the Ave. below below Below below below
*: significant at 10% level           **: significant at 5% level             ***: significant at 1% level
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Table 4.5: Long-term effects of Direct Sales Privatisations on Tupras stock performance and three comparison firms
The table reports the average stock return of Tupras over a 5-year period from January 2006 to December 2010 inclusive, and this of three comparison oil and gas 
firms during the same period. CAR1 equals to cumulative returns on the firm in question minus cumulative return on the Market portfolio. CAR2 is the 
cumulative abnormal return of the firm in question over the cumulative return of equal-weighted portfolio consisting of the other three comparison firms. The 
Difference in mean is t-test on the difference in means between the average cumulative rate of return on Tupras stock and this of each firm. The Average shows 
the simple average of return rate of three comparison firms and the last row compares Tupras’s stock return to the Average. All rates of return are on a monthly 
basis.
Firms Cumulative 
rate of return
Compounded 
rate of return
Cumulative Abnormal Return 5-year buy-and-
hold rate of return 
Difference in 
mean
t-statistics
CAR1 CAR2
Tupras 2.06% 1.42% 0.75% 0.22% 1.41% - -
OMV Petrol-AS (POAS) 2.15% 1.16% 0.84% 0.34% 1.15% -0.09% -0.050
Dogan Holding 0.41% -0.37% -0.91% -1.99% -0.36% 1.65% 1.042
Turcas Petrol 2.97% 1.76% 1.65% 1.43% 1.75% -0.91% -0.485
Average 1.84% 0.85% 0.52% -0.07% 0.84%
Relative to the Average above above above above above
*: significant at 10% level           **: significant at 5% level             ***: significant at 1% level
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Table 4.6: Dividend policy
The table presents the average amount of retained earnings, dividend payout, debt and new 
investment per year, and the change in dividend payout ratio over three main stages of 
Tupras’s privatisation. The last column reports the average figures over the entirely period 
from 1991 to 2010. Earnings, debt and dividend payout are in millions TRY, investment 
expenses are shown in million US dollars.
1991-2000 2001-2005 2006-2010 1991-2010 
(Ave.)
Retained earnings 753.19 2,093.44 3,491.54 1,772.84
Dividend payout ratio 0.70 0.75 0.66 0.70
Dividend payout:
- Regular cash
- Bonus
- Rights issue
0.97
0.01
0.53
0.43
1.26
0.79
0.47
2.26
2.26
Total debt 659.58 476.96 1,658.57 863.67
Investment (millions USD) 101.0 144.6 277.8 155.6
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Appendix 1: Data definitions
Data type Abs DataStream definitions
DataStream 
Mnemonic
Ticker 
symbol
Ticker symbol represents a symbol used to 
identify the company on the stock 
exchanges where it is listed. Local Ticker 
symbols are used for non-US corporations. 
ISIN
Base or start 
date
The base date is the date from which 
DataStream holds information about the 
stock issuing. Stocks are rebased in 
accordance to events of mergers, 
acquisitions and splitting off. It is used to 
calculate firms’ age.
BDATE
Sector Datastream classifies each company by 
industry (that is, its primary activity only). 
Equities with the same industrial 
classification are grouped into sectors. 
Datastream industrial classifications exist at 
six levels and this chapter classifies firms up 
to level 3 which consists of the following 
sectors
1. Resources
2. Basic industries
3. Cyclical consumer goods
4. Non-cyclical consumer goods
5. Cyclical services
6. Non-cyclical services
7. Utilities
8. Information technology
9. Financials 
ICBSN
Return Index A return index shows a theoretical growth in 
value of a share held over a specified period, 
assuming that dividends are re-invested to 
purchase additional units of the equity at the 
closing price applicable on the ex-dividend 
RI
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date.
Price Index P Price market index differs from Return index 
in the way that it does not assume dividends 
are re-invested
PI
Market 
capitalization/ 
Market value
MV The share price multiplied by the total 
number of shares outstanding
WC08001
Book-to-
Market equity
B/M The balance sheet value divided by the 
market value of the ordinary (common) 
equity
WC03501#
Earnings per 
Price
E/P The earnings rate per share divided by the 
price of the ordinary (common) equity
PE#
Dividend 
yield
DY A ratio in percentage of the total amount of 
dividends weighted by the total market value 
WC05101
1 month 
London 
Interbank 
Offered Rate 
1month 
LIBOR
(Rf)
The average interbank rate at which a 
selection of banks on the London money 
market charge one another for loans with 1 
month maturity, and is used in this thesis as 
a proxy for the Risk-free asset.
BOELI1M
Total Asset Represent the sum of total current assets, 
long term receivables, investment in 
unconsolidated subsidiaries, other 
investments, net property plant and 
equipment and other assets.
WC02999
Employees Represent the number of both full and part 
time employees of the company.
It excludes:
Seasonal employees
Emergency employees
WC07011
Sales Represent gross sales and other operating 
revenue less discounts, returns and 
allowances. 
DWSL 
Total Cash 
flow
Consist of:
Net Cash flow Financing: represents the 
net cash receipts and disbursements 
resulting from reduction and/or increase in 
long or short term debt, proceeds from sale 
WC04890
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of stock, stock 
repurchased/redeemed/retired, dividends 
paid and other financing activities.
Net Cash flow Investing: represents the 
net cash receipts and disbursements 
resulting from capital expenditures, 
decrease/increase from investments, 
disposal of fixed assets, increase in other 
assets and other investing activities.
Net Cash flow Operating Activities:
represent the net cash receipts and 
disbursements resulting from the operations 
of the company. It is the sum of Funds 
from Operations, Funds From/Used for 
Other Operating Activities and 
Extraordinary Items.
It includes but is not restricted to:
Funds from operations
Funds from/for working capital
Extraordinary items
Data for this field is generally not available 
prior to 1989.
WC04870
WC04860
Working 
capital
Represents the difference between current 
assets and current liabilities. It is a measure 
of liquidity and solvency.
WC03151
Data type Bloomberg database
% Shares 
owned 
directly by 
Insiders
The percentage of shares owned by the individuals who 
are in the firm management.
Example: To get the percentage of shares directly held by 
insiders of , for example, Anel Telekomunik company 
(Ticker ANELT), the following formula in Excel with a 
Bloomberg Add-in
=BDP("ANELT TI Equity","PCT_INSIDER_SHARES_OUT")
List of 
companies by 
sectors
Using Bloomberg’s private company screening tool, run {PSRC 
<GO>} and then filter by sector/industry by selecting oil and gas 
industry.
Company 
data
To obtain Tupras’s (code TUPRS in Bloomberg) financial 
statements and other company information, in Bloomberg 
station, start from TUPRS TI Equity FA IS <GO>.
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For Tupras historical dividends from 01/01/1991 to 
31/12/2010, use the following formula in Excel:
=BDS("TUPRS TI Equity","DVD_HIST_ALL", 
"DVD_END_DT=20101231", 
"DVD_START_DT=19910101")
#: DataStream Mnemonic provides the reciprocals
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Appendix 2: Variable definitions
Variables Abs Variable construction
High-minus-
Low
HML The mimic the risk factor in returns associated with B/M. 
At the end of July of year t, stocks are divided into 3 
groups using the breakpoints: 30%, 40% and 30% based 
on their B/M in June. The 1 month allows the factor to 
capture underlying risks but still can differentiate from 
Value and Growth portfolios which are built with a 6 
month lag. The monthly portfolio returns are value 
weighted by market value at the end of June, year t. The 
return differential between the top 30% B/M stocks and the 
bottom 30% (i.e. HML) means to capture the B/M effect.
Small-
minus-Big
SMB The mimic the risk factor in returns associated with size 
(i.e. market capitalization). At the end of July of year t, 
stocks are split into 2 groups by the median. The 1 month 
allows the factor to capture underlying risks and also avoid 
possible biases caused by asymmetric way of treating 
HML and SMB factors. The monthly portfolio returns are 
value weighted by the market value at the end of June, year 
t. The return differential between the small-cap stocks and 
the large-cap (i.e. SMB) means to capture the size effect.
Dividend
yield
DIV The monthly value-weighted Dividend return, which is the 
aggregate dividend divided by current stock price.
Short – term 
Treasury bill 
yield
STBill The weighted average auction rate on 3-month Turkish 
Treasury bills. The monthly rate is calculated using 
compounding interest rate formula from 3-month Treasury 
bill rate provided by DataStream (Mnemonic code: 
TKOIR077R)
Term spread TERM The variable means to capture the risk factor in returns 
associated with changes in interest rates. It is the difference 
between the yields of a long-term and a short-term 
Government bond. Turkish Government Bonds are sold in 
auctions and long-term bonds are bonds with maturity 
from 12-61 months and short –term ones are 3-month 
bonds. The choice of bond maturity in each period aims to 
maximise data availability while ensure representative 
purposes.
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Auction reports are obtained from the Central Bank of the 
Republic of Turkey
http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/yeni/evds/piyasaing.html
Default 
spread
DEF The mimic the default risk factor in returns. At the end of 
July of year t, stocks are divided into 3 groups using the 
breakpoints: 30%, 40% and 30% based on their probability 
of bankruptcy, measured by O-scores at the end of 
December year t-1. The 6 month lag allows delayed release 
of financial reports which is common. The return 
differential between the highest 30% O-score stocks and 
the lowest 30% O-score stocks means to capture the 
default spread. The monthly portfolio returns are value 
weighted by the market value at the end of June, year t.
Changes in 
Term spread
ΔTERM
ΔTERMt = TERMt – TERMt-1
Changes in 
Default 
spread
Δ DEF
ΔDEFt = -(DEFt – DEFt-1)
Turnover TURN The mimic the liquidity risk factor in returns. At the end of 
July of year t, stocks are divided into 3 groups using the 
breakpoints: 30%, 40% and 30% based on their turnover 
ratio at the end of June, measured by trading volume 
divided by the number of shares outstanding. The return 
differential between the lowest 30% turnover stocks and 
the highest 30% turnover stocks means to capture the 
liquidity risk. The monthly portfolio returns are value 
weighted by the market value at the end of June, year t.
Winner-
minus-Loser
WML The mimic the momentum factor of Jegadeesh and Titman
(1993) in returns. 11-month past returns are used to 
classify the winners from the losers. The return differential 
between the top 30% stocks and the bottom 30% stocks 
means to capture the momentum effects. The monthly 
portfolio returns are calculated at July, year t with 1-month 
lag and value weighted by the market value at the end of 
June, year t.
Firm age Ln(Age) Firm age is the natural logarithm of number of months 
firms have been listed in the ISE according to DataStream 
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records.
Stock price
Ln (1/P) Ln (1/P) is the natural logarithm of the reciprocal of the 
share price at month t-2.
Family firm 
dummy
DFamily The binary variable takes value of 1 when the firm is a 
family firm and value of zero otherwise.
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Appendix 3: RATS codes modified from Lee and Strazicich (2003) Unit root test 
with breaks
Five National indices including the ISE National 100 (denoted ise), the FTSE 100 (ftse), 
the Nikkei 225 (nikkei), the DAX 30 (dax) and the S&P 500 (sp) are examined with 
maximum lags of 8. Monthly data are obtained from DataStream Thomson Reuters, 
covering the period from January 1988 to December 2010. The Lee and Strazicich’s 
codes have been modified for testing monthly return data as followed.
calendar 1988 1 12
allocate 2010:12
open data unitroot.xls
data(FORMAT=XLS,ORG=COLUMNS) /ise ftse nikkei dax sp
source(noecho) LS_UROOT.src
@LS_UROOT(model=1,break=1,lags=8,method=gtos,print=0) ise;
@LS_UROOT(model=1,break=1,lags=8,method=gtos,print=1) ise;
@LS_UROOT(model=2,break=0,lags=0,method=gtos,print=1) ise;
@LS_UROOT(model=1,break=1,lags=8,method=gtos,print=1) ise;
@LS_UROOT(model=1,break=2,lags=8,method=gtos,print=1) ise;
@LS_UROOT(model=2,break=1,lags=8,method=gtos,print=1) ise;
@LS_UROOT(model=2,break=2,lags=8,method=gtos,print=1) ise;
dec series timetot timeavg; set timetot 1 276 = 0.; set timeavg 1 276 = 0.;
do country = 1, 5
set x = [series]country
do month = 1, 276
com timetot(month)= timetot(month)+x(month)
end do month
end do country
do month = 1, 276
com timeavg(month) = timetot(month)/5
end do month
do dgp = 1, 2
do country = 1, 5
set y = [series]country
com l$ = %l(country)
dis; dis l$
dofor j = 1 to 3
dofor i = 1 to 2
set dly = y - timeavg
if dgp == 1 {; @LS_UROOT(model=i,break=j-1,lags=8,method=gtos,print=0) y; }
if dgp == 2 {; @LS_UROOT(model=i,break=j-1,lags=8,method=gtos,print=0) dly;}
       end dofor i
       dis; dis "-----------"
       end dofor j
dis; dis "*************************************************************** "
end do country
end do dgp
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Appendix 4: Excel VBA codes to calculate firms’ O-score from annual accounting 
data
1- Calculate O-score for individual firms
Sub Oscore() ' Calculate O-Score
    Dim i, j, d, g As Integer 'd,g are dummies take 1 or 0
    For i = 1 To Range("os").Rows.Count 'i la moi firm
        For j = 1 To Range("os").Columns.Count 'j= years, Starting from 1989
         If IsNumeric(Range("TotalAssets").Cells(i, j).Value) = True And _
            IsNumeric(Range("TotalLia").Cells(i, j).Value) = True And _
            IsNumeric(Range("CurrentAss").Cells(i, j).Value) = True And _
            IsNumeric(Range("CurrentLia").Cells(i, j).Value) = True And _
            IsNumeric(Range("FundOper").Cells(i, j).Value) = True And _
            IsNumeric(Range("GNP").Cells(j).Value) = True And _
            IsNumeric(Range("NetIncome2").Cells(i, j).Value) = True And _
            IsNumeric(Range("NetIncome2").Cells(i, j + 1).Value) = True And _
            IsNumeric(Range("NetIncome2").Cells(i, j + 2).Value) = True And _
            IsNumeric(Range("WorkingCap").Cells(i, j).Value) = True And _
            IsEmpty(Range("TotalAssets").Cells(i, j).Value) = False And _
            IsEmpty(Range("TotalLia").Cells(i, j).Value) = False And _
            IsEmpty(Range("CurrentAss").Cells(i, j).Value) = False And _
            IsEmpty(Range("CurrentLia").Cells(i, j).Value) = False And _
            IsEmpty(Range("FundOper").Cells(i, j).Value) = False And _
            IsEmpty(Range("GNP").Cells(j).Value) = False And _
            IsEmpty(Range("NetIncome2").Cells(i, j + 2).Value) = False And _
            IsEmpty(Range("NetIncome2").Cells(i, j + 1).Value) = False And _
            IsEmpty(Range("NetIncome2").Cells(i, j).Value) = False And _
            IsEmpty(Range("WorkingCap").Cells(i, j).Value) = False Then
           
            If Range("TotalLia").Cells(i, j).Value > Range("TotalAssets").Cells(i, j).Value Then
            d = 1
            Else: d = 0
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            End If
            
            If Range("NetIncome2").Cells(i, j).Value < 0 And Range("NetIncome2").Cells(i, j + 1).Value < 0 Then
                g = 1
            Else: g = 0
            End If
            Range("os").Cells(i, j).Value = -1.32 - 0.407 * Log((Range("TotalAssets").Cells(i, j).Value / 
Range("GNP").Cells(j).Value)) / Log(10) _
                                           + 6.03 * (Range("TotalLia").Cells(i, j).Value / Range("TotalAssets").Cells(i, j).Value) _
                                          - 1.43 * (Range("WorkingCap").Cells(i, j).Value / Range("TotalAssets").Cells(i, j).Value) 
_
                                          + 0.076 * (Range("CurrentLia").Cells(i, j).Value / Range("CurrentAss").Cells(i, j).Value) _
                                          - 1.72 * (d) _
                                          - 2.37 * (Range("NetIncome2").Cells(i, j + 2).Value / Range("TotalAssets").Cells(i, 
j).Value) _
                                          - 1.83 * (Range("FundOper").Cells(i, j).Value / Range("TotalLia").Cells(i, j).Value) _
                                          + 0.285 * (g) _
                                          - 0.521 * (Range("NetIncome2").Cells(i, j + 2).Value - Range("NetIncome2").Cells(i, j + 
1).Value) / _
                    (Abs((Range("NetIncome2").Cells(i, j + 2).Value)) + Abs((Range("NetIncome2").Cells(i, j + 1).Value)))
        Else: Range("os").Cells(i, j).Value = "x"
        End If
        
        Next j
    Next i
     
End Sub
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2- Pick and match firms’ O-scores for each year
Function CountFirms1sheet()
    Dim m, i As Integer
    m = 0
    i = 1
    Do While IsEmpty(Cells(i, 1)) = False 
          m = m + 1
          i = i + 1
    Loop
    CountFirms1sheet = m - 1 
End Function
Sub PickOscoreAllSHEETsaccordingtoCode()
    Dim n, i, j, k, f, e, b, a, z As Integer
    Dim h, c, t As String
    Dim g As Date
    Dim d As Integer
    Dim ws As Worksheet
    Dim s As Boolean
        
    Workbooks("O score.final").Activate             
    Sheets("O Score").Select
    a = Range("NamdCode").Rows.Count - 1            
    b = Range("OscoreValues").Columns.Count
            
    Workbooks("O-score.Each year").Activate
    For Each ws In Worksheets
        Workbooks("O-score.Each year").Activate
        ws.Select
        f = 0
        n = CountFirms1sheet                                   
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        For i = 1 To n 
            Workbooks("O-score.Each year").Activate
            ws.Select
            h = Cells(i + 1, 3).Text
            
            'If IsEmpty(h) = False Then
            
                ''Workbooks("O score.final").Activate             
                ''Sheets("O Score").Select
                ''a = Range("NamdCode").Rows.Count - 1
                For j = 1 To a 'or Range("NamdCode").Columns.Count   
                             
                Workbooks("O score.final").Activate        
                Sheets("O Score").Select
                c = Cells(j + 4, 3).Text 
                
                If h = c Then
                    ''Workbooks("O score.final").Activate    
                    ''Sheets("O Score").Select
                    ''b = Range("OscoreValues").Columns.Count
                    
                        Workbooks("O-score.Each year").Activate 
                        ws.Select
                        g = Cells(1, 5).Value 
                   
                    For e = 1 To b        
                        Workbooks("O score.final").Activate 
                        Sheets("O Score").Select
                        'Range("OscoreValues").Select
                        d = Range("OscoreValues").Cells(1, e).Value 'K    'd = CDate(t)
                        
                        If d = Year(g) - 1 Then
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                            k = e
                            
                            Workbooks("O score.final").Activate 
                            Sheets("O Score").Select
                            'Range("OscoreValues").Select
                            f = Range("OscoreValues").Cells(j + 1, e).Value
                            'If IsEmpty(f) = False Then
                                
                                Workbooks("O-score.Each year").Activate 
                                ws.Select
                                Cells(i + 1, 4).Value = f
                                Exit For 
                            'Else: Exit For
                        End If
                         Next e
                Exit For
                End If
            Next j
         'End If
        Next i
                
    Next ws
    
End Sub
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